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Abstract
The central claim of this thesis is that concepts, the components from which
cognitively significant truth evaluable content (thought) is composed, are unstructured
entities an account of whose individuation makes no essential reference to other
concepts in the possession of the thinking subject or to any particular means by which
the reference of the concept is identified by the thinking subject. This position is called
Conceptual Atomism and contrasts with Inferential Role Semantics, according to
which concepts are individuated by their inferential roles or their conditions of
warranted application.
The structure of the argument is as follows. Firstly, a principle called the
Transparency Principle is developed. This places constraints on the individuation of
concepts across differing contexts. The Transparency Principle is then used to show
that Inferential Role Semantics is false because it cannot provide a satisfactory account
of cognitive dynamics; that is, of the conditions under which a concept is retained
through changes in the epistemic state of the subject over a period of time. A version
of Conceptual Atomism is then defended and it is shown that this theory yields the
correct individuation of concepts. According to this theory the concepts of an
individual subject are individuated in terms of referential episodes, episodes of
ongoing reference to an object or property during which it is diachronically transparent
to the subject that the same thing is being referred to. The more general notion of a
referential practice is then used to account for the sharing of concepts by more than
one person. Finally, a novel account of the thoughts expressed using indexical terms is
defended in order to show that indexicals present no counterexample to Conceptual
Atomism. This account of indexical thoughts is of some consequence in its own right.
Introduction
Frege's idea is that being in the same epistemic state may require different things of us at
different times; the changing circumstances force us to change in order to keep hold of a
constant reference and a constant thought - we must run to keep still (Gareth Evans 1995, p.
308).
This thesis is about what follows from the application of a certain simple principle,
which I shall call the Transparency Principle, to some matters in the philosophy of
thought. The main conclusion that will be drawn (though by no means the only one) is
that concepts, the components from which thoughts are composed, are unstructured
entities an account of whose individuation makes no essential reference to other
concepts in the possession of the thinking subject or to any particular means by which
the reference of the concept is identified by the thinking subject. Following Jerry Fodor
(1998) I shall call this general position Conceptual Atomism and the position it
opposes Inferential Role Semantics. According to Inferential Role Semantics concepts
are individuated by their inferential roles (that is, by the characteristic inferences which
can be made using them) or their conditions of warranted application. I This puts them
in constitutive relations to other concepts. Some versions of Inferential Role Semantics
take the notion of 'inference' more broadly and, for example, allow rational relations to
experiences of certain sorts to count as individuating; consequently advocates of this
position argue that there are such things as 'recognitional' concepts.
1 This definition is used informally by Fodor 2000, p. 350 to define 'epistemic individuation', which
he contrasts with Conceptual Atomism. But note that this differs from how Peacocke (2000a, p. 300)
uses the expression 'epistemic individuation'. Peacocke's use refers to concepts whose individuation
involves conditions under which the subject may be said to have knowledge of a certain content:
'There is a class of concepts each member of which can be individuated in terms of the conditions for
a thinker's knowing certain contents containing those concepts; and every concept is either such a
concept, or is individuated ultimately in part by its relations to such concepts'. The class of concepts
which Peacocke refers to as 'epistemically individuated' is therefore contained within the class to
which Fodor refers; and if concepts were as Peacocke describes them they would all be epistemically
individuated in Fodor's sense.
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To make it clearer what Conceptual Atomism amounts to it is necessary to say
more precisely how the word 'concept' is being used. I use the term in a way which
has become standard in a certain area of the literature (peacocke 1992, Fodor 1998) to
mean a component of a thought, where the word 'thought' should be construed in a
broadly Fregean way (I shall say more on this below). In his book A Study of Concepts
(1992, p. 2) Christopher Peacocke gives the following stipulation about the way he
uses the word 'concept':
Distinctness of concepts: Concepts C and D are distinct if and only if there are two
complete propositionalcontents that differ at most in that one contains C substituted
in one or more places for D, and one of which is potentially informative while the
other is not.
Thus, for example, 'C = C' is not informative but if 'C = D' is informative then C and
D are different concepts (I use the symbol '=' to mean 'is identical to'). Concepts can,
on Peacocke's definition, be of any category: singular, predicative or of higher level.
Thus even names express concepts. I shall follow Peacocke in this. It should be noted
that as well as differing from many everyday uses of the word 'concept', this is also
completely different from the way Frege used the word (in translation) to mean the
reference of a predicate, or a function from objects to truth values.
Peacocke's stipulation more or less captures the intuitive notion behind the use of
the word 'concept' as I shall use it. A concept, thus construed, is a component of a
thought of a rational thinker. Peacocke's criterion is clearly based on Frege's criterion
for distinguishing different thoughts, which Evans (1982, pp. 18-19) dubbed the
Intuitive Criterion of Difference. This says that two sentences express different
thoughts whenever it is rationally possible for a thinker who entertains both thoughts at
the same time to assent to one but not to assent to the other. Peacocke has merely
modified this in order to be able to individuate concepts rather than whole thoughts.
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Although I shall differ from Peacocke by introducing an additional criterion which, in
certain circumstances, determines when two concepts are the same I shall take it for
granted that Peacocke and I, as well as other philosophers engaged in recent debates
about concepts, are talking about the same thing. It therefore makes sense to disagree
with what these philosophers say about the nature of concepts; we are not merely
talking about different things.
I shall use the expressions 'sense' and 'mode of presentation' more or less as Frege
used them but without any commitment to the traditional Fregean 'descriptive' view.
Frege spoke of the sense of a sign, in which was contained the mode of presentation of
the reference. Sense is thus a property of linguistic expressions whereas a mode of
presentation is expressed by a term with a given sense but is itself a component of a
thought. Thus when one uses a term with a certain sense this indicates that one is
thinking of the reference under a certain mode of presentation. A thought is what is
expressed by the sense of a complete sentence and is thus composed from the modes of
presentation expressed by the terms which form the sentence. A concept and a mode of
presentation are therefore almost the same thing; the only difference being that thinking
of an object under a certain mode of presentation is the same thing as entertaining a
certain concept. But for convenience I shall sometimes speak of entertaining a mode of
presentation, which should be understood as the same thing as entertaining a concept.
It is crucial to the Fregean notion of a thought that thoughts can serve as the subject
matter of a rationalising psychology. Thoughts are the entities to which we have
attitudes such as beliefs and desires, and toward which a rational person cannot have
conflicting attitudes. Frege also held that thoughts are truth evaluable, and I shall
follow him in this as well. It is, of course, open to dispute (and indeed it has been
disputed) whether there can be single entities which are both cognitively significant and
truth evaluable simultaneously. One cannot make Fregean thoughts exist, or even make
it possible that they could exist, just by giving a list of the properties which define them
Gust as one cannot, for example, legitimately speak of round squares just by defining
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them as entities which are both round and square). For the purposes of argument,
however, I shall take it for granted that there are such entities as Fregean thoughts.
Even if this is incorrect, however, much of what I say about concepts will still be valid,
though it would have to be understood in a slightly different way. But, in any case, at
least one of the apparent obstacles to a Fregean theory (relating to indexical terms) will
be removed by the account to be given. This does not show that a Fregean theory is
obligatory but it at least suggests that such a.theory can be made consistent. 2
My adoption of this broadly Fregean framework should not, however, be taken to
imply a commitment to Frege's own account of modes of presentation; on the
contrary, this is preciselywhat is at issue. There is a certain very common and, it has to
be admitted, highly plausible reading of Frege in which modes of presentation are seen
as conditions which something must meet in order to be the reference of a term;
whether or not this is what Frege really intended, my account will differ radically from
it. I shall start by merely stipulating that modes of presentation are individuated in such
a way as to capture the rationality of the thinking subject; then I shall consider what
kind of entity could serve this purpose.
The Transparency Principle, the main tool which I shall use in investigating the
nature of concepts, is a simple modification and generalisation of the Intuitive Criterion
of Difference. The Transparency Principle yields the Intuitive Criterion of Difference as
a special case. It allows an account' to be given of the individuation of thought
components (and hence of whole thoughts) in situations not covered by the Intuitive
Criterion of Difference. In particular, it allows an account to be given of the
circumstances under which a person can retain a concept through time and through
changes of various sorts, and of the circumstances under which different people can
2 See chapter 6. An important motivation for wishing to defend a Fregean conception of thought is the
conviction that thoughts are representational intrinsically, not just contingently, and that there is
consequently no gap between being in a given psychological state and being related to the world in a
certain way. John McDowell (1998a, p. 243) has described the representational nature of thought as
'the most conspicuous phenomenological fact there is'; see his 'Singular Thought and the Extent of
Inner Space' (1986) for a brilliant defence of what is, in effect, the Fregean conception of thought.
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possess the same concept at a given time. The study of the former is known as
cognitive dynamics?
The central argument of the thesis will be that Inferential Role Semantics cannot
give a satisfactory account of cognitive dynamics whereas Conceptual Atomism can
(as well as being able to explain everything that Inferential Role Semantics can
explain). It will also be shown by a further appeal to the Transparency Principle that
Conceptual Atomism gives an intuitively more satisfying account of the conditions
under which different people possess the same concept. These issues occupy the first
of the two main parts of the thesis, consisting of chapters 2 to 4. The remaining part,
consisting of chapters 5' and 6, deals with the special case of indexicals, which raise
certain special difficulties for Conceptual Atomism. The resolution of these difficulties
involves the development of a theory of indexical thought which should also be of
some interest in its own right.
There is, I believe, nothing revolutionary about the Transparency Principle itself It
merely reflects a basic and familiar feature of thought and should therefore be seen as
little more than a truism; something which would be very difficult to deny while still
retaining a notion of thought recognisable as the subject matter of propositional
attitude (folk) psychology. I try to make this clear while setting out the Transparency
Principle in chapter 1. Then in chapter 2 I draw a distinction between Ways of
Thinking and Ways of Referring. Ways of Thinking are just modes of presentation; I
use the terminology only because it is already in use (mainly by philosophers influenced
by the work of Gareth Evans) and because it helps in drawing the contrast with Ways
of Referring. Ways of Referring to a thing, on the other hand, are different ways in
which the thinker can identify the thing; they are different means by which the thinker
can satisfy what Evans called Russell's Principle, the principle that in order to be
referring to a particular thing the thinker must be able to distinguish that particular
thing from all other things. By applying the Transparency Principle to certain dynamic
3 The expression 'cognitive dynamics' is due to David Kaplan (1989, p. 537).
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cases I argue that, contrary to what has been assumed by a great many philosophers,
Ways of Thinking and Ways of Referring are entirely separate things, and when a
person thinks of a thing in a certain way this may be consistent with referring to it in
any of a variety of different ways. This suggests a Conceptual Atomist view which,
although highly Fregean and consistent with the views of neo-Fregeans such as Evans
and John McDowell, also has a surprising amount in common with theories recently
put forward by certain philosophers whose views have usually been thought of as
antagonistic to the Fregean tradition, such as Jerry Fodor's recent work on concepts
and David Kaplan's work on words. In chapter 3 the Conceptual Atomist view is
expanded upon and I make a positive suggestion about how concepts should be
individuated on an Atomistic theory. On this view, concepts are worldly entities which
are individuated, like most worldly entities, by the circumstances of their creation and
continuity through time; this leaves room for certain of their properties to change
through time without a change in the identity of the concept. The consequences of this
view for various issues including analyticity and holism are also discussed.
In chapter 4 the Transparency Principle is applied to the question of whether
different people can share the same concept. The arguments are analogous to those of
chapters 2 and 3. By applying the Transparency Principle to certain interpersonal
(rather than dynamic) cases it is shown that despite the numerous objections which
have been raised to it, the Fregean chum that communication involves the sharing of
concepts is correct (though for reasons which will become apparent in chapter 6 I
remain agnostic at this stage about whether communication always involves the sharing
of thoughts). The objections to the Fregean view have two main sources. The first is a
failure to distinguish Ways of Thinking from Ways of Referring. Because it is always
possible for different speakers of the same language to employ different Ways of
Referring when using the same linguistic term it has seemed obvious to the objectors
that communication need not involve sharing the same Ways of Thinking either. This is
easily seen as erroneous once the distinction between Ways of Thinking and Ways of
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Referring is made. The second source of objections to the Fregean account of
communication is a failure to take adequate account of the social character of language
use. The objections tend to presuppose that each speaker uses words in a way which
involves no commitment to participation in a communal word-using practice, as though
each of us chooses our own vocabulary and it is only by a fortuitous coincidence that
our words tend to match up. This is false. Once adequate account is taken of the
commitments which have to be accepted whenever one acquires a term which belongs
to a shared language it becomes much clearer why, at least under normal
circumstances, communication involves sharing the very same concepts. The objection
has, I believe, been encouraged by Davidson's view that radical interpretation begins at
home, with its corollary that there is no such thing as a language. I argue that this is
incorrect; Davidson is correct to argue that a certain kind of communication can take
place without a shared language, but nevertheless there is another kind of
communication which does involve a shared language and shared concepts.
In chapter 5 I argue in favour of the Fregean idea that when a thought is expressed
using an indexical term the same concept can sometimes be retained through a change
of context which requires the indexical term which expresses the concept to be
exchanged for a different one. This is shown to follow from the Transparency
Principle, though I examine a number of additional arguments in favour of the same
conclusion. In chapter 6, however, I argue that the Fregean account is not adequate as
it stands because it does not account for the changes in the inferences which may be
drawn or the actions which it may be appropriate to perform when the indexical term
changes. This is a well-known problem with regard to indexical communication and
has been an additional reason why many philosophers have abandoned the Fregean
account of communication, yet it seems to have been entirely neglected in discussions
of cognitive dynamics. It poses a serious problem for Conceptual Atomism given that
the latter claims that concepts do not have characteristic inferential roles. The answer
cannot be to accept Inferential Role Semantics for indexicals, however, because
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Inferential Role Semantics offers no adequate account of how the same concept can be
retained through a change of indexicals, as argued in chapter 5. Fortunately these
difficulties can be straightforwardly resolved by a novel account of indexical thought in
which there is an egocentric predicate component associated with indexical thoughts.
On this account a single, atomic concept can be retained through a change of indexicals
while the associated egocentric predication changes according to the indexical term.
Having described this theory in some detail, I argue that it is independently supported
by certain hitherto neglected aspects of the phenomenon of immunity to error through
misidentification.
Any theory of concepts is bound to have connections with a great many
philosophical issues; too many for it to be possible to discuss them all in a thesis of this
size. A number of subsidiary claims are, however, made along the way where it has
been possible to do so reasonably briefly. Some of the more controversial ones have
been placed in the three appendices and should be regarded as optional extras rather
than as claims which are essential to the overall argument of the thesis.
Part 1: Preliminaries
CHAPTER 1
The Transparency Principle
The Intuitive Criterion of Difference - that two sentences express different thoughts
whenever it is rationally possible for a thinker who entertains both thoughts at the same
time to assent to one but not assent to the other - captures an important feature of the
structure of rationality. Let us take as a necessary condition for being rational that a
..
rational being will not knowingly have simultaneous conflicting attitudes toward the
same content; 'knowingly', because it is always possible to have logically inconsistent
beliefs without realising that they are inconsistent (simply failing to have worked
through the logical consequences of all of one's beliefs to eliminate inconsistencies
does not make one irrational). Now, there is nothing irrational about believing that
Hesperus is bright while simultaneously believing that it is not the case that Phosphorus
is bright, even if 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' refer to -the same thing, so long as the
thinker is not aware that they co-refer. This is not due to a failure to work through the
logical consequences of the beliefs, for there is no way for even a perfectly rational
thinker to derive a contradiction from 'Hesperus is bright' and the negation of
'Phosphorus is bright' without the addition of further premises. This illustrates the
well-known fact that the requirements of rationality cannot be captured solely at the
level of reference and it is, of course, for this reason that Frege introduced the
distinction between sense and reference. The level of senses artd modes of presentation
is intended to capture the rational bearing that one thought has on another. Hence
Frege's Intuitive Criterion; whenever there does not exist the kind of rational relation
between the thoughts expressed by two sentences that would require the thinker to
hold the same attitude to both, the two thoughts cannot be the same.
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The intuition behind Frege's criterion is what Michael Dummett (in numerous
places, e.g. 1978, p. 131; 1991, p. 34) has called the claim that sense is 'transparent';
that is, that anyone who grasps the senses of two expressions must thereby know
whether or not they are the same. In this chapter I shall argue that the notion of
transparency can be used to give a satisfactory principle for determining the sameness
of modes of presentation; and, moreover, one which will apply not only to the modes
of presentation comprising the thoughts of a single thinker at a singlemoment in time
but also to those comprising the thoughts of a single thinker at different times and the
thoughts of different thinkers at the same time. This is the principle I shall call the
TransparencyPrinciple.
The aim, then, is to find out what constraints are placed on the individuation of
modes of presentation by whatever rational relations hold between thoughts across
different contexts. It is, of course, a substantive claim that there are any rational
relations between thoughts which occur in different contexts, let alone that these
relations can suffice to determine whether or not components of the thoughts are
identical. The former claimwill be defended as and when necessary for the particular
variations of context with which we shall be concerned in later chapters, but it is first
necessary to provide a more general principle to ground the general claim that the
rational relations between thoughts can suffice to determine whether they contain the
same modes of presentation. I shall first 'look at Frege's tentative attempts to give a
criterion for sameness of thought which, like his Criterion of Difference, applies to a
single speaker at a single time. This has been shown to be unsatisfactory as it stands,
and was never published by Frege, but I shall argue that it can easily be modified to
suffice for our current purposes (which do not require a completely general criterion
for sameness of thought, but only one which is capable of settling the question of
samenessof concept in certain situations).
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1. 1 A criterion for sameness
Frege stated his Intuitive Criterion of Difference, giving a sufficient condition for two
sentences to express different thoughts, in numerous places. On just two occasions,
however, he suggested a criterion for sameness of thoughts. Firstly, in a letter to
Husserl (1980, pp. 70-71) he wrote:
It seems to me that an objective criterion is necessary for recognisinga thought again as the
same, for without it logical analysis is impossible.Now it seemsto me that the only possible
means of decidingwhether proposition A expresses the same thought as proposition B is the
following, and here I assume that neither of the two propositions contains a logically self-
evident componentpart in its sense. If both the assumption that the content of A is false and
that of B true and the assumption that the content of A is true and that of B false lead to a
logical contradiction, and if this can be establishedwithout knowingwhether the content of A
or B is true or false, and without requiring other than purely logical laws for this purpose,
then nothing can belong to the content of A, as far as it is capable of being judged true or
false, which does not also belong to the content of B.
This criterion has been criticised (by Jean van Heijenoort (1977) and by Dumrnett
(1981b); see also Picardi 1993) for the f~ct that it appears to make any pair of
analytically equivalent sentences express identical thoughts, which presumably was not
Frege's intention. The problem lies in the criterion's appeal to whether or not a
contradiction can be established; in the same way that, as suggested above, one should
not be deemed irrational for simultaneously holding beliefs from which a contradiction
could be derived (given enough time and effort), by the same token two sentences
should not be taken as expressing the same thought just because logical laws can be
used to show that a contradiction can be derived from the assumption that they differ
in truth value.
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At around the same time, however, Frege also produced a slightly different
formulation (which appears in his Posthumous Writings (1979), pp. 197-8):
Now two sentences A and B can stand in such a relation that anyone who recognises the
content of A as true must straightaway also recognise that of B as true, and conversely, that
anyone who accepts the content of B must immediately accept that of A
(equipollence) .... One has to separate off from the content of a sentence the part that alone
can be accepted as true or rejected as false. I call this part the thought expressed by the
sentence. It is the same in equipollent sentences of the kind given above.
By insisting that anyone who recognises the content (that is, grasps the sense) of the
two sentences must recognise immediately whether they have the same truth value, the
problem of mistaking analytic equivalence for sameness of sense is removed. This
second version of the criterion, however, is still not satisfactory. Notice first that the
criterion does not rely on sense being transparent if transparency is taken to imply that
anyone who grasps the senses of two expressions must thereby know whether or not
they have the same sense (as Dummett' s (1991, p. 34) definition implies). Strictly
speaking, what the criterion just quoted implies is that anyone who grasps the senses of
two expressions must thereby know whether or not they have the same reference; this,
in the case of complete sentences, being the truth value of the thoughts expressed. In
some passages Frege seems to hint at the former notion of transparency (e.g. 1979, p.
211) and perhaps this would have suited his theory better given that he was prepared
to allow there to be sense without reference. If there are empty names, for instance,
one must have a means of distinguishing between their senses which makes no appeal
to their references (though perhaps the notion of whether or not the thinker believed
that they must share the same reference assuming that they refer might be of some use
here).
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Nevertheless, the stated criterion for sameness of thought is that whenever it is
immediately apparent to the subject that two sentences must share the same truth value
then the sentences both express the same thought; whenever, that is, it is transparent to
the subject that the sentences must share the same reference. As Dummett (1991,
chapter 14) points out, Frege seems to have had a criterion of this sort in mind when,
in Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (§64f), he appealed to the idea that the following
pairs of sentences express the same 'content' as a means of introducing the concepts of
direction and, by analogy, number:
(AI) a is parallel to b
(A2) The direction of a is the same as the direction of b
(B 1) There are just as many Fs as Gs
(B2) The number ofFs is the same as the number ofGs
Frege's idea seems to have been that we have an 'intuition' of the notion of parallelism
which enables us to grasp the concept used in (AI), and from this it is possible to
derive the new concept of direction (of which Frege claimed we have no such intuition)
that occurs in(A2) because (A2) expresses just the same judgeable content as (AI). A
similar move is made to introduce the concept of number using (BI) and (B2).
Given that Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik was written before Frege drew the
distinction between sense and reference it would be unreasonable to presuppose his
later notion of thought in criticising the move he makes here. These examples,
however, provide a good illustration of why Frege's second criterion of sameness is
unsatisfactory. For the application of this criterion to these examples yields the
conclusion that both of the sentences in each pair express the same thought; anyone
who grasps their sense can immediately appreciate that they must share the same truth
value. Yet it is intuitively clear that the sentences do not, in fact, express the same
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thoughts at all. For thoughts with different components are different thoughts, and it is
intuitively clear that the pairs of thoughts contain different concepts; indeed, that seems
to have been Frege's whole point in discussing them.
The problem with Frege's criterion, then, is that there can be cases in which it is
manifest to someone who understands two expressions that their reference (truth
value, for whole sentences) must be the same without it being plausible that the two
expressions share the same sense. It is implausible that the sense is the same because
the two expressions differ in structure in a way which requires the subject to possess
different concepts in order to be able to grasp them; and this is sufficient for them to
have different senses.
Since the difficulties for Frege's criterion arise from differences in the structure of
the sentences one solution would be to specify that two thoughts can only be identical
if there are no differences in their structures. This would preclude the possibility that
the same thought might be expressed by sentences whose surface grammatical
structure differed, and this might seem too strong a requirement. It would, however, be
possible to make a more modest claim: that when there are two sentences whose
grammatical structure is the same, they express the same thought whenever it is
immediately apparent to the subject that they must share the same truth value. This
would not be a full criterion for the individuation of thought, but it would at least allow
us to conclude that certain pairs of sentences express the same thought. The principle
which I shall develop is of this more modest variety, but it will suffice for the purposes
for which it is needed.
Before proceeding, however, it is necessary to mention a further potential difficulty
with the idea of using transparency as a sufficient condition for sameness of mode of
presentation. I There can be situations in which it seems transparent to the subject that
two expressions have the same reference when in fact they do not. Consider, for
1 The following remarks are much influenced by John Campbell's (1987) article 'Is Sense
Transparent?'
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example, two successive utterances of a demonstrative 'that'. It is possible to imagine
(at least in principle) a situation in which the object referred to by the demonstrative is
exchanged for a different one without the subject noticing. It would therefore seem
clear to the subject that both utterances of 'that' had the same reference, yet this would
not be correct. Similar problems can be encountered with the word 'here'. It would be
possible to utter two sentences containing the word 'here' in quick succession without
realising that one had moved during the time between the two utterances. The
reference would have changed without this being apparent. Frege's own criterion
applies only to thoughts which are entertained simultaneously, and therefore does not
apply in this case. I shall, however, use the notion of transparency to argue (in chapter
5) that two successive utterances of a demonstrative can express the same mode of
presentation, so the more general diachronic case must be taken into account here.
It is worth pausing to note that there is only a difficulty here if it is assumed that
sense is intrinsically connected to reference. It is, as I implied in the introduction, a
defining characteristic of the Fregean approach that the sense of a term is sufficient to
uniquely determine its reference. There are those, however, who think that Frege
should have kept the level of sense independent of the level of reference (e.g. Perry
1977), so that two people could entertain the same mode of presentation while
thinking about different things. On such a view, it is trivially true that sense is
transparent. The problems appear only when sense is understood as determining a
unique reference. Nevertheless, this is the view I shall defend.
A simple response to the problem would be to hold that transparency can be used as
a criterion for the individuation of modes of presentation only when the reference is the
same. This requires abandoning a Cartesian conception of the mind according to which
the mind is fully transparent to the subject and it is always apparent to the subject
whether or not two thoughts are the same. Many neo-Fregeans have already accepted
this conclusion (e.g. Campbell 1987, McDowell 1986). And as Campbell (1987) points
out, although unnoticed switches of reference are possible in principle, the fact that it is
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consequently possible to entertain a doubt about whether a demonstrative has
preserved the reference of an earlier demonstrative does not suffice to show that the
senses of two demonstratives are always different, rather than merely different when
the reference is different. For we do not normally think in this reflective manner when
keeping track of an object and thinking about it demonstrativelyover a period of time;
there is not normally any question of making a reflective judgment about whether the
object seen now is the same one that was thought about moments ago. One merely
keeps track of the object without any need for such reflection, and in doing so one
keeps hold of the thought.
While I think that this is correct, a further response to the reference switching
problem is possible. The objection presupposes that each occurrence of a
demonstrative has its reference determined independently of any other use of a
demonstrative, so that there is no question that in the switching example the two
uttered demonstratives (or the occurrences of 'here') have different references. But it
seems to me that it is possible to doubt this, and to claim instead that the second
demonstrative is, to use Evans's (1982, pp. 132-135) phrase, 'ill-grounded'. Suppose
that the subject conceived of each demonstrative as an entirely independent
occurrence, whose reference was determined purely by the object in view at that
particular moment. Then, at the second utterance, it would be a matter for further
investigationwhether or not the same object was being referred to as had been referred
to earlier. But, ex hypothesi, this is not the case; the subject takes it for granted on the
occasion of the second utterance that there has been no change of reference.
The second use of 'that' must therefore be understood as linked to the first. The
relationship seems to be quasi-anaphoric; the second 'that' is intended to preserve the
reference of the first in a similar way to an anaphoric utterance of 'it', yet the
dependence is only partial because the subject maintains an independent grip on the
reference by keeping track of the object. The problem occurs when the two
components, the quasi-anaphoric intention to preserve the reference of the first
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demonstrative and the independent means of identifying the reference using perceptual
information, come apart and pick out different objects. It then becomes unclear what
the reference of the second demonstrative is; the thought is not well-grounded because
the reference is ambiguous, and the demonstrative therefore lacks a clear sense, even
though it will seem to the subject that the same sense has been preserved. The subject
is simply in a state of confusion about the reference, without realising this. But if the
same object had been referred to throughout 'there is no reason why the same sense
should not have been preserved. It remains the case that transparency alone cannot
without qualification be said to be sufficient for sameness of mode of presentation; but
it does at least follow that where there is transparency there cannot be two different
modes of presentation. Rather, in the case described, the subject starts by entertaining
a certain thought but subsequently fails to retain it, and lapses into a confused state in
which there is no clearly determined content.
1.2 The Transparency Principle
As I implied above, something less than a full-blown criterion for sameness of thought
applicable to all situations will suffice for the investigations to follow. A criterion
which covered thoughts expressed by sentences of arbitrary complexity might be
technically quite difficult to formulate. For our purposes, however, we shall only need
a criterion which determines the circumstances under which a mode of presentation is
the same between two contexts. I take it for granted that there are primitive concepts
from which more complex concepts can be constructed and whose properties
determine the properties of the complex concepts constructed from them.
Consequently we need only concern ourselves with these primitive concepts. In order
to investigate these, it will be sufficient to concentrate on the very simplest sentences,
atomic sentences of subject-predicate form.
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For the purposes of argument we shall need to be able to assume that under certain
circumstances two subject-predicate sentences share a component (either the subject or
the predicate) in order to be able to consider whether the remaining component is also
the same. This, however, is not problematic. Suppose we have two simple, atomic
subject -predicate sentences 'a is F' and 'b is F'. We need to be able to take it for
granted that the 'is F' part is common to both in order to investigate whether 'a' is the
same mode of presentation as 'b'. Alternatively we might have the sentences 'a is F
and 'a is G'; here we need to be able to take it for granted that the 'a' part is common
to both sentences, in order to investigate whether 'is F' and 'is G' are the same.
We can give a more general formulation of this as follows. Suppose S(r) is a
function which forms an atomic subject-predicate sentence from an unstructured term
'y. For example, if'y is a singular term then S(r) might be the sentence 'ris F' where
'is F' is a predicate, or alternatively if r is itself a predicate component then S(r) could
be the sentence 'a is y, where a is a singular term. Then the question to be addressed
is: if 'y and '/1' are unstructured co-referential terms then under what circumstances
does S(r) express the same thought as S(/1)? In posing this question we take it for
granted that the sentence-forming function'S' is the same in both sentences. But can
we take this for granted without begging the question?
I do not think there is a genuine problem here. I shall be concerned, in what follows,
with two kinds of case: those in which S(r) and S(/1) are uttered at different times by
the same person, and those in which they are uttered at the same time by different
people (perhaps 'uttered' should not be taken too literally here; I assume that an
utterance can express the content of a thought, but the thought can still be present
without any actual utterance. The sentences in question are those that the subjects
would utter in order to express the thoughts, if they were to express them). Now, in
order to investigate the circumstances under which 'y and 'p', in the sentences S(r)
and S(,u), express the same mode of presentation it will not be necessary to have a
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separate criterion for whether or not the same sentence forming function'S' appears in
both cases. We can merely stipulate that it does. In order to be justified in making this
stipulation we have only to assume that it is possible for'S' to appear twice; we need
not apply any criterion for establishing whether this is the case for any given pair of
sentences.
The assumption that it is possible for'S' to appear twice amounts to nothing more
than the assumption that the same concepts can occur in different contexts; that is, they
can be entertained at different times and by different people. To deny this would be to
adopt a view of concepts as 'atoms', only capable of existing at a single moment in
time in the mind of a single subject. This is particularly problematic in the temporal
case. The word 'green' as it appears in 'grass is green' would have to express a
different concept from that expressed by 'green' in 'emeralds are green', or even in
two separate utterances of 'grass is green'. It is hard to see what could motivate such a
view of concepts. If concepts were to be individuated in this way an entirely separate
account would have to be given of the rational relations between one thought and
another. It can be inferred, for instance, from the two thoughts just mentioned that
both grass and emeralds have the same colour. It seems natural to account for this by
appeal to the fact that the same concept, 'green', occurs in each thought. If this cannot
be assumed then some explanation has to be given of how one occurrence of 'green'
bears upon another. One might, of course, have all sorts of reasons for dividing up
whatever one calls 'concepts' in various ways according to the project by which one is
motivated. But the project engaged in here is that of giving a theory of thought in such
a way as to make rational sense of a thinker. Given that this is the project, the atomic
view is ruled out. Only a view on which the same concepts can occur on different
occasions; either in the same thought or in different thoughts, can possibly hope to
capture the structure of rationality. 2
2 See Evans 1985, pp. 309-311 for a related argument, and see Evans 1982, pp. 235-236 on the
relation between persistence of beliefs and the requirements of rationality.
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These considerations make it clear that it must sometimes be possible for a person
to entertain thoughts containing the same concept at different times. But it may appear
that there is still room for a theory in which different people possess entirely different
concepts from one another. Rationality is, after all, an intrapersonal rather than an
interpersonal matter; it is irrational to knowingly contradict oneself but it is not
irrational to knowingly disagree with other people. Itmay not seem obvious, therefore,
that there are any rational relations between the thoughts of different people which
require appeal to shared concepts. Hence, although it is clear that a single subject may
be assumed to entertain thoughts S(r) and S(p) where'S' is common to both, it may
appear unjustified to take it for granted that these two thoughts could be entertained by
different people, while still assuming that'S' is common to both.
A certain amount of 'bootstrapping' may therefore be necessary in the interpersonal
case, but I think this can be justified. If, as I shall argue in chapter 4, there can in fact
be the relevant kinds of rational relations between the thoughts of different thinkers
even though rationality is an intrapersonal matter, then some explanation of these
,
rational relations must be given. I shall argue that if it is assumed, under certain
circumstances, that there is a common thought component'S' between the thoughts,
S(y) and S(,u), of two different thinkers, a satisfying explanation of the rational
relations between the thoughts can the!l be given, but only if 'r' and 'p' express the
same concept. This gives an entirely consistent theory. If, on the other hand, it is not
assumed that there is a common thought component'S' then the rational relations
between S(r) and S(,u) would be left entirely mysterious. This justifies the assumption
that'S' can be shared.
The foregoing threads can now be pulled together in the form of a general, if
somewhat abstract, principle which, I believe, embodies the basic Fregean insight about
the relation of transparency to the individuation of modes of presentation:
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The Transparency Principle: If an attitude A to the thought expressed by the
sentence S(r) can make it irrational to dissent from attitude A to the thought
expressed by the sentence Seu), without the involvement of any further thoughts,
then ''I and '1/ express the same mode of presentation.
An 'attitude' just means belief, desire or any other attitude which someone may have
towards a thought. The qualification 'without the involvement of any further thoughts'
is to allow for the possibility that it might be sometimes be irrational to take conflicting
attitudes to S(r) and Seu} because of some further thought such as a belief that r = u.
The principle should be understood as applicable only when there is no thought whose
absence would allow conflicting attitudes to be taken to S(r) and S(p).
It may help clarify things if we consider a familiar example in which the attitude 'A'
is belief and S(r) and S(p) are the thoughts of a single thinker at a single time.
Suppose, then, that ''I and 'p' are 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' respectively, and that
S(r) and S(p) are the sentences 'Hesperus is bright' and 'Phosphorus is bright'. What
the Transparency Principle says is that if believing that Hesperus is bright can make it
irrational to disbelieve that Phosphorus is bright, without the involvement of a further
belief such as 'Hesperus = Phosphorus', then 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' express the
same mode of presentation (the reason for the qualification 'can make it irrational' will
become apparent shortly). As a matter of fact it is possible to take conflicting attitudes
to 'Hesperus' - and 'Phosphorus' -sentences so 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' do not
express the same mode of presentation. Whereas the Intuitive Criterion of Difference
embodies the notion that where there can be conflicting attitudes there must be
different content, the Transparency Principle uses a similar intuition to show that
where there cannot be conflicting attitudes there must be the same content.
I have deliberately formulated the Transparency Principle in such a way as to leave
it open whether S(r) and S(p) are uttered at the same time or by the same speaker.
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Formulating it in this way does not presuppose that there are rational relations between
thoughts in different contexts. The existence of such rational relations must be argued
for in particular cases. But whenever those rational relations exist, whenever it can be
rationally impossible to take conflicting attitudes to S(y) and S(,u) without the
involvement of any further thoughts then 'r' and ',u' express the same mode of
presentation.
,-
Let us now consider how the Transparency Principle applies to a diachronic case,
one in which S(y) and S(,u) are uttered by a single speaker but at different times. The
principle implies that if assenting to 'Hesperus is bright' at time tr can make it irrational
to dissent from 'Hesperus is bright' at a later time h without the involvement of any
further thoughts then 'Hesperus' expresses the same mode of presentation on both
occasions. The rational relation between the different times is such that what it is
rational to assent to at a given moment can be systematically dependent on what it was
rational to assent to at an earlier time. In simple cases like the example just given, the
most straightforward way of capturing this systematicity is to regard the later thought
as simply a continuation of the earlier one. As an objection to this one could, of course,
claim that it is just a brute fact that certain modes of presentation stand in certain
rational relations to other modes of presentation under certain circumstances. But in
order to make such a claim it would be necessary to explain what could motivate one
to regard the two modes of presentation as different, as well as explaining why the
rational relations exist between some modes of presentation but not others. Given that
the project being undertaken is to individuate thoughts in such a way as to capture the
rational structure of thinking, it is very hard to see what motivation there could be. I
shall give more detailed arguments of this general form when we come to deal with
specific cases.'
3 Jerome Dokic, at least in Dokic 1996, dissents from the view that diachronic transparency can be
used as a criterion for sameness of thought (though in conversation he has expressed possible
subsequent doubts). Dokic's strategy is to argue as follows: when there are two disconnected episodes
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It is not, of course, irrational to change one's mind, and to take a different attitude
to a thought from the attitude that one had earlier. Hence it would be rationally
possible to take conflicting attitudes to S(y) and S(,u) at different times even if'r' and
',u' expressed the same mode of presentation. One could start by believing S(y) at ti
but by h one's attitude could have changed in such a way as to make one dissent from
S(,u). It is for this reason that I have formulated the Transparency Principle so as to
require only that an attitude A to the thought expressed by S(y) can make it irrational
for a thinker to dissent from the same attitude to Seu). This should be understood to
mean that there are imaginable circumstances, those in which no change of mind has
occurred, in which the rational relation in question would hold.
Similar remarks can be made about the interpersonal case, in which S(y) and S(,u)
are uttered by different speakers. As remarked above, there is nothing irrational about
dissenting from the thoughts of others. If, however, it can be shown that that there are
circumstances in which one can take a certain attitude to someone else's thought, and
that taking this attitude makes it irrational to dissent from that attitude to a certain
thought of one's own, it would follow that a mode of presentation was shared by both
speakers.
There is one more general issue to be dealt with. I have suggested a way in which
the question of whether two terms express the same mode of presentation can be
settled by appeal to the rational relations between the thoughts containing them. Now,
of thinking at different times it is an open question whether the later thought is the same as the earlier
one. Because of the disconnection (i.e. there is a pause between the thought episodes) there is no
diachronic transparency. But Dokic infers from a principle of ontological parsimony that, for instance,
in a case in which a demonstrative thought is followed by a memory, then a subsequent demonstrative
thought about the same object, since the demonstrative thoughts should be regarded as the same the
mode of presentation held in memory after the initial perceptual encounter must be different from the
initial demonstrative sense. I think that this is incorrect because it neglects the rational relations
'between the original demonstrative and the thought retained in memory, and I believe that this
rational relation should take precedence over principles of parsimony. In any case, as I hope will
become apparent, the principle that one should not multiply entities beyond necessity favours my
theory because it avoids populating time with endless sequences of different modes of presentation.
Arguments such as Dokic's strike me as examples of what happens when one loses one's grip on the
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there may appear to be a problem concerning the direction of explanation implied by
this. If the presence of a certain rational relation were understood as being what
constituted the sameness of the modes of presentation then the Transparency Principle
would be true, but trivially so. It would amount to nothing more than a description of
the rational relations, rather than an explanation. Coupled with this there might be a
suspicion of the notion of a mode of presentation implied by the exclusive use of the
Transparency Principle as a means of individuating modes of presentation. If nothing
else can individuate modes of presentation then they appear as somewhat mysterious,
ineffable entities. At the very least, a theory in which thoughts are individuated in this
way seems incompatible with naturalism, insofar as naturalism is construed as requiring
that a theory of intentionality should be capable of being given in non-intentional terms
(though there are, of course, versions of naturalism which do not require this). 4
The worry is misplaced, however, because the direction of explanation just
described is not the intended one. The Transparency Principle should be regarded, like
Frege's intuitive criterion of difference, as a condition of adequacy on a theory of
concepts, not as a theory of concepts itself 5 It provides, in a manner of speaking, the
data which a theory of concepts has to explain; a way of mapping the rational relations
between thoughts which any satisfactory theory of concepts must yield.
point of talking about modes of presentation which is, as I have been emphasising, to capture the
. rational structure of thinking.
4 Robert Stalnaker (1984, pp. 24-5) expresses a worry of this kind.
5 Christopher Peacocke (1986, p. 5) makes a very similar point about the use to which he puts 'Frege's
Principle', the principle that 'if it possible rationally to believe that p and not to believe that q, then
the contents that p and that q are distinct'. I shall argue in the next chapter that although Peacocke's
(1992) theory of concepts conforms to Frege's Principle it fails to conform to the Transparency
Principle.
,. Part 2: Concepts
CHAPTER2
Concepts I: What Concepts Cannot Be
The main purpose of this chapter is to show that the main opponents of Conceptual
Atomism cannot give a satisfactory account of cognitive dynamics. I shall give a more
detailed characterisation of their views and the way in which they differ from
Conceptual Atomism before setting out the argument against them, but first it is
necessary introduce some terminology.
2.1 Ways of Thinking and Ways of Referring
The expression 'Way of Thinking' has, as a result of Evans's (1982) work, gained
some currency as an alternative expression for 'mode of presentation'. Evans
introduced it to emphasise the fact that, according to him, a mode of presentation is a
way of thinking of something and as such cannot exist unless there exists a certain
thing which is being thought of I shall make use of this expression both for the same
reason as Evans and because it will be helpful to draw a contrast between Ways of
Thinkingand what I shall call 'Ways of Referring'.
A Way of Referring has something in common with what Frege called a 'mode of
determination' (Beaney 1997, pp. 65, 321; but see qualificationsbelow); it is the way
in which the reference of a term is identified by the thinker. I shall take it for granted
. that in order to make a judgment about something it is necessary for the thinker to
know which item is being referred to, which implies having some means by which to
distinguish it from all other things. Russell (1912) argued for this view, and Evans
(1982, chapter 4) defended it at length against theories which assume that reference
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can be determined by something less substantial such as the causal history of the term.
I shall follow Evans in calling it 'Russell's Principle'. I shall take it for granted that
Russell's Principle applies to terms of all categories, not just singular terms. Thus in
order to possess a concept of any category it is necessary to have a way of identifying
whatever the concept refers to; that is to say, it is necessary to have a Way of
Referring to it.
Although I shall not give a detailed defence of Russell's Principle here, I should
nevertheless like to briefly note in passing a difficulty that would be encountered by its
wholesale rejection. If the principle is not adopted in some form then this would leave
open the possibility that someone could be said to be thinking about the world around
them despite the fact that they possessed no means of identifying the objects or
properties that they were supposed to be thinking about. Such a person would be
unable to manifest their alleged thoughts in any way; they would be unable to act on
any thought because they would be unable to establish that any encountered object was
in fact the object of the thought. The fact that the alleged mental states were, as a
matter of fact, caused by interaction with the object in question would make no
difference to this. So the rejection of Russell's Principle would make possible only an
extremely dubious 'private' conception of thought according to which it is possible for
someone to be thinking about an object even when there are no circumstances in which
an observer could discover this. Few philosophers would be willing to defend such a
view; most, I think, would prefer to defend a conception of thought according to
which thinking about x implies, at least in principle, being capable of acting on x in
some way (with suitable qualifications to deal with objects only existing in the distant
past etc.)
Ways of Referring fall into three main categories. These involve either perceptual
contact, recognitional capacities or definite descriptions. I shall refer to these as
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demonstrative, recognitional and descriptive Ways of Referring respectively.'
Sometimes a Way of Referring may involve a mixture of different categories. I shall
also speak of 'identifications' (as in 'a demonstrative identification of an object'),
because a Way of Referring to an object is, as discussed above, a way of identifying it
or distinguishing it from all other things. It will facilitate a lucid exposition of the
arguments to follow if I make clear some assumptions that I shallmake about how the
different varieties of reference function before proceeding. My account of this is
strongly influencedby Evans's book The Varieties of Reference (1982).
Demonstrative Ways of Referring to objects allow the subject to distinguish an
object from all other objects by receiving a continuing stream of perceptual information
from it. This does two things. Firstly, it determines which object it is whose states are
treated as relevant to the truth or falsity of the relevant thoughts. Secondly, it
determines which object will be acted upon in relevant situations. This occurs because
the ongoing information link to the object allows the subject to 'home in' on its
location and act upon it. This is the case even when the object is not where it appears
,
to be because of a perceptual distortion of some kind, for example when an object is
seen at the bottom of a swimming pool which looks shallower than it really is.
Although the object is not where it appears to be, the ongoing information link allows
the subject to home in on it and act upon it. These are the things which determine
,
which object is the reference of the thought?
. Demonstrative identificationsof properties are a little less straightforward. They do
not seem to occur in practice anywhere near as often as demonstrative identifications
of objects. Demonstrative identifications of properties often involve demonstrative
identifications of objects. For example, it is possible to pick out 'that shape' in virtue
1 See Evans 1982, p. 89 on this trichotomy. As Evans notes, it is also found in the works of Strawson
and Dummett.
2 Evans is sometimes interpreted as having held that what is crucial to a demonstrative Way of
Referring is that it enables the subject to 'locate' the object egocentrically. See for example McDowell
1990. However Peacocke (1991) is surely correct to argue against McDowell that being able to 'locate'
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of a demonstrative identification of an object which has the shape in question. The
shape might, for example, be sufficiently complex or irregular that the subject could
not remember it well enough to distinguish it from a slightly different shape on a
subsequent occasion. In such a case, the subject's ability to identify the shape rests
entirely on an ongoing abilityto identify the object which has that shape. It is not clear,
however, that the demonstrative identification of a property always rests on an
identificationof the object whose property it is. It is, for example, possible to perceive
properties relating to the way something sounds without being able to identify the
source of the sound. One could then refer to 'that sound' (meaning 'that kind of
sound') without identifying its source. Sometimes one's identification of the sound
would not rest entirely on one's ongoing perception of the sound; one might be able to
recognise the sound on a subsequent occasion and think 'there is that sound again'.
But there might be sounds of a particularly unusual nature such that one could not be
sure that it was the same sound again on a subsequent occasion. In such a case one's
ability to identify the sound would rest entirely on one's ongoing perception of the
sound, but this would not necessarilyinvolve the perception of an object.3
It is a matter for debate whether, and to what extent, demonstrative identifications
must be supplementedwith sortal terms. It could be argued that it is impossible to truly
identifya thing without being aware that the thing falls into some very general category
such as 'physical object'." If this is correct then it indicates that demonstrative
identification always involves at least a minimal recognitional element, wherein the
the object should be understood to imply being able to 'home in' on the object even if it is not quite
where it seems to be. This seems correct both in itself and as an interpretation of Evans.
3 Note that during an episode of perception it might be possible to detect small changes in the sound
which it would not be possible to detect if the change occurred after a break in perception. Otherwise,
if it were not possible to detect such changes, then it would be possible to argue that the perception of
the sound does nothing more than 'fix the reference', setting up a recognitional capacity (a disposition
to recognise the same sound on subsequent occasions). It would then be the recognitional capacity
which would enable the sound to be distinguished from all others, rather than the perception itself.
4 See Recanati 1993, pp. 169-72, for an argument that no 'specific' sortal is required for
demonstrative identification (as specific as, for example, 'bird' or 'plane') but that there may still
have to be some very general category such as 'perceptible and occupying a certain portion of space'.
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object is partially identified in virtue of some (very general) property which it
possesses.
Recognitional Ways of Referring are intrinsically related to perceptual encounters
but enable objects (or properties) to be thought about while not being perceived. The
expression 'recognitional capacity' should be understood as meaning a disposition to
recognise a perceptually presented object or property unreflectively. The capacity to
recognise human faces is a good example; one often simply sees that it is or is not so-
and-so without needing to reflect upon what one is looking at. This contrasts with
partially descriptive cases in which one can find oneself thinking that the person looks a
bit like so-and-so but being unsure whether it is really so-and-so because one had the
impression that so-and-so was a bit taller and wore glasses. One thus reflects upon
whether the perceived person satisfied certain descriptions.
Recognitional capacities often have to be supplemented with additional criteria or
information before a unique reference can be identified. There can be no guarantee that
a given object does not have a duplicate, so merely recognising the appearance of
something is sometimes not sufficient to uniquely identify it. Consider the following
example (taken from Evans 1982, pp. 279-80). Suppose that I am able to see a sheep
on a hillside where I am sitting. There may be certain features of the sheep which
would make it easy for me to recognise it if I took my eye off it for a while (if it is the
.,
only sheep around then I just have to be able to recognise a sheep). In general,
however, there will be other sheep somewhere in the world which I would not be able
to distinguish from the present one by appearance alone. If there is only one sheep on
this side of the valley, however, then given certain assumptions about the maximum
speed at which sheep can travel when I close my eyes for a short period of time I can
be confident that the sheep I see when I open them is still the same one. The sheep
could not have left the area and no other sheep could have reached the vicinity during
Something slightly more substantial than this may be required in order to keep track of a persisting
object as it moves around (ibid., p. I7ln).
Concepts I: What Concepts Cannot Be 32
the time that I had my eyes closed. So in cases like this one my visual recognitional
capacity is supplemented by a constraint on the spatiotemporal region in which the
reference must be found. The identification of this spatiotemporal region will typically
be demonstrative.
There is a group of concepts whose reference can only be identified via a kind of
recognitional capacity, which mayor may not be purely perceptual. These are 'mind-
dependent' concepts: concepts whose references are determined solely by the ability of
human beings to recognise them or judge that they instantiate the concept. Jerry Fodor
(1998, chapter 6) has recently given a detailed and highly illuminating discussion of
these concepts.' I shall not reproduce the details of Fodor's position here but, briefly,
the idea is that a mind-dependent concept such as DOORKNOB refers to those items
which we are disposed to call 'doorknobs' and there is no other way of individuating
the class of items referred to than through the fact that we have such dispositions."
There may be no way to define a doorknob in terms of its form or function. It has
rather to do with the role that certain items play in the lives of human beings within
certain cultures. A determinate, objective reference is nevertheless determined for the
concept. Doorknobs may be sometimes be recognised by perception alone, but since it
would also be possible to imagine a novel object and decide that it is a doorknob
without having perceived it, and since recognising a doorknob may involve thinking
about aspects of its function that are not immediately perceptible, then strictly speaking
it is not purely a perceptual recognitional capacity which determines the reference.
We have already seen how descriptive elements can come into play in otherwise
demonstrative or recognitional identifications. But it is also possible to give a unique
identification of an object or property using a definite description. Sometimes the use
of a descriptive identification will rely on a demonstrative or recognitional
5 The idea of a mind-dependent concept bears some relation to the view of colour concepts put forward
by John Campbell (1993) and the view of value concepts put forward by David Wiggins (1987,
chapter 5).
6 Following a common convention I use words in capital letters for the names of concepts.
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identification of something referred to by one of the primitive concepts from which the
description is composed. For example suppose that I can identify something as 'the
only black sheep on this side of the valley'. This picks out a unique individual but its
ability to do so rests on my being able to identify the region of space that I refer to as
'this side of the valley'. This will probably rest ultimately on a demonstrative
identification of some region of space. I shall not assume, however, that descriptive
Ways of Referring always involve a guarantee that there is a unique reference. For any
definite description 'the <p' which does not contain any demonstrative elements it is
always impossible to rule out the possibility that there is more or less than one item
which fits the description." It is often assumed as a consequence of this that the
description requires a spatiotemporal 'anchoring' using a demonstrative to ensure a
unique reference, as in the example just described. By contrast, however, I shall
assume that if there is, as a matter of fact, one and only one <p then the description 'the
<p' could be a Way of Referring. This may be a rather controversial assumption but
fortunately very little of what follows depends on it; those who disagree can simply
,
assume that whenever I speak of a descriptive Way of Referring there is always a
demonstrative anchoring present within the description. I do not, however, assume that
there could be a descriptive Way of Referring in which the elements of the description
involve neither a demonstrative nor a recognitional Way of Referring. Such a
description would be empty; it could never be used to identify anything in relation to
either perception or action."
Now, there are two ways in which the notion of a Way of Referring could be
understood; either it does, or it does not presuppose that there is something referred
7 er. the possibility of what Strawson (1959) calls 'massive reduplication'.
8 I give my reasons for rejecting the need for demonstrative anchoring in appendix B. I also discuss
the difference between genuine singular thoughts (whose truth conditions involve a specific
individual) and thoughts which are logically descriptive (whose truth conditions involve whichever
object happens to satisfy a certain description) in appendix A. In addition to the cases discussed so far
there are also cases in which in order to identify something it is necessary to defer to other people.
Demonstrative identifications may ultimately be involved in these cases as well (for instance in being
able to identify the people to whom I defer). I discuss deference in greater depth in chapter 4.
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to. A Way of Referring which can exist without actually referring to anything
corresponds to what Frege called a 'mode of determination'; it is a 'route to a
reference', a condition which something must meet to be the reference or, more
generally, a means by which a reference can be determined. The same means can be
used to determine different objects in different contexts or no object at all. This
contrasts with the use that Frege sometimes (but not always) made of the expression
'mode of presentation', wherein a mode of presentation essentially refers and can
therefore be construed (on one interpretation of Frege) as involving a reference in
addition to a mode of determination." Unless Ways of Referring are assumed to be
identical to Ways of Thinking, however, there is nothing to prevent us from following
Evans in holding that a Way of Thinking always has a reference while construing the
notion of a Way of Referring as equivalent to a Fregean mode of determination, which
has no essential reference. This is in fact the way in which I shall construe Ways of
Referring.
2.2 Ways of Referring and the individuation of concepts
The difference between Conceptual Atomism and the views to which it stands opposed
can be put in terms of the relation that the different views imply between Ways of
Thinking and Ways of Referring. Conceptual Atomism holds that concepts are
unstructured entities an account of whose individuation makes no essential reference to
other concepts in the possession of the thinking subject or to any particular means by
which the reference of the concept is identified by the thinking subject. Let us consider
the two clauses of this definition in tum. Firstly, an account of the individuation of a
given concept makes no essential reference to other concepts in the possession of the
9 See Beaney 1997, p. 23, for a description of Frege's relative uses of 'mode of determination' and
'mode of presentation'.
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thinking subject. This rules out versions of Inferential Role Semantics according to
which a concept is constitutively associated with a particular descriptive Way of
Referring. Consider, for example, the claim that in order for someone to possess the
concept HESPERUS they must identify its reference using the description 'the morning
star'. It would follow from this that anyone who possesses that concept must be
prepared to make certain inferences; if, for example, they believe that:
(1) Hesperus is bright
then they must be prepared to infer that:
(2) There is a bright star in the morning
Hence, it is said, the concept is individuated by its characteristic inferential role.
The second clause of the definition states that an account of the individuation of a
given concept makes no essential reference to any particular means by which the
reference of the concept is identified by the thinking subject. This simply generalises
the first clause to cover other, non-descriptive Ways of Referring. Suppose that it were
claimed, for example, that to possess a particular concept SQUARE it is necessary to be
able to identify square objects when they are visually presented in an orientation which
makes certain symmetries salient to the subject. This would mean that the subject
would associate a certain recognitional Way of Referring with the concept. It is not
clear that such a person would make any characteristic inferences using the concept of
the kind supposedly associated with HESPERUS in the example above. But it might
nevertheless be claimed that when the subject is visually presented with a square object
in the appropriate orientation the subject has a reason to make certain judgments such
as 'that is a square'. Thus the concept is individuated by its characteristic role in
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judgments; and views of this kind are sometimes described as versions of inferential
Role Semantics.
The essential difference between Conceptual Atomism and Inferential Role
Semantics is therefore that according to Inferential Role Semantics an account of the
individuation of a concept (and thus of a Way of Thinking) makes essential reference
to a Way of Referring associated with the concept. Conceptual Atomism denies this.
According to Conceptual Atomism, for example, there is no such thing as a
'demonstrative concept' or a 'recognitional concept'; there are just concepts, whose
individuation does not depend on the way in which the reference is identified.
It may strike the reader that I have taken it for granted that Inferential Role
Semantics claims that the characteristic inferential role of a concept relates to the way
in which the reference is identified. Would it not be possible to put forward a different
kind of theory according to which an account of the individuation of a concept makes
no essential reference to a Way of Referring but nevertheless makes essential reference
to other concepts in the possession of the thinking subject? It would be possible to
,
claim, for example, that in order to possess the concept HESPERUSit is necessary to
believe that Hesperus is the ninth planet from the sun, even though this is false (I am
not suggesting that such an account would be at all plausible). Some other account
would then have to be given of what determines the reference OfHESPERUS.1o
As a matter of fact, the arguments to be given against Inferential Role Semantics
could be very simply modified to refute theories of this kind. I shall not say much about
this, however, since as far as I know no such account has ever been put forward. The
reason for this is simple. The key idea behind Inferential Role Semantics is that what
10 A well-known example from the literature which could be used to illustrate this point is Kripke's
(1980, pp. 83-92) 'Godel-Schmidt' argument. Kripke invites us to imagine that someone has only one
identifying belief about Godel (that he proved the incompleteness of arithmetic) and that this belief is
false, and actually identifies Schmidt. But on a 'causal' theory the reference of 'G6deI' is G6de1, not
Schmidt, because of the chain of causation going back from the use of 'G6de1' to the 'initial baptism'
at which G6de1 was named. In principle someone could hold that the mode of presentation expressed
by the word 'G6deI' for this particular person is partially constituted in terms of the description 'the
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gives a concept its identity is the characteristic role it plays in the judgments that the
thinker makes, whether this be cashed out in terms of judgments based on inferences,
on perception, or both. The thought is then that the role that a concept plays in
judgments depends on the way in which the reference of the concept is identified.
Other kinds of relations to other concepts would contribute nothing positive to the
judgments that the thinker makes, given that judgment essentially aims at truth .
.
In fact Conceptual Atomism, at least in the version that I shall defend, has in
common with Inferential Role Semantics the claim that the possession a concept
requires the ability to identity the reference of the concept. Where the two views differ
is in the fact that according to Conceptual Atomism nothing further needs to be added
regarding the way in which this is achieved; for any given concept there must be a Way
of Referring but this need not be any particular Way of Referring and the way in which
the reference is identified plays no essential part in an account of the individuation of
the concept.
2.3 Varieties of Inferential Role Semantics
I shall·now give some specific examples of versions of Inferential Role Semantics. This
"
will not be an exhaustive list by any means; for there seem to be almost as many views
about what a concept is as there are philosophers. Instead I shall just mention a few
well-known ones to give a more concrete idea of which views are in question. Many of
these views have their roots in a traditional understanding of the idea that Fregean
sense 'determines' reference. On this view a mode of presentation is seen as a means
by which the reference can be identified or a criterion which something must meet in
order to be the reference of a term; in other words, a Way of Referring. There are
man who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic', even though this description does not pick out the
reference of the concept.
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certainly many passages in which Frege appears to suggest that wherever there is a
difference in a Way of Referring there is a difference in sense:
An object can be determined in different ways, and every one of these ways of determining it
can give rise to a special name, and these different names then have different senses; for it is
not self-evident that it is the same object which is being determined in different ways. ('Letter
to Jourdain, Jan. 1914', Beaney 1997,p. 321).
When Frege speaks of the way in which an object is 'determined' he means the Way of
Referring to that object. I shall not engage in the dispute over the correct interpretation
of Frege here. But there is clearly an interpretation of this passage according to which
it is being argued that concepts must be individuated by Ways of Referring because if
the object is referred to in a different way it may not be apparent to the subject that it is
the same object. A difference in the Way of Referring therefore corresponds to a
cognitive difference, and if two concepts differ in their cognitive significance they are
different concepts. Consequently it is inferred that concepts are individuated by the fact
that each one is associated with some particular Way of Referring.
That seems to be the basic idea that lies behind quite a few views but it appears in
many different guises. 11 Most philosophers these days would reject a view which says
that some or all concepts can simply be defined in terms of other concepts.
Philosophical difficulties with definitions are well known. Ever since Quine published
Two Dogmas of Empiricism (1961) the notion of analyticity that goes hand-in-hand
11 One version of Inferential Role Semantics about which I shall say very little is the one advocated by
Robert Brandom (1994). Brandom's position is very complex and consequently I cannot discuss it in
detail but his 'inferentialism' (according to which concepts are individuated by their inferential roles,
their representational properties being a product of this individuation rather than an element in it) is
straightforwardly susceptible to the criticisms of Inferential Role Semantics given below. But this
should not be taken to imply that I advocate what Brandom would call 'representationalism',
according to which it is only an afterthought that conceptual contents are involved in inferences. I
agree with McDowell (1997) that there is room for a position in between Brandom's dichotomy of
inferentialism and representationalism according to which it is not merely an afterthought that
concepts are involved in inferences but nevertheless their representational function is an essential part
of what individuates them.
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with the notion of definition has been treated with suspicion. Even so, there are still
many adherents to the notion that there is a small subset of the overall set of concepts
which can be defined analytically; for example by defining BACHELOR in terms of
unmarried men." And it also seems quite common to assume that even if concepts do
not stand in analytic relations to other concepts there are relations between them which
are held as defining by a given subject. This allows a view of concepts according to
which the relations to other concepts in which a given concept is held determine which
inferences involving that concept the subject will hold to be valid. A combination of the
rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction with an adherence to the assumption that
concepts are individuated by conceptual relations has lead some people to endorse a
kind of radical holism in which there is no distinction between defining beliefs about
something and informative beliefs about it, and any difference whatsoever in what is
believed about x thereby makes x a different concept. Others have been more
restrained, and held that there are only 'local holisms', groups of concepts which one
cannot possess without possessing the other members of the group. But this has still
been taken to imply that the concepts are individuated by their relations to other
members of the group.
A more sophisticated view due to Christopher Peacocke (1986) says that concepts
are individuated in terms of their canonical acceptance conditions, which are spelled
"
out in terms of their 'canonical grounds' and 'canonical commitments'. Canonical
commitments, for example, are those things which a thinker is committed to in judging
that a given concept applies. In judging that something is cubic, for example, one takes
on commitments about how the object would look from a different angle. If the object
were to fail to fulfil these conditions one would be obliged to withdraw the judgment.
The underlying assumption is still the same, however; that the means by which the
reference is determined is partially constitutive of the concept:
12 My own account of cases in which there is a strong intuition of analyticity is given in section 3.5.
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If the truth condition for a content obtains, the spectrum of commitments for that content are
fulfilled. This is quite consistent with the nonexistence of a route back from reference to
sense: for it can be informative to say of two spectra of commitments that one is fulfilled if
and only if the other is. So there can still be a unique content-determining association of a
spectrum of canonical commitments with a given content. Thus suppose we could both feel
heat and see it with infra-red vision. If the terms 'heat}' and 'heat,' are introduced for the
physical properties presented in these two ways, the thought that something is hot} if and only
if it is hot, can be informative. Correspondingly, consider the two thoughts that an object,
presented in a given way, is hot} and that it is hot2. The canonical commitments of the first
thought are all fulfilled if and only if the canonical commitments of the second thought are:
but this is an a posteriori truth (1986, p. 24).
This passage mirrors the one quoted above from Frege. The examples that Peacocke
gives of canonical grounds and commitments invariably relate to the way in which the
reference of the concept is identified. If the discovery that the canonical commitments
have not been met obliges one to with draw a judgment (as in the 'cube' example) this
must surely be because the object of the judgment has been discovered not to
instantiate the concept. A certain physical object has been discovered not to be cubic,
for example, when it is discovered not to look the way it was expected to look from a
different angle. The 'spectrum' of canonical commitments which Peacocke claims to be
associated with a concept are therefore components which combine to constitute a
Way of Referring to the reference of the concept. Peacocke's view thus implies that
the individuation of a concept makes essential reference to a particular Way of
Referring. This is particularly clear in the cases of 'heat!' and 'heat,' in the quoted
passage above, where each of these concepts is held to be constitutively associated
with a different Way of Referring to the same thing (one Way of Referring involves the
recognition of heat through tactile sensations whereas the other involves recognising
heat visually).
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Another variety of Inferential Role Semantics is found in theories drawing on the
ideas behind David Kaplan's (1978, 1989, 1989a, 1990) 'dthat' term. Kaplan's
distinction between 'content' and 'character' is well known. To avoid confusion with
other uses of the word 'content' I shall spell it 'kontent' in what follows whenever I
am using it specifically in Kaplan's sense (except in quotations)." The character of a
term determines its kontent for a given context. The kontent of a sentence is the
.'Russellian proposition expressed by the sentence. But it is character which determines
the cognitive significance of a term. The character of a term thus corresponds to the
mode of presentation associated with the term. And, since the kontent of a referring
term is the item referred to, the mode of presentation once again determines the
reference, albeit with context taken into account (where relevant).
Now, Kaplan introduced his term 'dthat' as a means offormalising the way in which
a definite description can be used in referring directly to something. His idea was that
sometimes a description could take the place of a demonstration; it is a kind of
specialised 'pointing'. This allows there to be direct reference to an object using a
definite description to single out the object but without the description being part of
the kontent thus determined. Thus the expression 'dthat (the o)' refers directly to some
object which is picked out by virtue of satisfying the definite description 'the <p' but the
description is not part of the kontent expressed by 'dthat (the <p) is F' .14 The definite
description thus merely 'fixes the reference' (Kripke 1980) of the term. As Kaplan
(1989a, p. 581) puts it:
The word 'dthat' was intended to be a surrogate for a true demonstrative, and the description
which completes it was intended to be a surrogate for the completing demonstration. On this
13 This is also the way Ruth Millikan (e.g. 1993) uses the word 'kontent'.
14 In his 'Afterthoughts' (l989a) Kaplan notes that his use of'dthat' in 'Demonstratives' (1989) was
ambiguous and at times varied between two possible uses of the term. One possibility was that it could
be taken as a rigidifying operator such that for any definite description 'the cp' the expression 'dthat
(the cp)' would turn 'the cp' into a rigid designator. The other possibility was the one described above.
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interpretation 'dthat' is a syntactically complete singular term that requires no syntactical
completion by an operand. (A 'pointing', being extralinguistic, could hardly be a part of
syntax.) The description completes the character of the associated occurrence of 'dthat', but
it makes no contribution to content. Like a whispered aside or a gesture, the description is
thought of as off-the-record (i.e. off the content record).
This apparatus is very useful as an aid.to grasping how there could be a descriptive
Way of Referring involved in thoughts containing a syntactically simple directly
referring term, and indeed I shall make use of an idea like this in chapter 3. What I
wish to draw attention to here, however, is where Kaplan locates the Way of Thinking;
it is associated with the character of the term, and since 'the description completes the
character' it follows that the description determines the Way of Thinking of the
reference. So, once again, we have a notion of a Way of Thinkingof the same general
kind as those discussed above; an account of the individuation of a given Way of
Thinkingthus construed makes essential reference to a particularWay of'Referring."
There are many philosophers, especially those in the neo-Fregean tradition
influencedby Evans's book The Varieties of Reference (1982), who take it for granted
that that the three broad categories of Way of Referring (demonstrative, recognitional
and descriptive) necessarily correspond to different concepts. They take it for granted
that 'demonstrative thoughts' aria 'recognition-based thoughts', for example, are
. different kinds of thoughts (as opposed to merely different ways of entertaining a
thought) and that consequently no demonstrative thought could contain exactly the
same concepts as a recognition-based thought. Any such view is opposed to
Conceptual Atomism.
Kaplan (1989a, pp. 579-581) makes it clear that it was the latter that he really had in mind in
'Demonstratives' .
15 Kaplan tends not to distinguish between thought and language when he writes about character.
Recanati (1993, pp. 69-72), whose view of a mode of presentation has similarities with Kaplan's (and
Perry's) argues that it is necessary to distinguish two different levels, which he calls 'linguistic' and
'psychological' modes of presentation. Perry (1977, 1979) has very similar ideas to Kaplan but in his
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In addition to the philosophical views just described a certain statistical theory of
concepts which holds that concepts are 'prototypes' is extremely popular among
cognitive scientists. On this theory concepts are individuated by their inferential roles;
that is, by the inferential relations between them and other concepts. But the inferential
relations are statistical and are thus weaker than the inferential relations which would
be required for concepts to be individuated by definitions, for example (i.e. by
inferences which are analytic)." The id~a is that for any given concept there are certain
stereotypical properties which items which instantiate that concept typically, though
not always, have. A bird, for example, is typically able to fly (even though not all birds
can fly), so being able to fly is part of the bundle offeatures statistically associated with
the concept BIRD. These features, put together, build up a prototypical example of a
bird, and it is this prototype which constitutes the concept. There is, in fact, substantial
empirical evidence that many concepts are standardly associated with certain
stereotypes; thus when asked to think of a typical vehicle people tend to think of a car,
when asked to think of a typical jewel they think of a diamond, and so on." But this
does not, of course, constitute a proof that concepts are or are individuated in terms of
prototypes. The prototype theory is yet another example of the kind of epistemic,
inferential role theory that opposes Conceptual Atomism.
2.4 Fodor's arguments for Conceptual Atomism
One of the few explicit advocates of Conceptual Atomism is Jerry Fodor (1998),
whose views have been seen as radical and counterintuitive by many philosophers and
more recent work (1997) distinguishes 'linguistic' from 'doxastic' characters. It is of course the
psychological/doxastic notions which are relevant here.
16 For a highly illuminating discussion of prototypes and what is wrong with them, see Fodor 1998,
chapter 5. Fodor's own arguments against equating concepts with prototypes or recognitional
capacities are discussed below, in section 3.1.
17 For a review of the relevant psychological literature see Smith and Medin 1981.
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cognitive scientists.IS Fodor's motivation for endorsing Conceptual Atomism relates to
the well-known importance that he attaches to a view of thoughts and thought
components which is compatible with the idea that thinking (construed as the making
of inferences) is computation (Fodor 1975, 1987). Fodor accepts Turing's notion of
computations as truth-preserving causal relations among symbols, which of course
requires there to be suitable symbols (mental representations; physical items with
semantic properties) upon which computations can be performed. One does not have
to accept all of Fodor's associated ideas in order to accept this general point." But,
according to Fodor, if thinking is computation then one does at least have to accept
that the notion of content must not presuppose the notion of computation; that is to
say, it cannot be the case that the semantic properties of a mental representation
depend on the computations that it enters into, at least not unless there is an
explanation of what computation is which does not presuppose notions such as
'symbol' or 'content'. Fodor feels that no such notion of computation is likely to be
found; certainly Turing's notion is not of this sort, for it presupposes the notion of a
symbol.
This gives Fodor a motivation for rejecting Inferential Role Semantics. For
Inferential Role Semantics seems to make it impossible to tell a computational story
about what inference is without the circularitycaused by also telling an inferential story
about the symbols upon which the computations are performed (Fodor 1998, p. 13).
But although Fodor has advocated the computational story for a long time and a form
of Conceptual Atomism has probably been implicit throughout his work, it is only
recently that he has made this position explicit and offered arguments for it.
Fodor offers a variety of arguments directed against various different versions of
InferentialRole Semanticsfound in different academic disciplines.Since I largely agree
with Fodor's conclusions I shall not discuss all of his arguments in detail. I do find it
18 See for example Peacocke 2000, Vision 2001.
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necessary, however, to discuss an argument which he directs against the individuation
of some or all concepts in terms of either prototypes or perceptual recognitional
capacities (Fodor 1998, chapter 5; 1998a). This argument is an important part of
Fodor's case for Conceptual Atomism but unfortunately, much as I am sympathetic to
its conclusion, I do not think it is valid. The argument is based on the uncontroversial
principle that complex concepts are composed from simple ones. This, according to
Fodor, shows that concepts cannot be prototypes because whereas concepts are
compositional, prototypes are not. Thus if you have the concepts PET and FISH then you
can have the complex concept PET FISH for free, but there is no obvious way that you
can combine a prototypical pet (e.g. a dog) with a prototypical fish (e.g. a trout) to get
a prototypical pet fish (e.g. a goldfish). Neither can you do this in reverse, which you
ought to be able to do if concepts were prototypes because having the concept PET
FISH requires you to have the concepts PET and FISH.
As an argument against equating concepts with prototypes I think this is valid but it
does not apply with equal validity to the individuation of concepts in terms of
,
recognitional capacities. For it seems pretty clear that if one has the ability to recognise
pets and the ability to recognise fish then all one has to do to recognise a pet fish is to
decide whether it is a pet then decide whether it is a fish (cf Peacocke 2000, pp. 337-
340). Fodor is aware of this, but tries to avoid the problem by assuming that a
'recognitional capacity' is never the capacity to recognise all instances of the type of
thing referred to, but rather the ability to recognise 'good instances' of it:
Thinking centers on the notion of an instance; recognitional capacity centers on the notion of
a good instance. Unless you are God, whether you can recognise an instance of X depends on
whether it's a good instance of an X; the less good it is, the likelier you are to fail (1998a, p.
44).
19 One does not, for example, have to accept Fodor's defence of 'methodological solipsism' (1980,
1987 chapter 2), which he himself has now repudiated (1994).
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If this were correct then Fodor's argument would be valid, for it is clear that 'good
instances' suffer the same problems of compositionality as prototypes. It seems to me,
however, that Fodor is mistaken in limiting recognitional capacities to the recognition
of good instances and, moreover, this limitation is inconsistent with Fodor's own
adherence to 'informational semantics' (on which see Fodor 1987, 1994, 1998 p. 12).
It is important, first of all, to distinguish being able to recognise any instance of X
from always being able to recognise an X I cannot always recognise red things; there
are circumstances under which a red thing may not look red to me and I may judge it
to be some other ~?lour. But this is quite different from the claim that there are red
things which I could not, under any circumstances, recognise as red. Since, as a matter
of fact, I do have the ability to recognise red things I suggest that any object which
does not look red to me under any circumstances is not red.
Fodor goes wrong because he tacitly assumes that, for example, the concept FISH
refers to fish of all kinds even though someone might only be able to recognise certain
kinds of fish. If we abstract from the effects of deference to others this cannot be right.
Maybe, as a matter of fact, my ability to recognise fish is not comprehensive; I judge
dolphins to be fish and I am a bit unsure about eels. I can, however, defer to experts
who can correct me on this. A defender of recognitional concepts, however, will
probably conclude from this that FISH is not a recognitional concept (where a
recognitional concept is one an account of whose individuation makes essential
reference to a particular recognitional Way of Referring). Purely recognitional
concepts are not supposed to involve deference to others; to possess the putative
recognitional concept X it is necessary to have the ability to recognise instances of X
without assistance. In that case, surely, the reference of my concept X is whatever I am
(under the right circumstances) disposed to recognise as an X Not, of course,
whatever I judge to be an instance of X under any circumstances; this would leave no
room for error. But if my use of the concept RED rests on a recognitional capacity then,
as I said above, any object which I never judge to be red under normal circumstances is
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not red. By the same token if I have a concept FISH for which my only Way of
Referring is a recognitional capacity which picks out only 'good instances' (such as
trout, but not eels) then this concept does not refer to fish at all: it refers only to
certain kinds offish. All of this follows, incidentally, from Russell's Principle.
Now Fodor, as mentioned above, advocates informational semantics. Roughly
speaking, this is the view that a concept refers to a certain item (object or property)
because it carries information (in the sense of Dretske 1981) about that item. Just as
the sound of a smoke alarm carries the information that the building is on fire a
tokening of RED (a~ in 'that is red') carries the information that there is something red
in the vicinity. This requires, of course, that tokenings of RED are normally caused by
the presence of red things. If a given thing is picked out by a recognitional Way of
Referring associated with a concept then the presence of that thing will typically cause
tokenings of the concept, so informational semantics and the notion that reference can
be determined by a recognitional capacity are perfectly consistent with one another.
Now, if the recognitional capacity associated with the putative recognitional
concept X is only sensitive to good instances of X, and if there is no other Way of
Referring associated with the concept X, then it must be only good instances of X that
cause tokenings of X. But then, according to informational semantics, the concept X
does not refer to instances of X ~t all, but only to certain instances of it (the 'good'
ones). My tokening of the concept FISH would be caused by the presence of trout but
not by the presence of eels which implies, according to informational semantics, that
this particular concept FISH refers to trout but not to eels. But if the reference is
determined in this way then there is no problem with compositionality; recognising an
instance of PET FISH requires only recognising that it is a pet and that it is a fish. So
Fodor's argument against recognitional concepts does not work.
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2.5 The dynamic argument/or Conceptual Atomism
Although Fodor's arguments are not conclusive a more general and conclusive
argument for Conceptual Atomism can be found by taking into account the rational
relations that can exist between thoughts entertained by a single thinker at different
times. Now, for many concepts it is necessary to consider whether the concept in
"
question is possessed only by one person or whether it is shared by others. If a concept
is shared with other people it may then be necessary to consider whether the sharing of
the concept has any effect on the principles of its individuation. For our present
purposes this would introduce an unfortunate additional complexity which could cloud
the issues. Consequently I shall start by restricting my discussion to concepts which are
possessed only by a single individual, leaving the discussion of shared concepts until
the next chapter.
This initial restriction should not be understood to imply a prior commitment to any
view about the relation between thoughts and shared languages, such as whether one is
possible without the other. There are, of course, a number of philosophers who have
argued that genuine thinking is only possible within a linguistic community (e.g.
Davidson, Kripke 1982), and that Robinson Crusoe (had he been entirely alone on a
desert island from birth) could n?t have had genuine thoughts. Fortunately, it is not
necessary to enter into this dispute because members of a linguistic community
entertain many thoughts which they do not actually express, and in some cases they
may have no public language words with which the thought could be expressed.
Imagine, for example, that a feral cat comes into my garden. On seeing the cat I can
entertain a singular thought about it. If this thought were to be expressed it would be
most natural to express it using a demonstrative. So, for example, I might think:
(3) I have never seen that feral cat in the garden before
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If the thought was left unexpressed, however, then the particular token of the
demonstrative 'that feral cat' would never occur as an item of a spoken language. Yet
the mode of presentation would surely still be available whether or not the
demonstrative was uttered. Furthermore, the cat might start to make regular
appearances in the garden and I might develop the ability to recognise it every time I
saw it. I could then start to think about the cat even when it was not present, satisfying
Russell's Principle in virtue of the acquired recognitional capacity. I might therefore
think:
(4) I wonder whether that feral cat will visit today
Equally, I might invent a name for the cat:
(5) I wonder ifFergal will visit today
Now, this name could be introduced into common currency so that it could be used in
communication with others. But it does not seem remotely plausible that this has to
occur in order for me to be able to think singular thoughts about Fergal. By the same
token, it would not be plausible !o suggest that an explorer who travelled alone to an
unpopulated foreign land and returned having invented names for the places, flora and
fauna discovered there would not have been entertaining thoughts expressible using
those names prior to returning to the linguistic community. So although it could in
principle be argued that membership of a linguistic community is required in some
general sense in order to be able to think (though I am not advocating this position
myself), it is surely not plausible that each and every thought component must
correspond to a linguistic term that is in common currency; apart from anything else, it
would make it mysterious how new terms get introduced in the first place.
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Let us now return to an argument discussed above for the association of Ways of
Thinking with Ways of Referring. This argument had the following general form:
suppose I identify an object in two different ways, corresponding to two different
Ways of Referring W land W2. Then it is always possible for me not to realise that the
object identified in way Wl is the same as the object identified in way Wl. But
whenever there is an informative identity there are two different Ways of Thinking of
the object, so the two different Ways of Referring must correspond to two different
Ways of Thinking. Hence Ways of Thinking must be individuated in terms of Ways of
Referring.
There is clearly something in this argument which is correct. Indeed, I entirely
accept that when an object is referred to in two different ways at the same time then if
it is informative for the subject that the objects referred to in those two different ways
are one and the same then there are two different Ways of Thinking of the object, that
is, two different concepts. Consequently I must accept that there is a sense in which a
Way of Thinking can be individuated in terms of the Way of Referring with which it is
associated at a given time.
What I do not accept, however, is the inference from this to the conclusion that it is
constitutive of a particular Way of Thinking that it is associated with a particular Way
of Referring. Clearly this concl~sion does not follow deductively from the premises
stated so far, for no account is taken of the possibility that Ways of Thinking could be
associated with different Ways of Referring at different times.
In fact a simple application of the Transparency Principle shows that there are
circumstances under which a concept possessed at one time is identical to a concept
possessed at a different time but associated with a different Way of Referring. Consider
a case in which a demonstrative Way of Referring is exchanged for a recognitional or
descriptive Way of Referring. Returning to the example given above, when I see the
cat in my garden for the very first time my perception of the cat affords me a
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demonstrative Way of Referring to it. I might then make some judgment about it, for
instance:
(6) That feral cat is younger than the cat that lives next door
In this particular example a complex demonstrative, 'that feral cat' (as opposed to a
simple demonstrative 'that') is used. This may imply that the demonstrative is
supplemented with an element of description; the fact that the object in question is a
feral cat helps me .~oavoid confusion with other objects in the vicinity. It is not crucial
to our current concerns, however, whether or not there is any supplementary
descriptive or recognitional element; all that matters is that we are considering a Way
of Referring which is predominantly demonstrative.
Now, suppose that while looking at the cat I notice that it has certain very
distinctive features. I might notice these features in such a way that I am able to
describe them explicitly; I might be able to say for example that the cat has two black
spots on its tail. On the other hand, I may simply acquire the ability to recognise it
without being able to say how, just as we are able to recognise human faces without
being able to say how we do it. Let us also suppose that I live on an island on which I
know that there are only three ca,ts and that I have seen the other two cats already and
I know that they do not have the distinguishing features which I currently perceive.
These distinguishing features therefore allow me to distinguish the cat I am now
perceiving from all other things. They afford me a Way of Referring to the cat which is
independent of my perception. This Way of Referring could be descriptive,
recognitional or a combination of the two. This kind of transition from a demonstrative
to a recognitional or descriptive Way of Referring is, of course, extremely common in
everyday life; it is almost always necessary to make such a transition in order to think
about something which is no longer perceived.
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After the cat has left I can continue to think about it using the new Way of
Referring. I can think of it as 'that feral cat' or I can name it 'Fergal' as described
above (remember that for the time being we are supposing that if I invent any names I
keep them to myself). Now, if I continued to think about the cat under these
circumstances I would, ceteris paribus, be rationally obliged to continue to predicate
the same things of it.20 In other words, given my earlier thought, (6), it would be
irrational of me to dissent from the thought that:
(7) That feral cat is younger than the cat that lives next door
when this thought occurred after the perception of the cat had ceased. My thinking
would occur in one continuous episode between seeing the cat and continuing to think
of it and hold things true of it as it went out of sight. I would simply continue to think
of the cat as the same one throughout. And if, once it was out of sight, I decided to
adopt the nickname 'Fergal' for it then it would be equally irrational of me to dissent
from the thought that:
(8) Fergal is younger than the cat that lives next door
Let us put this a little more abstractly. I started at time tl with a thought of the form 'a
is F'. At a later time tz the fact that I earlier assented to 'a is F' made it irrational for
me to dissent from a certain thought of the form 'b is F'. 'a' corresponds to the first
token of 'that feral cat' and 'b' corresponds to the second token (or the token of
'Fergal'). There are, I suggest, only two ways that this can be explained. The simplest,
which I claim to be correct, is that 'a' and 'b' both express the same Way of Thinking
(the same concept). That way, it is easy to account for the irrationality of dissenting
20 The 'ceteris paribus' is to exclude cases in which I simply forget or change my mind about whether
the predicate applies. See chapter 1, above.
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from (7) or (8); for on this view (7) is the same thought as (6) and one should not
assent to a thought at one moment and dissent from it a moment later without a
reason. And since (8) stands in the same rational relation to (6) the same point applies;
there must be a single concept expressed by both 'that feral cat' in (6) and 'Fergal' in
(8).21 In other words, someone who thinks that 'a is F' at tl would, ceteris paribus, be
irrational to dissent from 'a is F' a moment later; so the suggestion that in fact 'a' and
,.
'b' express the same mode of presentation explains things very easily. This is, in effect,
a straightforward application of the Transparency Principle.
The altemativ~ view says that the Way of Thinking of the cat changes as soon as the
Way of Referring to it changes (i.e. as soon as the cat goes out of sight and a
demonstrative identification is no longer possible). In our more abstract notation the
suggestion is that 'a' and 'b' express different Ways of Thinking. But it is necessary to
explain the rational relation which exists between the thought at it and the thought at h
(why assent to the former makes it irrational to dissent from the latter). The only way
that this can be explained is for there to be an identity judgment of the form 'a = b' so
that the thoughts at tl and h are related by an inference of the form: 'a is F; a = b;
therefore b is F' .
Now, in order for the identity 'a = b' to be a possible object of thought it would be
necessary to entertain the differ~nt Ways of Thinking expressed by 'a' and 'b' at the
same time. This means the cat would be thought of in two different ways at once:
demonstratively and either recognitionally or descriptively. There would of course be a
temporal overlap in the two Ways of Referring; since we are supposing that the
recognitional capacity or descriptive information is gained from the perceptual
encounter with the cat there must be a period of time during which this new Way of
21 One slight qualification: I am assuming that 'Feargal' and the demonstrative in (6) express the
same singular mode of presentation. But it need not be the case that (6) and (8) express exactly the
same overall thought, because (6) involves predicating of the object in question that it is a feral cat
whereas (8) does not. This qualification would have been unnecessary if the demonstrative in (6) were
not complex. For more on the nature of the thoughts expressed using complex demonstratives see
chapter 6.
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Referring has been acquired but the cat is also still identified demonstratively. So it
could be very tempting for the theorist who holds that there is a constitutive relation
between Ways of Thinking and Ways of Referring to suppose that there are indeed two
different Ways of Thinking of the cat at once, and that the rational relation between the
earlier and later thoughts is due to a judgment of identity between the two Ways of
Thinking of the cat:
(9) That feral cat (thought about demonstratively) = that feral cat (thought about
recognitionallyl descriptively)
This, however, cannot be correct. It is not plausible that there must be two
simultaneous Ways of Thinking of the cat in the situation described. Ways of Thinking
are supposed to be psychologically real; where there are different Ways of Thinking an
identity between them is supposed to be at least potentially informative. But there is no
possibility of an informative identity between two different Ways of Thinking of the cat
in the circumstances described (which are simply that I see a cat and notice its
distinguishing features). If there were two different Ways of Thinking, 'a' and 'b', then
it ought at least to be possible to make sense of a suggestion that 'a is F but b is not
F. But it is not possible to make sense of such a suggestion in the case in question.
There is no way to make sense of a thought such as:
(10) That feral cat (thought about demonstratively) is younger than the cat that lives
next door, but that feral cat (thought about recognitionally/descriptively) is not
younger than the cat that lives next door
It is not merely that such a thought would be obviously contradictory; rather, in the
circumstances described it does not seem possible to entertain such a thought at all.
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It is important when thinking about this matter to make a distinction between a
judgment of identity and a judgment that an object has a certain property. Consider the
distinction between the following two judgments:
(11) a is the <p
(12) a = b (where b is identified descriptively as 'the <p')
A similar pair, using Kaplan's terminology, would be:
(13) that is the <p
(14) that = dthat (the <p)
The first judgment in each pair ascribes a property to an object; it says that the object is
uniquely <p. The second judgment, by contrast, is an identity statement; an object
thought about in one way is identified with ?Jl object thought about in another way.
Two possible analyses of (II), for example, would be:
(IS):Ix [a = x & <px& Vy (oy ~ y = x)]
(16) <pa& vv (oy ~ y = a)'
I suspect that (16) is a better analysis since intuitively (11) does not make any assertion
about existence, but in any case both versions clearly differ from an identity such as
(12). A similar distinction could be made between (13) and (14). It is essential to be
able to make distinctions of this kind, for otherwise there would be no such thing as
ascribing properties to objects. There would only be judgments of identity between
differently identified objects, a possibility whose implausibility I take for granted.
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In the example of the cat it is clear that in acquiring a recognitional capacity or a
descriptive Way of Referring I make a judgment ascribing properties to the cat rather
than identifying a demonstratively identified cat with a recognitionally or descriptively
identified cat. For example, I might first see the cat, then judge that:
(17) That feral cat has two black spots on its tail
This is an entirely different judgment from, for example:
(18) That feral cat (demonstrative) = dthat feral cat (the one with two black spots
on its tail)
Whereas (18) involves two different Ways of Thinking of the cat, (17) is a subject-
predicate judgment involving only one Way of Thinking. The property that is ascribed
in (17) can, however, be used to identify the cat once it has disappeared from sight.
The same principle applies to the acquisition of a recognitional capacity except that
there is no articulated ascription of a property (at most there could be an ascription of
the property of 'looking like that'). Hence, strictly speaking, the acquisition of a
recognitional capacity need not, involve a judgment at all, but this only strengthens my
point.
To sum up, we started from the observation that assenting to a thought of the form
'a is F can make it irrational to dissent from a thought of the form 'b is F at a later
time even though 'a' and 'b' are associated with different Ways of Referring. In our
example 'a' is associated with a demonstrative Way of Referring and 'b' is associated
with either a recognitional or a descriptive Way of Referring. We then noted that if the
Way of Referring associated with 'b' was acquired from the perceptual episode which
provided the demonstrative Way of Referring associated with 'a' then the rational
relation between 'a' and 'b' is not explained by an identity judgment 'a = b'. It follows
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that 'a' and 'b' must express the same concept. And since 'a' and 'b' are associated
with different Ways of Referring it cannot be the case that concepts are individuated in
terms of Ways of Referring. The latter can change while the former remains the same.
Consequently an account of the individuation of a given concept makes no essential
reference to any particular Way of Referring; Conceptual Atomism is correct.
Although I have used an example where a demonstrative Way of Referring is
"
exchanged for a recognitional or descriptive Way of Referring the same sort of case
can be made whenever there is a transition from one Way of Referring to another.
There could, for example, be changes in the descriptive or recognitional information
used to identify the reference which would allow the kind of psychological continuity
through time which requires there to be a continuous Way of Thinking. I have
discussed only terms which refer to objects but nothing I have said is specific to any
one kind of term. Changes in the Way of Referring occur more rarely with terms which
refer to properties but they can nevertheless occur for some concepts and a similar
argument can be constructed. There may be some concepts for which there is only one
possible Way of Referring to the reference in which case no comparable argument
about the dynamics of such concepts can be constructed. If Conceptual Atomism offers
a satisfactory account for all concepts, however, whereas its rivals fail for all but
certain special cases then it seems reasonable to accept Conceptual Atomism as an,
account of all concepts.
2.6 Changing one's mind
The persistence of the identities of various things through time is a fundamental
metaphysical feature of the world.22 It is required in order for there to be such a thing
22 In saying this, I do not intend to take any position on the endurance/perdurance debate in temporal
metaphysics(Lewis 1986); both notions are consistent with the present point.
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as change because in order for it to make sense to say that something changes,
something must persist." This is reflected in the fact that in order for one to change
one's mind about the nature of something, rather than merely changing one's beliefs,
there must be a mode of presentation of it which persists while what is predicated of it
changes.
This is, in effect, another way to express the key idea behind the dynamic argument
for Conceptual Atomism. For the majority of concepts it is possible to change one's
mind about almost any property which one predicates of the concept without changing
the concept. 24 T.~s includes the properties which one uses at a given time to identify
the reference of the concept, so long as they can be replaced by some other Way of
Referring. This applies to recognitional capacities as well as to descriptive
identifications; if, for example, someone identifies me in virtue of a capacity to
recognise my face they will have to update this recognitional capacity as I get older
and my appearance changes. I may end up looking quite different to the way I looked
when I was younger and the recognitional capacity will make use of quite different
features of my appearance. Yet there is still the same mode of presentation of me
throughout; so long as the updating process is reasonably continuous, allowing a
gradual transition of the recognitional capacity (so that there are no intervals between
encounters with me which are, long enough that I might not be recognised), I will
simply be thought of as the same person, looking gradually older.
The relation between changing one's mind and the retention of a concept was drawn
attention to in the context of indexical thoughts by David Kaplan (1989, pp. 537-8):
I want briefly to raise the problem of cognitive dynamics. Suppose that yesterday you said,
and believed it, 'It is a nice day today'. What does it mean to say, today, that you have
23 This point is made by many philosophers including Kant in the First Analogy of the Critique of
Pure Reason (1933) where it is used in an argument for the existence of persisting 'substance'.
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retained that belief? It seems unsatisfactory to just believe the same content under any old
character - where is the retention? ..What does it mean to say of an individual who at one
time sincerely asserted a sentence containing indexicals that at some later time he has (or has
not) changed his mind with respect to his assertion? (p. 537n).
The distinction that Kaplan has in mind is between sequences of thoughts such as the
following:
(19) At tr: Cicero was a great orator
(20) At h: Cicero was not a great orator
(21) At h: Cicero was a great orator
(22) At h: Tully was not a great orator
Let us assume that 'Cicero' and 'Tully' both refer to the same person but that the
person who thinks the above thoughts does not know this. In that case there is a sense
in which the sequence (19)-(20) can represent a change of mind but (21 )-(22) cannot.
In both cases the same kontent is entertained at h but there is clearly an important
difference at the level of thought. Changing one's mind cannot just mean changing
from saying, of something, that is it F to saying, of that same thing, that it is not F
(purely at the level of kontent) because that is what happens in both of the cases just
described but only one of them involves changing one's mind. Kaplan assumes that
differences like those between (19)-(20) and (21)-(22) must be explained at the level of
character, but he has certain difficulties in making his account work."
24·Theexceptions include concepts like BACHELOR, where is does not appear possible to change one's
mind about whether bachelors are unmarried men. As 1 argue below (section 3.3), however, the
existence of such concepts does nothing to refute conceptual atomism.
25 Kaplan discusses cognitive dynamics with regard to indexicals but in fact examples like the
Cicero/Tully one present Kaplan with an even bigger problem than indexicals. This is because the
character of a proper name is just a function assigning it a reference, which means that 'Cicero' and
'Tully' have the same character. Kaplan was aware of this problem even at the time: 'I claimed that a
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A different account of concept individuation solves the problem, however; in (19)-
(20) there is a change of mind because at ti something is predicated of the concept
CICERO and at h its negation is predicated also of CICERO. In (21 )-(22), by contrast,
the concepts to which the predicates apply change between ti and h so the former
thought is not understood as having any bearing on the latter.
Now, suppose that at tl while the cat is in sight in the garden I think:
(23) That feral cat (identified demonstratively) is in the garden
Then at tz, as soon as the cat leaves the garden and simultaneously goes out of site, I
think:
(24) That feral cat (identified recognitionally/descriptively) is not in the garden
The suggestion made above implies that the sequence (23)-(24) is like the Cicero-
Cicero sequence (19)-(20) rather than the Cicero-Tully sequence (21)_(22).26 The
second thought, (24), has the kind of rational bearing on the earlier thought, (23), that
makes it possible to describe the sequence as a change of mind rather than a sequence
competent speaker knows the character of words. This suggests (even if it does not imply) that if two
proper names have the same character, the competent speaker knows that. But he doesn't.' (1989 pp.
562-3).
26 Strictly speaking, (23) and (24) should be understood to imply that the cat is or is not currently in
the garden. Since the two thoughts occur at different times they therefore do not contradict one
another. But there is still a relevant sense in which this counts as a change of mind. The later thought
still has the relevant bearing on the earlier thought; I am aware that what I think now is a change
from what I thought about that (same) feral cat earlier on. Consider, as a further example, the
difference between the sequences 'Cicero is alive; Cicero is dead' and 'Tully is alive; Cicero is dead'.
In the former sequence the new piece of information (that Cicero is dead) has a bearing on the
preceding thought (that Cicero is alive) even though, if the thoughts occur at different times, the later
thought does not strictly contradict the earlier one. There is no such relation between the thoughts in
the latter sequence. I could, of course, have chosen a predicate for (23) and (24) for which there was a
strict contradiction; the current one, however, helps to illustrate the point I am making about the
transition from a demonstrative to a recognitional Way of Referring.
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of unrelated thoughts?' Consequently a concept is retained from (23) to (24). But, to
reiterate the argument, only Conceptual Atomism can reconcile this retention with the
fact that the concepts in (23) and (24) involve different Ways of Referring.
2.7 Reason and Perception
There are surprisingly few explicit arguments in favour of Inferential Role Semantics
apart from the. standard Fregean one discussed above." There is, however, an
argument which has been expounded in recent years by Christopher Peacocke (1992,
2000) to which it is necessary to respond in detail because it has in common with my
own argument the fact that it appeals to the need to individuate concepts in such a way
as to make rational sense of the thinker.
Peacocke describes his view as a version of Fregean Inferential Role Semantics
(IRS). He characterises two key features of such theories (2000, p. 332):
(I) We need in psychological explanation and in epistemology a notion of a way of
thinking individuated by the Fregean Criterion of informativeness.
(II) The notion of a way of thinking motivated by (I) is either individuated by, or at
least is constrained in various constitutive ways, by its conceptual or inferential
role.
Principle (I) is what makes a theory Fregean. Principle (II) is what makes it a version
of Inferential Role Semantics. Peacocke (2000, p. 332) explains the relation between
these two principles and the rationality of the thinker as follows:
27 Michael Luntley (1998, 1999 chapter 12) makes some related points about indexicals. See below,
chapter 5.
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What all Fregean IRS theories, of whatever stripe, agree upon is the central place of reasons
and rationality in the individuation of concepts. Reasons for making judgments are central in
any Fregean theory, since the informativeness criterion appeals to what can be reasonably
judged in given circumstances. The distinctive claim of the Fregean IRS theorist is then that
we can give a philosophical explanation of how reasons contribute to the individuation of
concepts by appealing to inferential or conceptual role.
Now, this assumes that there is something more to the 'inferential role' of a term than
is implied by principle (I). To see what is implied by principle (I), for example, consider
the fact that an alternative way of capturing the Fregean informativeness criterion
would be to appeal to the notion of formally valid inference." To say that 'a = b' is
informative while 'a =a' is not could, for example, be seen as equivalent to saying that
(25) is a valid inference while (26) is not:"
(25) ~a =a
(26) ~a = b
There is, of course, a notion of 'valid inference' according to which an inference is
valid whenever it is the case that if the assumptions are true the conclusions are true.
This would make (26) a valid inference. But another notion of validity is relevant here;
an inference is valid, and should be drawn by any rational person, if it has a valid form.
(25) is valid in this sense because whatever 'a' refers to an inference of that form is
28 Fodor (1998, 2000) notes at some length how surprisingly few explicit arguments there are in
favour of Inferential Role Semantics even though some version of the position is often taken for
granted in both philosophy and cognitive science.
29 This way of individuating concepts (sense) is described by John Campbell 1987, 1994, pp. 73-82.
Timothy Williamson (1997) registers an objection, but see Campbell's (1997a, pp. 664-669) response.
30 I use the symbol' F as the 'assertion sign' (Lemmon 1987, pp. 11-12): assumptions are listed on
the left of the sign and the conclusion which is held to follow from those assumptions is stated on the
right. (25) and (26) are therefore being claimed to follow from no assumptions (incorrectly in the case
of (26».
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valid. We could substitute any other term for 'a' in (25) (in both positions) and obtain
a valid inference. This cannot be said for (26).
It will perhaps be clearer that this point concerns inference in general and not just
judgments of identity if we consider another example:
(27) a is F, a is G ~a is both F and G
(28) a is F, b is G ~a is both F and G
Once again, if 'a = b' is true then in both cases true assumptions entail a true
conclusion. But only (27) is formally valid; someone who does not know that a = b can
rationally make the transition represented by (27) but not the transition represented by
(28). (27) is formally valid because all of the occurrences of 'a' express the same mode
of presentation whereas (28) is not formally valid because 'b' expresses a different
one." This is what the individuation of modes of presentation has to capture. This is
one sense, then, in which any Fregean should agree that modes of presentation must be
individuated in such a way as to capture their 'inferential roles'. Let us call an
inferential role, construed as that aspect of the role of a term which is required for
inferences containing it to be formally valid, a formal inferential role. This is a very
insubstantial notion of a 'role', for terms of the same category (such as names) do not
differ in their formal inferential role (if all of the 'a's are substituted with 'b's, for
example, the validity of the inference is not changed). The notion is therefore far too
coarse-grained to be used to individuate concepts.
31 I am not assuming that modes of presentation can be individuated by symbol type; I do not deny
that different tokens of the same symbol 'a' could be used in expressing different modes of
presentation. I shall, however, stipulate that my terminology avoids this. If an inference can be written
down with the same form as (27) without being valid then this is because different tokens of the same
symbol type are in fact being used to express different modes of presentation. But if we adopt a
terminology which makes transparent what is going on at the level of thought then, by stipulation, this
will not occur. See, once again, Williamson 1997 and Campbell I997a, and see also Luntley 1999, pp.
303-312.
Concepts I: What Concepts Cannot Be 64
All of this, as Peacocke seems to tacitly acknowledge in the quotation above, is
implied by principle (I). Principle (II), however, says that modes of presentation as
required by (I) can be individuated (or have their individuation constrained) by their
inferential role. If this is not trivial then there must be more to the inferential role of a
term than its formal inferential role. Peacocke thinks there is; moreover, he thinks that
terms which are associated with different Ways of Referring have different inferential
roles and it is this which makes them different concepts.
Peacocke does not apply this reasoning to all differences in Ways of Referring. He
shows signs, for example, of accepting the idea that there could be changes in
descriptive Ways of Referring without changes in the concept:
Recognition of the level of concepts in the present sense is also needed for a proper
description of cases in which there is a change of prototype or of relatively central beliefs
associated with a concept. Indeed, as elsewhere, describing a case as one of change, rather
than as one of replacement, is correct only if there is something that persists through the
change, and it is the concept in my sense that so'persists (1992, p. 3).
Peacocke's main focus, however, is on recognitional and demonstrative Ways of
Referring and the concepts which he takes to be constitutively related to these. To take
one of Peacocke's own favourite examples, he argues that it is possible for someone to
possess different concepts SQUARE and REGULAR DIAMOND which refer to the same
shape property. Moreover, he argues that when presented with an object in the
orientation of figure la (below) it may be rationally required for the subject to judge
that 'that is a square' rather than 'that is a regular diamond', and vice versa for figure
lb. It is, Peacocke claims, constitutive of these concepts that someone who possesses
them makes these judgments as described and not, for example, the other way around.
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la lb
Strictly speaking, it is not the orientation of the shapes that matters but rather the
symmetries to which the subject is sensitive. Peacocke (1992, pp. 74-7) argues that
perceiving something as square requires an awareness of the symmetries around lines
parallel to its sides whereas perceiving something as' a regular diamond requires an
awareness of its symmetries relative to its diagonals. Consequently it is in fact possible
for most of us to perceive figure 1b as square and figure 1a as a regular diamond; the
difference in the two orientations simply makes certain symmetries more salient. There
could, however, be a subject who only noticed the square-symmetries for shapes in the
orientation of figure 1a and only noticed the regular diamond-symmetries for shapes in
the orientation of figure lb. If a subject of this kind was presented with figure la it
would, according to Peacocke (2000), be rationally obligatory for that subject to judge
that 'that is a square' rather than 'that is a regular diamond', and vice versa for figure
lb.
It is important to realise that SQUARE and REGULAR DIAMOND are what Peacocke
calls 'observational concepts'. They are not the geometrical concepts usually expressed
using the same names; for, of course, anyone with the geometrical concept of a square
might check on whether something was square by making measurements rather than by
simply looking, and if they did they would find that both la and lb are (approximately)
square. Rather, these are supposed to be concepts which pick out a certain shape just
because of the way it appears to the subject. The extensions of the observational and
geometrical terms need not be the same. Consequently, for example, something might
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be correctly judged to be square in the observational sense which is not precisely
square in the geometrical sense. Roughly speaking, something is square in the
observational sense if and only if it appears square to a normal observer under normal
conditions. The same applies, mutatis mutandis, to regular diamonds; and Peacocke is
presumably considering a subject whose perceptual sensitivities are such that they pick
out the very same shape property with SQUARE and REGULAR DIAMOND, the difference
in the concept judged depending only on the different ways in which the shape is
identified (the difference in the symmetries to which the subject is sensitive)."
Since, Peacocke argues, a subject with the dispositions described above is rationally
obliged to judge that 'that is a square' rather than 'that is a regular diamond' on being
presented with I a, and since concepts are to be individuated so as to respect such
rational considerations, it must be the case that SQUARE and REGULAR DIAMOND are
different concepts; each of them being constitutively associated with a different
recognitional Way of Referring. Being confronted with la gives the subject a reason to
judge that 'that is a square' and being confronted with lb gives the subject a reason to
judge that 'that is a regular diamond' but not vice versa. The individuation of concepts
must respect the reasons the subject has for accepting a content containing a given
concept, so the rational relation just described constrains the individuation of the
concepts.
Individuating concepts in this way does not merely add an extra fineness of grain to
the principles of rational individuation that were applied in the diachronic cases
described above. On the contrary, despite appealing to the same grounds of
rationalising individuation, Peacocke's theory is in direct conflict with the diachronic
individuation of concepts for which I have been arguing. It says that certain concepts
32 SQUARE and REGULAR DIAMOND do not, however, refer to a relation between the shape and the
observer; i.e. it is not the case that something is square only if it is in the correct orientation with
respect to the observer. This would be an example of what, in chapter 6, I call an 'egocentric
predicate'. Rather, the reference of the concepts currently under discussion is simply a mind-
independent shape, which can be picked out in two different ways (i.e. using two different perceptual
dispositions).
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must be different where my theory says that they must be the same. In my opinion,
Peacocke's individuation of concepts offers us no explanation of many diachronic
cases of the kind discussed above. By the same token, however, in order for my theory
to be acceptable I must show where Peacocke goes wrong.
Peacocke's argument requires there to be a sense in which SQUARE and REGULAR
DIAMOND differ in their inferential roles, where there is more to an inferential role than
a merely formal inferential role. SQUARE and REGULAR DIAMOND can be seen to be
different concepts from the fact that (29) is a valid inference whereas (30) is not:
(29)/is square, g is square ~both/and g are square
(30)/is square, g is a regular diamond ~both/and g are square
But Peacocke thinks that the difference between SQUARE and REGULAR DIAMOND has
to do with the difference in their 'inferential roles', the supposed difference between
whether a rational subject should apply one ,concept or the other in certain perceptual
situations, as described above. If it can be shown, however, that there is nothing more
to the inferential role of a term than its formal inferential role then Peacocke's attempt
to explain the latter in terms of the former clearly fails.
I shall first show that Peacocke's example of SQUARE and REGULAR DIAMOND fails
to prove his point then I shall give some more general arguments against his view. In
order to be able to compare the concepts SQUARE and REGULAR DIAMOND on equal
terms it is necessary to assume that REGULAR DIAMOND is a simple, unstructured
concept (for which there is, as far as I know, no word in English) rather than a
complex concept made up of REGULAR and DIAMOND. But because it is very natural
when thinking about this example to have in mind the complex concept rather than the
novel simple one, one's intuitions get rather distorted. Someone who possesses the
complex concept REGULAR DIAMOND must possess the concept DIAMOND, and in order
to possess the concept DIAMOND one must possess a way of distinguishing diamonds
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from all other things. The concept DIAMOND is not, of course, co-referential with the
concept SQUARE and in order to judge that something is a diamond it may well be
necessary to be sensitive to the symmetries made salient by lb rather than la. If the
simple concept which we are invited to consider is called 'REGULAR DIAMOND' it is
therefore likely to retain this association, which naturally pushes one's intuitions in the
direction in which Peacocke wishes them to go. Let us therefore refrain from calling
this the concept REGULAR DIAMOND and call it REG instead.
Now, suppose that a subject has only the concept SQUARE and not the concept REG
and suppose that this subject only ever notices that something is square when it is in
the orientation of I a. Someone could take a square object in the orientation of 1a and,
before the subject's eyes, rotate it through forty five degrees, saying 'look, squares can
look like this'. The subject might, at this point, become aware of the diagonal
symmetries of the shape for the first time. But this would not be a discovery that
squares and regs are the same thing; rather, it would be the acquisition of a new way of
identifying squares, for the rotated shape was kept track of throughout and had already
been recognised as a square. So now the reference of a single concept, SQUARE, could
be identified using either of the two symmetries. It would even be possible for the
subject to subsequently forget about the symmetries normally associated with squares
while still retaining the same concept. None of this would be possible, however, if the
concept SQUARE was constitutively tied to a particular Way of Referring, as Peacocke
suggests. This argument is, of course, just a particular application of the more general
dynamic argument for Conceptual Atomism discussed above in section 2.5.
Just in case the intuition that the concept REG is acquired when the shape is rotated
still seems compelling, consider how crazy the same reasoning would seem when
applied to concepts more generally. Consider, for example, what happens when
Jacques Chirac, whom I had previously only been able to recognise from the front,
turns around before my eyes. I now acquire the ability to recognise Jacques Chirac by
looking at the back of his head, as well as from the front. Does this mean that I acquire
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a new concept JACQUESCHIRAC (SEENFROM BEHIND)to add to my pre-existing
concept JACQUESCHIRAC(SEENFROM rns FRONT)? Of course not. SQUAREand REG
should not be treated any differently.
It should be possible to construct a similar argument for any pair of co-referential
concepts. If this is correct then Peacocke's argument is refuted. We can, however,
consider what is wrong with views of this kind at a deeper, more general level. The
general structure of the argument was as follows: firstly, it was observed that the
individuation of concepts must respect the reasons that someone might have for
accepting a co~tent containing a given concept. This I accept. Secondly, however, it
was claimed that particular types of perceptual experiences provide reasons for
accepting certain contents. It was inferred from this that there are certain concepts
whose individuation is constitutively related to particular perceptual sensitivities or
recognitional capacities.
The problem with this line of argument is that it does not work if the content of
experience is itself conceptual, yet unless experience is conceptual there can be no
rational relation between experience and belief. If experience is conceptual then the
claim that a perception as of an F provides a reason to believe that the perceived item
is an F cannot be used to individuate concepts without circularity. So Peacocke's
argument only makes sense o~ the assumption that the putative reasons are given by
something extra-conceptual; presumably the supposed non-conceptual content of
perception."
A number of philosophers have attacked the idea that anything extra-conceptual
could stand in a rational relation to belief. Donald Davidson, for example, claims that
33 It is only 'observational concepts' that should be considered here. Suppose that I cannot recognise
dodecagons except by counting their twelve sides. Then I could have a conceptual representation of
something as, for example, a shape or a polygon without immediately recognising it as a dodecagon;
hence there would be no need to posit non-conceptual content as a reason for accepting that a
perceived shape is a dodecagon. My judgment (based on counting) that the shape has twelve sides
might of course form part of an inference which leads to my judging it to be a dodecagon. But
Peacocke's idea is presumably that observational concepts are not like this; and that one is able to
recognise squares, regular diamonds, red things etc. immediately and non-inferentially.
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'nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief except another belief (1990, p.
123). He argues as follows:
Suppose we say that sensations themselves, verbalised or not, justify certain beliefs that go
beyond what is given in sensation. So, under certain conditions, having the sensation of seeing
a green light flashing may justify the belief that a green light is flashing. The problem is to see
how the sensation justifies the belief. Of course, if someone has the sensation of seeing a
green light flashing, it is likely, under certain circumstances, that a green light is flashing. We
can say this, since we know of his sensation, but he can't say it, since we are supposing he is
justified without having to depend on believing he has the sensation. Suppose he believed he
didn't have the sensation. Would the sensation still justify him in the belief in an objective
green light? (1990, pp. 124-5).
Davidson presumably construes 'sensation' as something extra-conceptual. One
cannot, of course, give a reason for believing that one has certain sensations; one just
does believe it.34 But although he does not think that sen~ations justify beliefs Davidson
does not imagine that beliefs are adopted independently of the way things are:
The relation between a sensation and a belief cannot be logical, since sensations are not
beliefs or other propositional attitudes. What then is the relation? The answer is, I think,
obvious: the relation is causal. Sensations cause some beliefs and in this sense are the basis or
ground of those beliefs. But a causal explanation of a belief does not show how or why the
belief is justified (1990, p. 125).
34 Peacocke (1986, p. 111), in responding to the remark by Davidson quoted above, casts doubt on
whether it is intelligible for someone to have an experience of a certain subjective character yet believe
that there is no such experience. Even if this is correct it does little to deflate Davidson's overall point.
But if it is correct it also lends support to the claim that ultimately some beliefs must be accepted
without justification; for in order for an experience to justify my belief that I am having a certain
experience there would have to be a gap between whatever it is that is supposed to justify the belief
and the belief itself. That gap seems to be lacking in the case of subjective experience.
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The first sentence captures a crucial point, that there is no logical relation between
sensation and belief This is clear from the fact that sensation, construed as extra-
conceptual, would always underdetermine belief As Hume (1978) showed, there is no
deductive inference from any finite set of observations to a generalisation. Attempts to
prove this conclusion wrong have been unconvincing. Attempts have been made, for
example, to show that a finite number of observations can lend probabilistic support to
a theory. But they cannot; the probability is always zero (see Miller 1994). The same
principle applies to perception. In a section of The Logic of Scientific Discovery
(1959) in which he explicitly attacks the idea that experiences justify beliefs, describing
this idea as a form of psychologism, Karl Popper argues that all empirical statements
involve universals which go beyond what can be observed (he describes this as 'the
transcendence inherent in any description' (1959, p. 94)}:
Every description uses universal names (or symbols, or ideas); every statement has the
character of a theory, of a hypothesis. The statement 'Here is a glass of water' cannot be
verified by any observational experience. The reason is that the universals which appear in it
cannot be correlated with any specific sense-experience. (An 'immediate experience' is only
once 'immediately given'; it is unique.) By the word 'glass', for example, we denote physical
bodies which exhibit a certain law-like behaviour, and the same holds for the word 'water'
(1959, pp. 94-5).
The same could be said even about terms like 'green', as can be seen from the fact that
a perception which supposedly gave a reason to believe that something is green would
give just the same reason for thinking that it was 'grue' (Goodman, 1965) .
. McDowell (1994) has recently argued strongly against the existence of non-
conceptual content and the associated idea that anything extra-conceptual could serve
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as a reason for a belief 35 McDowell's arguments are well-known and I shall not
rehearse them in detail here, but they depend on similar principles to Davidson's;
nothing extra-conceptual could possibly be the right kind of thing to impinge upon
rationality so nothing extra-conceptual could count as a reason for a belief McDowell
rejects Davidson's idea that sensation is merely the cause of beliefs, however, in favour
of a view according to which experience is inherently conceptual; it is a form of
'openness to reality' (1994, p. 26) in which beliefs are justified, albeit defeasibly,
because conceptual experience is the right kind of thing to impinge upon rationality. 36
..
In my opinion these arguments serve as a strong refutation of Peacocke's argument for
Inferential Role Semantics.
2.8 Summary
In this chapter I have argued for Conceptual Atomism 'on the grounds that there are
situations in which a Way of Referring can be exchanged for a different one over time
3S McDowell also argues explicitly against Peacocke's (1992) particular version of the claim that
something extra-conceptual could be a reason for a belief. See McDowell 1994, pp. 162-70. Bill
Brewer (1999, chapter 5) defends and elaborates upon McDowell's arguments and also deals
specifically with Peacocke's account.
36 Although I agree with much of McDowell's account I do not, in fact, agree with the claim that
experience gives absolute justification to beliefs. If one accepts Popper's (1959,1972,1989; see also
Miller 1994) overall approach to the acquisition of true beliefs then one sees that there is room for a
position according to which beliefs are accepted without justification and rationality consists in
avoiding inconsistency among one's beliefs and in subjecting beliefs to the most stringent testing
possible. One acquires a body of true belief because one is disposed to accept one's perceptions as
veridical, not because one has any reason to do so. Just as it is an inherent quality of an itch that it
brings with it a compulsion to scratch, so it is an inherent quality of perceptual experience that it
brings with it the compulsion to believe, but a compulsion is not the same thing as a reason. This view
of the role of perception is consistent with the popular view in cognitive science that perceptual
systems generate hypotheses. To accept one's perceptions as veridical (when one is 'open to reality')
would be to treat all perceptual hypotheses as true unless one adopted a belief which was inconsistent
with them. See Gregory 1970, 1981 for some of the original development of the idea and for an up-to-
date overview of the evidence from cognitive science see Papathomas 1999. Daniel C. Dennett (1991),
who occasionally hints at a Popper influence (e.g. Dennett 1975), also has a view of perception which
could be construed as compatible with this. Brewer (1999) gives an interesting argument for the claim
that perceptions provide reasons for beliefs; I do not believe that this is valid but unfortunately a
discussion of this would involve too great a departure from the arguments of this thesis.
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without a change of concept. The concept must be retained because there are rational
relations between the thoughts entertained at different times which can only be
explained by a retained concept. Consequently an account of what it is to possess a
given concept makes no essential reference to any particular Way of Referring.
I have also refuted Peacocke's version of Inferential Role Semantics, according to
which certain concepts are individuated by the rational relations in which they stand to
certain kinds of perceptions. I argued against Peacocke in two ways. Firstly, I argued
that his claim cannot be correct for the examples he uses (such as SQUARE and
REGULAR DIAMOND), because the Ways of Referring associated with these concepts
could in fact be exchanged over time. Hence their relations to perceptions of a
particular type are contingent rather than constitutive. It does not seem likely that there
could be any examples which would not be subject to this objection. Secondly,
Peacocke's argument could only work on the assumption that perception contains non-
conceptual content; an assumption which, following McDowell and others, I reject.
CHAPTER3
Concepts II: An Atomistic Theory
The purpose of the last chapter was largely negative; its main aim was to show that a
common set of views about concepts which can be grouped together under the heading
oflhferential Role Semantics should be rejected because they cannot give a satisfactory
account of cognitive dynamics. But rejecting a view is only ever fully plausible if it can
be shown that there is an acceptable alternative. In this chapter I shall outline a version
of Conceptual Atomism which has no difficulties with cognitive dynamics. According
to this theory concepts are individuated in terms of referential episodes, episodes of
ongoing reference to a particular thing during which the Way of Referring may change
in various ways provided there is the diachronic transparency required by the
Transparency Principle. A concept is created when a -referential episode begins and
ceases to exist when it ends and the difference between different concepts consists in
nothing more than the difference in numerical identity between different referential
episodes. Before describing this theory in more detail, however, I shall briefly discuss
the views of three philosophers - Gareth Evans, John McDowell and some recent
views of David Kaplan - in order to show how, despite expressing their theories in
different terms, a number of philosophers have been gradually moving towards
positions which are, or can be made compatible with, versions of Conceptual Atomism.
This will put Conceptual Atomism in a broader context and will also help with the
subsequent exposition.
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3. 1 A convergence of theories
The interpretation of Gareth Evans's (1982) theory is debatable. Evans can very easily
be interpreted as individuating Ways of Thinking in terms of Ways of Referring and I
suspect that many readers have understood him in this way. This may very well be a
correct interpretation. There is, however, some significant ambiguity in what Evans
says. I shall quote a few passages to illustrate this ambiguity, but ultimately I shall be
more concerned to describe a position which Evans could have held, given many of his
other views, rather than to debate whether or not he actually did hold it.
Here is Evans's official explanation of what he means by a 'way of thinking':
I suggest that the desired notion can be explained in terms of the notion of an account of what
makes it the case that a subject's thought is a thought about the object in question. Imagine
such an account written out. 'S is thinking about the object a in virtue of the fact that ... S ... ':
what follows 'that' is an account in which references to the subject and the object thought
about appear, possibly at several places. Now I suggest that another subject, S', can be said
to be thinking about the object a in the same way if and only if we get a true statement when
we replace reference to S with reference to S' throughout the account provided for S, deriving
'S' is thinking about a in virtue of the fact t?at ... S' ... ' (1982, pp. 20-1).
Since the account of what it is to think in a given way involves the object thought
about as well as the subject this may be a good way of capturing the Fregean idea of a
mode of presentation as a semantic notion. But in itself it tells us very little about what
Evans thought a 'way of thinking' was, because it leaves open just what kind of
account should be given of what makes it the case that the subject's thought is about
the object in question. It is, however, very tempting to read Evans's subsequent
lengthy discussion of the different varieties of reference as a discussion of precisely
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what forms such an account might take. This interpretation is especially tempting in the
light of remarks such as this one:
To give an account of how a thought concerns an object is to explain how the subject knows
which object is in question (1981, p. 289).
Thus it is very natural to interpret Evans as holding, for example, that when an object
is identified demonstratively a different account must be given of what makes it the
case that the thought concerns the object than when the object is identified by
description or by a recognitional capacity. Hence the Ways of Thinking are different in
these different cases (and in any others in which there are different Ways of Referring).
It is a little difficult, however, to reconcile this understanding of Evans with
passages such as the following:
It is important to understand that the ability to keep tr~ck of an object must allow both
subject and object to move during the period of observation. Note also that it would be quite
arbitrary to deny that the same ability can be exercised in cases in which the object
disappears momentarilybehind an obstacle (1982, p. 176).
This passage suggests that Evans believed that the Way of Thinking of an object can be
regarded as the same even if the object goes temporarily out of sight. This implies that
an object can be identified purely demonstratively for a period of time, then
recognitionally, then demonstratively again, without a change in the Way of Thinking.
Consider also:
There is indeed no general guarantee that a belief will persist. Suppose I perceive an object
and judge 'This is F, and then lose track of it. There is no guarantee that there will be
available to me a past-tense demonstrative Idea... , enabling me to judge 'That was F. (If
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such an Idea is available to me, it will need to draw on conceptual material not present in the
original demonstrativeidentification.)(1982, p. 236).
This passage states that retaining a Way of Thinking is not always possible if the object
is lost track of (making a demonstrative Way of Referring unavailable). But the last
bracketed sentence implies that such retentionis possible if the subject has acquired a
recognitional or descriptive Way of Referring during the perceptual encounter with the
object, which again seems to conflict with the individuation of Ways of Thinking in
terms of Ways of Referring: 1
Further support for a more 'atomistic' reading of Evans comes from his
endorsement of McDowell's (1977) 'austere' construal of the way in which the senses
of expressions can be given by a theory of meaning. Evans (1981) argues (following
both McDowell (1977) and to some extent Dummett (1981» that a semantic theory
for a language should be based on a theory of reference. This is a theory which assigns
a reference to each meaningful expression of the language in a way which reflects the
compositional structure of the language.' Now there can, of course, be many different
equally correct theories of reference for a given language. Two such theories could, for
example, be identical in all respects except for the fact that they offered the following
two different clauses in assigning a reference to the word 'Hesperus' (it is assumed
that 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus', as they appear on the right hand side, both refer to
the same object):
I, In quotingthese passagesand giving them the interpretationI have described,however,I do not
meanto denythat there are sectionsin whichEvanssaysthingswhichseemquite incompatiblewith
this reading e.g. 'If this is true in the case where the Fregean sense of a singular term is purely
descriptive... ' (1982, p. 61).WhateverEvansmayhaveintended,however,suchpassagescanoftenbe
re-readas concerningWaysofThinkingthat are onlycontingentlyassociatedwitha particularWayof
Referringat a particulartime withoutmakingmuch differenceto Evans's point in the passage in
question.
2 Forbrevity,I omitnumerousdetailsofwhatsucha theoryofmeaningwouldlooklike.An example,
however,wouldbe thekindof theorymadepopularby Davidson,based on a Tarskiantruth theory.
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(1) The reference of 'Hesperus' =Hesperus
(2) The reference of 'Hesperus' = Phosphorus
If it is a matter of indifference which of these two clauses is accepted then the theory in
question is acceptable as a theory of reference but tells us nothing about the senses of
the expressions in the language. A theory of reference of this kind can, however, be
used simultaneously as a theory of sense (and thus a fully-fledged theory of meaning)
provided that the clauses which assign reference to the terms of the language do so in a
..
way which makes the sense of the term manifest. This can be done because to grasp a
sense (at least on Evans's and Dummett's reading of Frege) is to think of the reference
in a particular way and is therefore not something which could be stated other than in
the process of stating the reference. The idea is that the senses of expressions are
shown by the particular formulation of the theory of reference 'which identifies the
references of expressions in the way in which one must identify them in order to
understand the language' (Evans 1981, p. 282). One cannot simply state the sense ofa
term; instead one states what the reference of the term is, but the way in which one
does this shows or displays its sense. This means that the formulation must include
only clauses such as (1) and not clauses such as (2). In order to be made to understand
(1) one must be made to think of the reference in the appropriate way; having done so,
and having understood that the word 'Hesperus' refers to the object thus thought of,
one has grasped the sense of 'Hesperus'.
The question, for our current purposes, is what is involved in identifying the
references 'in the way in which one must identify them in order to understand the
language'. This could mean that one must think of the reference using a particular Way
of Referring in identifying it. But I can see no reason to insist on this, and indeed
McDowell seems explicitly to reject such ideas:
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Would knowledge that 'Hesperus' stands for Hesperus - in the context of suitable knowledge
about other expressions, and suitable knowledge about the forces with which utterances may
be issued - suffice for understanding utterances containing 'Hesperus'? Or would one require,
rather, knowledge to the effect that the bearer of the name may be recognised or identified
thus and so? Now patently this second, stronger requirement, interpreted in any ordinary way,
insists on more than would suffice; for it insists on more than, in some cases, does suffice
(1998, p. 178).
He then goes on to reject "even the notion that the supposedly necessary knowledge
could be possessed tacitly; the point is not merely that one does not know, explicitly,
how one is to recognise or identify the reference, but rather that there is no particular
way in which one has to do this in order to grasp the sense of the term. There is
nothing about the way in which the reference is identified of which one needs to have
even tacit knowledge in order to grasp the sense.
Whether or not Evans construed sense in the same 'austere' way is not absolutely
clear, and I shall not attempt to find any further textual evidence on the matter; but it
seems to me that he certainly could have construed sense in this way, without having
to change much of what he said about reference or Russell's Principle. In any case, the
apparatus of the austere theory of sense, can be used to help make clearer the way in
which I think concepts should be individuated. I do not think, in fact, that there is very
much more to the individuation of concepts than the individuation of the words which
are used to express them (or which could be used to express them, in the case of
concepts which are never expressed). McDowell seems to have a similar idea:
.Difference in sense between 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' lies in the fact that the clauses in
the theory of sense that specify the object presented by the names are constrained to present it
in the ways in which the respective names present it. They meet this constraint - surely
infallibly - by actually using the respective names. But it takes subtlety to find the metaphor
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thus already applicable; it can easily seem to necessitate something more like a description
theory of names (1998, p. 181).
What I take McDowell to mean - and what, in any case, I shall argue - is that once I
have learned to use the name 'Hesperus' I have thus already acquired its sense,
provided I know what it refers to. Thinking of the reference in the appropriate way
simply means thinking of it qua Hesperus. Now, in this chapter I am still considering
only the unshared thoughts of an individual so strictly speaking situations in which the
sense of a name is learned' from someone who already knows it are not our present
concern. Shared thoughts, and the way in which the ideas currently being described can
be used to provide an account of them, will be dealt with in the next chapter. But, of
course, a theory of meaning of the kind described above can still be given for an
individual's idiolect including concepts expressed by terms which are not shared with
others.'
When clauses like (1) are part of a theory of meaning for an individual they should
be understood as displaying the senses of the terms which the speaker could use in
expressing thoughts; and thus displaying the particular concepts which that individual
possesses. The individual's grasp of the concept consists in knowledge of a clause like
(1); but it should be remembered that in order to grasp (1) it is necessary to be thinking
of Hesperus, not merely of the word 'Hesperus'. One must be able to identify the
object in question (but not by any particular means) and one must think of it qua
Hesperus; one might be said to think of it in a 'Hesperus' way, and no further
description of the 'way' in which it is thought of is necessary.
Further clarification of this general idea can be obtained by considering some views
which David Kaplan developed after the publication of his Demonstratives (1989).
3 Cf thinking about 'that cat' in private internal monologue (see above, section 2.5). I shall speak
freely of the 'meaning of a term' even when this 'term' is left entirely unexpressed; what I am
referring to is a term which would be used to express a given concept, if it were ever expressed. My
view will not, however, rest on it being possible to make sense of the notion of an unexpressed term.
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Although I cited Kaplan's kontent/character distinction combined with his 'dthat'
operator above as an example of a version of Inferential Role Semantics (with which I
disagree) Kaplan himself was never entirely convinced that he had found the correct
account of cognitive significance and, therefore, of concepts. Recall his worry about
proper names, for which in Demonstratives he assumed a causal chain theory of
reference:
If the character and content of proper name words is as I have described it (according to the
causal theory), then the informativeness of Ia. = 131, with a. and 13 proper names, is not
accounted for in terms of differences in either content or character. The problem is that
proper names do not seem to fit into the whole semantical and epistemological scheme as I
have developed it. I claimed that a competent speaker knows the character of words. This
suggests (even if it does not imply) that if two proper names have the same character, the
competent speaker knows that. But he doesn't. (1989, pp. 562-3).
The problem is that for proper names the character, which assigns a kontent to the
term given the context, simply assigns a reference to the name in the same way for all
proper names referring to a given object. Consequently there are no differences in
character to explain the informativeness of identities between coreferential names. This
is a problem for Kaplan, given that character was supposed to correspond to the
linguistic meaning of the term, and consequently to the mode of presentation expressed
by the term. The same problem should occur for any context independent term on
Kaplan's theory, not just proper names; so at best his theory works only for
indexicals."
Kaplan has subsequently had a rethink of these issues. In his Afterthoughts (1989a)
he observes that in earlier work he had been trying to follow Frege in using 'a strictly
semantical concept (character), needed for other semantical purposes, to try to capture
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his idea of cognitive value' (p. 597). This assumes (probably correctly) that Frege had
intended sense to serve the semanticalpurpose of determining reference; the idea being
that something had to determine reference, and it would lead to a very neat theory if
that same thing simultaneously determined cognitive significance. I have, of course,
been arguing against this idea. Having discovered problems with this traditionally
Fregean way of doing things, however, Kaplan hit upon a rather straightforward way
of avoiding it:
The syntactic properties or"'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus', for example, their distinctness as
words, are surer components of cognition than any purported semantic values, whether
objectual or descriptional.
If words are properly individuated, by their world histories rather than by their sound or
spelling, a name might almost serve as its own Fregean Sinn. The linguistic difference
between 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' - the simple differencebetween thinking of Venus qua
Hesperus and thinking of it qua Phosphorus - may be all the difference in mode of
presentation one needs in order to be able to derive the benefits of sense and denotation
theory. Words are undoubtedly denizens of cognition. If, through their history, they also
provide the worldly link that determines the referent, then except for serving as content, they
do all that Fregean Sinn is charged with. But they do it off-the-record, transparently and
nondescriptively (1989a, p. 599).
Kaplan's idea is in some ways similar to Fodor's but offers a way of individuating
concepts in situations which Fodor's account does not address. Although Fodor is an
advocate of informational semantics he is still prepared to grant the neo-Fregean the
notion of a mode of presentation. His official position is that he leaves it open what
modes of presentation are so long as they are whatever distinguishes distinct but
coreferential concepts such as WATER and H20 (Fodor 1998, p. 15). In fact, however,
4 In fact I shall show below (chapter 6) that at the level of thought (rather than purely linguistic
meaning) Kaplan's theory does not work for indexicals either.
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it seems pretty clear that he thinks that what makes WATER and H20 different concepts
(assuming, for the moment, that H20 is unstructured) is that they are associated with
different mental symbols, that is, syntactically (and thus causally) different mental items
with the same semantic properties. If concepts have their semantic properties
essentially, however, they cannot be individuated purely by a physical entity inside the
head, for such an entity has no intrinsic semantic properties.' Moreover, individuating
concepts by mental symbols alone would leave us with no way to answer questions
about whether different people share the same concepts or whether, for example, a re-
..
occurrence of the same symbol at a later time counts as a re-occurrence of the same
concept. The latter problem is particularly pressing given the diachronic features of
rationality for which have been arguing.
Kaplan's account solves these difficulties by arguing, in effect, that for any concept
there is a word which could be used to express the concept. He then ties the
individuation of the concept to the individuation of the word. Thinking of something in
the Way of Thinking associated with 'Hesperus' then just means thinking of it qua
Hesperus." This is surprisingly close to McDowell's austere theory (surprising, that is,
given the extent to which their views had previously differed).
Kaplan (1990a) provides a detailed account of how words are individuated. He
contrasts the more traditional orthographic conception of words with his preferred
account, the common currency conception. According to the orthographic conception
occurrences of words in utterances, inscriptions and the like are tokens of a word type.
Kaplan describes this as the 'typesetter's conception' of a word (1990a, p. 98). There
can, however, be great differences in the way a word is spelled or pronounced in
different dialects without our intuitions saying that it is not the same word. 'Colour'
can be spelled 'color', schedule can be pronounced either 'shedge-yule' or 'skedge-oo-
5 Contra early Fodor (1980, 1987), but not necessarily contra the later, externalist Fodor (1994, 1998).
6 See also Ackerman 1979 for a similar view.
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ul', and so on. There are well-known differences in regional and national accents. Yet
we still consider the words produced to be occurrences of the same word.
Kaplan feels that these differences are not comfortably explained by regarding all
these disparate utterances and inscriptions as tokens of the same type. A better
account, he argues, can be obtained by the common currency conception according to
which utterances and inscriptions are regarded as 'stages of words, which are the
continuants made up of these interpersonal stages along with some more mysterious
intrapersonal stages' (1990a, p. 98). The account has certain (limited) similarities to
..
the tentative 'causal chain' theory put forward by Kripke in Naming and Necessity
(1972/1980). At some moment in time someone decides to dub a certain thing with a
certain word. At this moment a new word is created. The continuity of the word
through time depends only on the intention of the speaker to continue to produce the
same word and similarly the continuity of the word from one person to another
depends only on the intention of each speaker to utter the word that was uttered to
them.
This means that when I learn a word by hearing someone uttering it, so long as I
intend to utter the word I have learned, the sound (or inscription) that I make will
count as an utterance of that word even if it sounds quite different from what I heard.
,
My pronunciation may be different or my spelling may be different, but it is still the
same word that I have reproduced. As Kaplan puts it:
No matter how poor the subject's imitative ability (his ability to make his output resemble his
input), we can imagine circumstances in which we would say 'Yes, he is repeating that name;
he is saying it in the best way that he can' (1990a, p. 104).
Kaplan thus construes words as worldly entities whose form, like that of other worldly
entities, can change through time without their ceasing to exist. They continue to exist
just so long as people continue in the practice of using them.
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This leads to an individuation of words according to which, for example, different
people called 'David' have different names; what they have in common is what Kaplan
calls a 'generic' name. That is why it is possible to utter, for example, 'David is tall but
David is not tall' without contradiction - one can be using two different words in such
a sentence even though they are both examples of the same generic name. Many
problems relating to cognitive significance are solved in this way, and the account
seems to me to be perfectly compatible with conceptual atomism because the reference
is simply thought of 'qua Hesperus', 'qua David' etc.
I shall not accept Kaplan's account without qualification, but I shall nevertheless
adopt some quite similar ideas about how concepts can be individuated. The emphasis
of my account is more on the individuation of concepts than of words. It may be, in
fact, that there is a greater degree of separability between words and the concepts
which they can be used to express than Kaplan allows. One reason for thinking this is
that demonstrative and indexical terms cannot always express the same concepts
(otherwise it would be impossible to claim that 'that is not identical with that'). Yet it
is not very intuitively appealing to suggest that every new utterance of 'that' expresses
a new word. Moreover, I shall argue that the same concept can sometimes be
expressed using different indexical terms at different times.'
.,
One final point. Although Kaplan's observations about the differences in the spelling
and pronunciation of a given word certainly show that words cannot be individuated by
their precise spelling or pronunciation, he is not necessarily correct to conclude that
any spelling and any pronunciation could count as an occurrence of the word. Word
individuation could be comparable to doorknob individuation; it could be mind-
dependent. 8 What counts as a successful utterance of a word may be determined
precisely by what we (typical members of the relevant linguistic community) are
disposed to recognise as an utterance of that word. Someone who cannot pronounce
7 See chapters 5 and 6.
8 See above, section 2.1, for Fodor's discussion of mind -dependent concepts such as DOORKNOB.
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the word in a way that we can understand simply cannot pronounce that word,
whatever their intentions. This need not, however, preclude them from possessing the
concept expressed by the word."
3.2 Concepts as referential episodes
The correct way to individuate concepts, I suggest, is by one-to-one correspondence
.,
with referential episodes. The notion of a referential episode is a way of capturing the
relevance of transparency to the individuation of concepts as implied by the
Transparency Principle. When a person first refers to an object (or property) a
referential episode begins. A new concept is thus created. The referential episode
continues so long as there is diachronically transparent reference to the object; in other
words, so long as the subject continues to possess a Way of Referring to the object and
continues to think of it in a diachronically transparent way. If the subject then loses the
ability to identify the object (by losing track of it perceptually or by forgetting a
description which it uniquely fits, for example) the referential episode ceases and the
concept ceases to exist. A referential episode begins, for example, when an object is
,
first seen and identified demonstratively and it continues so long as the object is kept
track of If the object is lost track of, and the subject has no other means by which to
identify it, the referential episode comes to an end. If the subject had acquired an
alternative Way of Referring to the object through the perceptual encounter, however,
the referential episode could continue when the object was no longer seen.
The notion ofa referential episode thus cuts across particular Ways of Referring. A
variety of different Ways of Referring may be used within a given referential episode,
9 Cf. Cappelen 1999. Kaplan's account is also criticised by Gregory McCulloch (1991) on the grounds
that it cannot handle some of the problem cases discussed by Kripke in 'A Puzzle About Belief
(1979). I argue below (chapter 4), however, that such cases can be dealt with once it is correctly
understood what is involved in sharing a concept with other people.
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so long as the ability to identify the same reference is retained throughout, coupled
with the necessary transparency. In order for there to be this transparency there will
generally have to be a degree of temporal overlap when one Way of Referring is
substituted for another. Imagine, for example, that at some point during a referential
episode the reference is identified demonstratively. In order to continue the referential
episode after perception of the object has ceased a recognitional or descriptive Way of
Referring is required. But it is crucial that this should be acquired before the reference
is lost track of perceptually; otherwise a question could arise in the subject's mind as to
..
whether the same object was referred to at the different times. It is also crucial that the
different Ways of Referring are understood by the subject to identify the same
reference. A temporal overlap between the possession of different Ways of Referring
to the same thing would not automatically constitute a single referential episode.
An analogy may be helpful here. A useful way of thinking of the difference between
subject terms and predicates is to regard the subject term as a dossier of information
about something and the predicate as an item of information in the dossier." This way
of thinking of subject terms, in particular, provides a useful model for the dynamics of
a simple concept. At some point in time a concept is created, for example due to a
perceptual encounter with an object. Information about the object (that it has certain
,
properties etc.) may be acquired over a period of time and added to the dossier of
information which corresponds to the concept. Information may also be removed from
the dossier or may simply become lost (due to a lapse of memory). The predicates in
the dossier will often contain concepts which in tum have their own dossiers; the
dossier for 'Jones' may, for example, contain the predicate 'is taller than Smith', and
there may be a dossier for 'Smith' containing various other predicates, and so on.
We can broaden the notion of a dossier to include more than descriptive
information. Picture a dossier for a given concept as being like a personnel file in an
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office. For each employee there is, for example, a cardboard folder containing
information relating to that employee. Corresponding to descriptive information in a
dossier there are various papers in the file. But on the broadened notion of a dossier
we can also incorporate a recognitional capacity; in our analogy we could think of this
as, for example, a photograph of the employee placed in the file.11Demonstrative Ways
of Referring are a little harder to fit into the analogy, but perhaps we could imagine a
new employee coming into the personnel office for the first time. In order to start a
new file we simply get the employee to hold the cardboard folder until some identifying
..
information is acquired (a picture, some descriptive paperwork etc.) to put in it. If the
employee leaves before this happens (if the reference is lost track of before another
Way of Referring is acquired) then the file is simply discarded. But if the employee
stays long enough we may be able to acquire identifying information about the
employee to place in the file, in which case the file can be retained.
Now a system of files of this kind is normally operated by writing the name of an
employee on each file and making sure that only items relating to the person with that
name are placed in the file. But there is another possibility. Instead of writing names on
the file we could simply allow the contents of the file to do the identifying. Imagine
that within each file there is at least one item which uniquely identifies an employee - a
photograph, a copy of a birth certificate, a paper with a precise job description written
on it, and so on. These correspond to Ways of Referring. Each of these items performs
a dual function: on one hand it identifies a person but on the other hand it also tells us
something about that person. So a piece of paper with 'head of marketing' written on
it tells us that the file belongs to the head of marketing, but it also tells us that the
person in question is the head of marketing.
10 The notion ofa dossier has been used by numerous philosophers. See e.g. Grice 1969, Evans 1982,
Recanati 1993. The following account also has some similarities with the account of names given by
Evans 1973.
11 This analogy should not be taken too literally; I am not suggesting that a recognitional capacity
works by having a mental image of the reference which is compared with what is perceived.
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If there was only one item in the file this would, of course, be uninformative. But
now suppose that the head of marketing comes into the personnel office; this
corresponds, in our analogy, to a perceptual encounter with a referent. Further
information can be acquired from the head of marketing. First of all, we must establish
who the person in the office is. If we discover (for example through the testimony of
the person in question) that this person the head of marketing we can look through the
files and find that there is just one file with this information in it (this corresponds to
the identification of a perceptually presented object as one which was previously only
identified by description). So any further information that we can acquire from the
person now present can be put in this file. We discover the person's name (Smith),
room number, National Insurance number, and so on. A photograph could also be
added. Some of the information might not be uniquely identifying (e.g. 'used to work
at Head Office'), but some of it might be.
So now when Smith leaves the room we have a file containing many ways of
identifying Smith. But it is still the same file. The original piece of paper which said
'head of marketing' could now be lost - it might, for example, fallout of the file by
accident (corresponding to a lapse of memory). But the same file would be retained,
because it would still retain the means to identify its subject. In fact, over the course of
time, there may be many replacements of items in the file. It could be the case that
nothing ever stayed in it permanently. Yet even though there was nothing about the file
itself (the cardboard folder) to determine who it was about it would still retain its
identity as a particular file about a particular person. This corresponds to the way in
which a referential episode continues through a temporal overlap of Ways of Referring .
. If the file was ever emptied completely it would lose its identity, of course. It would
simply cease to exist. There was really no need to include the cardboard folder in the
story at all - the same system could be operated with piles of paper on a table. When
no papers are left, the pile vanishes. But a new pile can be created with any items
which uniquely identify an individual. The metaphysics of a pile of papers in which
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items can be added or taken away thus mirrors certain aspects of the metaphysics of a
referential episode, and thus of a concept. 12
A second file could, of course, be opened in error for the same individual. Suppose
that in the personnel office we receive a phone call from the deputy director. Unaware
that there was such a person, we open a new file using a piece of paper with 'deputy
director' written on it. As time passes, other items are added to the deputy director's
file. Yet all along the deputy director was none other than Smith, who holds both the
post of deputy director and head of marketing. This, of course, corresponds to a case
in which there are coreferential terms which are not known to be coreferential.
Finally we must consider what happens if false information is placed in the file. This
could lead to a file containing information which identifies two different individuals.
Either we say that the file is about Smith but contains false information actually relating
to Jones, or vice versa, or we say that the file fails to be about any particular individual.
Which of these is correct depends on which of the identifications is taken to be non-
negotiable. Typically at any moment in time there will be some means of identification
which is regarded as non-negotiable while there may be others for which doubts can be
entertained. I may recall that the file was started as belonging to the head of marketing
and may therefore treat a paper which says 'chief accountant' as rogue information
"
when I discover that the head of marketing is not the chief accountant. Or I may have
forgotten how the file started out and I may come to treat 'chief accountant' as non-
negotiable and the paper which says 'head of marketing' may therefore have become
the rogue information instead.
A Way of Referring which is non-negotiable at one time might lose this status at
some later time without changing the concept. In order for a file to retain its identity,
however, it must continue to be about the same person. That means that all new
information which is treated as non-negotiable must correctly identify the same
individual. In terms of concepts, this corresponds to the fact that the same concept is
12 Consequently, contra Frege, concepts are not timeless entities on this view.
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only retained if its reference is preserved. In those rare cases where there are two
simultaneous Ways of Referring which pick out different referents but are both treated
by the subject as non-negotiable then there is simply no unambiguous concept
possessed. The subject is in a confused state and no unambiguous thought is possible. 13
Despite what has been said so far, there are situations in which it might appear that
a concept can be retained through changes of Ways of Referring even though there is
no strict overlap between the different Ways of Referring. It depends, however, on
how Ways of Referring are individuated. Consider, for example, an ongoing
demonstrative identification of an object over a period of time. Clearly there are
circumstances in which different occurrences of the word 'that' at the same time
express different concepts even if both tokens of 'that' refer to the same thing. Thus
one might, for example, see each end of a long ship through two different windows and
think 'that is a steamer but that is not a steamer', without contradiction."
Consequently it will not suffice to claim that there is only a generic 'demonstrative
Way of Referring' which is the same for all demonstratives.
Now, if we consider only how things stand at a given moment in time it might seem
sufficient to individuate demonstrative Ways of Referring in terms of directions: the
information. from one end of the ship is received from a certain direction while the
13 Note the related comments about unnoticed switching of the reference during an episode of
demonstrative thought in chapter 1, above. The idea that certain Ways of Referring are held as non-
negotiable at certain times may hold a clue to the solution of the following rather vexing problem in
metaphysics. Suppose that an object can be identified in virtue of two distinguishing features but the
object then splits in two, with one of the previously distinguishing features belonging to each half.
Since the two products of the fission are not identical to one another they cannot both be identical to
the original object so it may seem that neither of them is identical to it; the original object has ceased
to exist. Yet sometimes we say that an object continues to exist when a piece breaks off it. So how do
we determine which, if either, of the fission products is the original object? Perhaps this depends on
which identifying feature is held as non-negotiable; if just one is held as non-negotiable, then the
object survives and is retained as the half with the distinguishing feature (and now lacks the other
property). But if both features were held as non-negotiable then the original object has ceased to exist.
This way of approaching the problem does rather assume that identify is in the eye of the beholder.
But as anyone who has studied the metaphysics of identity over time knows, cases like this present an
intractable problem for almost all theories of identity which approach the problem in mind-
independent terms. See surveys of the literature on this subject see e.g. Oderberg 1993, Gallois 1998
chapter 1, Sider 2000.
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information from the other end of the ship is received from a different direction. But
over a period of time the same object may move around relative to the observer while
the observer keeps track of it. We could, of course, describe this as an infinite series of
instantaneous non-overlapping Ways of Referring, where Ways of Referring are
individuated in terms of directions. These non-overlapping Ways of Referring would be
associated with a single Way of Thinking. But this seems an unnecessarily clumsy way
of putting things. It seems more reasonable to say that human beings have an ability to
keep track of moving objects and it is the ongoing exercise of this single ability over a
particular episode that is relevant to individuating the Way of Referring." Different
simultaneous demonstrative Ways of Referring could then be distinguished from one
another by, for example, the different information channels upon which they depend at
a given time.
A similar situation occurs with certain other types of Way of Referring. Consider,
for example, keeping track of a place while moving around with one's eyes closed and
without using any other sensory modality." One could still keep track in a very limited
way provided one knew roughly how one was moving. One might, for example, have a
way of moving slightly to the left. Provided one had the necessary understanding of
spatial relations one would then know that the place which was formerly 'here' would
,
now be 'slightly to the right'. Given that one had no sensory input the place could only
be identified egocentrically as, for instance, 'here' or 'slightly to the right' .17 These
14 This example has been used by numerous authors but, as far as I know, is originally from Perry
1977, p. 483.
15 Ruth Millikan (1993, p. 339) conspicuously misses this point in arguing that modes of presentation
cannot be semantic (i.e. involving an intrinsic connection with the reference) rather than merely
'psychological'. She assumes that wearing left-right inverting prisms in a situation like the one
described would reverse the matching up of modes of presentation to referents. Dynamic
considerations show that this is simply the wrong way to individuate modes of presentation. Further
arguments for the 'dynamic' view of demonstratives will be given in chapter 5, but it should be
sufficient to note that the same arguments about the diachronic nature of rationality given in chapter 2
apply a fortiori here. This is another straightforward application of the Transparency Principle.
16 One normally uses one's senses to keep track of places just as one does when keeping track of
objects; the way of keeping track described here is a special case and could only work in a limited way
(see below, chapters 5 and 6). Something very similar can occur in keeping track of time.
17 Seebelow, section 6.6, for more on egocentric and other ways of identifying places.
Concepts II: An Atomistic Theory 93
identifications could not overlap, yet one could still think of the place in the same way
throughout.
One final example. Imagine a room containing several moving objects which are
exactly alike except for their colours. These change gradually and continuously in a
regular way such that there are never any two of the same colour at the same time.
Someone who observed this and then left the room could continue, at least for a
limited period, to think about one of the objects by using its colour to identify it. But
this would require a continuous updating of the Way of Referring in order to keep up
.,
with the changes in the colour of the object. Once again we have a choice between
describing this as a single Way of Referring or an infinite series of different non-
overlapping Ways of Referring. I think the former description is the more natural, but
if we chose the latter description it would no longer be correct to insist that Ways of
Referring must always overlap within a referential episode. The difference, however, is
purely terminological.
3.3 Analyticity and holism
One advantage the version of Conceptual Atomism for which I have been arguing is
that it makes it easy to explain away the admittedly strong intuitions most of us have
that sentences like 'bachelors are unmarried men' are analytic. It is desirable to be able
to explain this because Conceptual Atomism is inconsistent with analyticity. It would
be inconsistent with Conceptual Atomism, for example, to claim that it is constitutive
of the concept BACHELOR that possession of it requires possession of the concepts
UNMARRIED and MAN.
In a nutshell, intuitions of analyticity can be explained away because of the fact that
there are some concepts for which there are limitations on the ways in which it possible
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to identify the reference. Thus, for example, if it is only possible to identify bachelors in
virtue of their being unmarried men then anyone who possesses the concept BACHELOR
will inevitably find the statement 'bachelors are unmarried men' compelling. But it
does not follow from this that an account of the individuation of the concept
BACHELOR makes essential reference to the concepts UNMARRIED or MAN; it can be
individuated in terms of its reference and the circumstances of its creation and
continuity (that is, in terms of a referential episode), without any need to mention the
specifics of the way in which the subject identifies the reference."
On this issue I entirely agree with Fodor (1998, pp. 80-86). Fodor expresses his
view as a modification of Putnam's (1983) view that there are 'one-criterion' concepts.
Despite being a fan of Quine's (1961) attack on the analytic/synthetic distinction,
Putnam was bothered by the fact that on Quine's view the only thing that makes some
sentences harder to deny than others is that they are more 'central'. But certain beliefs,
such as 'bachelors are unmarried men' seem just impossible to deny in a way that a
relatively central belief like Newton's second law, 'F ='MA', is not. If beliefs of the
former kind are analytic, however, this will be of far less philosophical interest than, for
instance, 'F = MA' being analytic. So, according to Putnam, much of what is
philosophically important in Quine's denial of the analytic/synthetic distinction still
applies even if there are a few philosophically uninteresting analytic sentences like
'bachelors are unmarried men'.
Putnam's claim, then, is that although there are sentences which are analytic they
are among the least central ones; their truth or falsity has virtually no consequences for
the truth or falsity of other beliefs (unlike central ones such as 'F =MA'). What makes
these sentences analytic is that they contain a one-criterion concept: a concept for
18 Although analyticity conflicts with Conceptual Atomism it should not be assumed that advocates of
Inferential Role Semantics are invariably committed to analyticity. Peacocke (1997, p. 234), for
example, suggests that the notion of the canonical commitments of a concept can explain why certain
sentences are a priori without those sentences being analytic. This is a similar idea to the one being
advocated here. My difference with Peacocke concerns only his claim that canonical commitments are
constitutive of a concept.
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which there is only one criterion which can be used to tell whether or not the concept
applies. So, for example, there may be only one way to find out whether something is a
bachelor and that is to determine whether it is an unmarried man. Hence BACHELOR is a
one-criterion concept and that is why, according to Putnam, 'bachelors are unmarried
men' is analytic.
Putnam could presumably have said something similar about 'recognitional'
concepts (as discussed and rejected in chapter 2). Although these do not really give
rise to analytic sentences they are supposed to have just one criterion of application (an
experience of a certain kind). So given the experience it would be something akin to
analytic that the concept applied." Thus it could be claimed that it is constitutive of a
recognitional concept that it is related to certain kinds of experiences via a
recognitional capacity just as it would be constitutive of BACHELOR that it stands in
certain relations to the concepts UNMARRIED and MAN.
As Fodor points out, however, Putnam's account is circular. The problem is
essentially that Putnam attempts to explain what analyticity is in terms of one-
criterionhood, but it is impossible to explain one-criterionhood without appealing to
analyticity. For in order to determine that something is a one-criterion concept it is
necessary to have a way to count criteria. It is necessary to be able to determine, for
.,
example, whether 'unmarried man' and 'man who is not married' count as the same
criterion. But whether they do depends on whether they are synonymous, and
synonymy is interdefinable with analyticity. So asserting that BACHELOR is a one-
criterion concept is really not much different from just asserting that 'bachelors are
unmarried men' is analytic, and it cannot therefore explain the supposed analyticity of
the latter sentence."
19 Perhaps not strictly analytic, though, because the fact that I am experiencing a certain object as
looking red, for example, is not sufficient for its being red (whereas by contrast Jones's being an
unmarried man is sufficient for Jones being a bachelor). As suggested in chapter 2, there is always an
element of theory behind even the most basic recognitional judgments; they always involve a
hypothesis rather than an inference.
20 Fodor (1998, p. 82) attributes this argument to Jerry Katz.
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The intuitive idea behind one-criterion concepts can, however, be used to explain
the spurious intuition of analyticity (as opposed to accounting for a genuine property
constitutive of certain concepts, as Putnam tries to do). To put Fodor's point in my
terminology, whereas for most concepts there are many possible Ways of Referring
there are some concepts for which there are very few. Whether or not we say that for
some concepts there is precisely one Way of Referring does not really matter. What
matters is that for such concepts certain truths seem undeniable simply because it is
only through those truths that we have any way to pick out the reference of the
concept. The only way to tell whether someone is a bachelor, for example, is to
determine whether that person is an unmarried man. Hence the strength of the intuition
of analyticity. But that does not show that BACHELOR is constituted in terms of
UNMARRIED and MAN or that no account can be given of the former without
mentioning the latter. To think otherwise would be to conflate the epistemic property
of being a priori with the semantic property of being analytic. The same could probably
be said about the supposed recognitional concepts: there may as a matter of fact be
only one way to determine whether something is red but that does not make the
recognitional capacity constitutive of the concept.
In any case, there is a further reason to reject the notion of one-criterionhood as a
means of capturing a notion of analyticity. The reason is that strictly speaking there can
be no concepts the identification of whose reference requires the possession of specific
concepts. For if, as I am arguing, concepts are individuated by referential episodes then
there are no particular concepts which one must possess in order to possess the
concept BACHELOR, even though bachelors can only be identified by virtue of being
unmarried men. For we must keep in mind that there can be different concepts which
share the same reference. On the account of concepts for which I am arguing there can
be a potentially infinite number of concepts referring to any given thing. Bachelors can
be identified descriptively as unmarried men, or unmarried men', or unmarried
men" ... etc., where MAN, MAN', MAN',... etc. are all different concepts referring to men
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(and the same applies, mutatis mutandis, for 'unmarried'). So although it may well be
the case that in order to possess the concept BACHELOR it is necessary to be able to
identify men it does not follow that in doing so it is necessary to think of men under
any particular mode of presentation. The most that can be concluded is that in order to
possess the concept BACHELOR it is necessary to possess a Way of Referring to men.
It might be objected that in some cases it isnot possible to possess more than one
concept with a given reference. Although there may be different ways of identifying
men, and consequently one could simultaneously possess MAN and MAN' without
realising that they referred to the same thing, there may be some concepts (PLACE
might be an example) for which it would be impossible to possess two co-referring
concepts without realising that they referred to the same thing. This objection would,
of course, apply only to a very limited set of cases. But in any case it is question-
begging for it ignores the possibility that different concepts (such as different place
concepts) could be different because they corresponded to referential episodes that
took place at different, non-overlapping times.
Analyticity is related to meaning holism. Holism is a large and complex subject; too
complex, in fact, for it to be possible to give a comprehensive discussion of it here. I
shall, however, make a few general remarks. Holism comes in many different versions.
Some versions have the consequence that when one theory is replaced by another, the
terms of the theory change their meanings. So, for example, when one theory about
electrons is replaced by another the word 'electron' changes its meaning - it no longer
expresses the same concept. A typical argument for this would appeal to the idea that
electrons are theoretical posits, unobservable entities posited to explain observable
phenomena. What a different theory posits must be different; if the 'electrons' of the
new theory have different properties then they are different entities.
Radical versions of this position (such as Kuhn's (1962) theory) claim that when
there is a major change in a theory all of our concepts change. But weaker versions are
also possible, in which it is only concepts which stand for unobservable posits like
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electrons which change, thus avoiding the rather implausible consequence that
concepts like cow and TREE are replaced by different concepts every time there is a
discovery in sub-atomic physics. Cows and trees, after all, seem to be most obviously
identifiable as things with which we are familiar from our encounters with them, and
they are still the same entities when we make a new discovery about their nature. But,
it might be argued, the same cannot be said about electrons; the only reason for
thinking that they exist at all is that they play a certain specific role in a theory and if
we reject the theory we reject the entities it posits.
Conceptual Atomism is radically opposed to holism but the version for which I have
been arguing helps make it clear what is right and wrong in the arguments for holism.
Whether or not the concept ELEC1RON can be retained through a change of theory
depends on whether or not the word 'electron' is expressive of a single referential
episode. So long as electrons continue to be identified as, for instance, the particles
transmitted in an electrical spark then there is no reason why the word 'electron'
should not express the same concept on both the old' and the new theory; the two
theories just say different things about the same entities. If, on the other hand, there is
not a continued referential episode then the two theories use different concepts for
which they happen to use the same word. I assume that the latter scenario very rarely
occurs.
Some philosophers who reject global holism nonetheless maintain that there are
'local' holisms. These are families of interdependent concepts such that possession of
one member of the family requires the possession of others. PLACE and SPATIAL
RELATION would be an example; it might be held that one cannot possess one of these
concepts without possessing the other." Local holisms, however, can be treated by a
Conceptual Atomist along the same lines as analyticity. Certain groups of concepts
might be such that identifying the reference of one requires being able to identify the
reference of another, and vice versa. But it does not follow from this that an account of
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the individuation of one of these concepts makes essential reference to any of the
others.
Some philosophers are very interested in investigating what one must be committed
to in order to possess a given concept; the fact, for example, that no one could be said
to possess the concept PLACE who did not have a certain grasp of the spatial relations
that one place can stand in to another." Such matters are certainly important. But
these studies should be understood as placing constraints only at the level of reference,
not at the level of concept individuation. They concern the details of what is required
in order to satisfy Russell's Principle for a given concept; but this is not part of an
account of the individuation of the concept.
3.4 Psychology and causation
The theory which has been developed has the consequence that two people could be in
identical internal physical states, be thinking about the same thing, and yet be
entertaining numerically different thoughts because their concepts were associated with
different referential episodes. This puts the theory in conflict with a familiar argument
that says that psychological states, in order to be explanatory, must be individuated in
terms of the causal powers of the states. The locus classicus for arguments of this kind
is probably the earlier work of Fodor (1980, 1987) but similar views have been
expressed by many philosophers. Consider, for example, this passage by David Lewis:
The main purpose of assigning objects of attitudes is, I take it, to characterise states of the
head; to specify their causal roles with respect to behaviour, stimuli, and one another. If the
assignment of objects depends partly on something besides the state of the head, it will not
21 Cr. Peacocke 1997, p. 243.
22 See for example Peacocke's notion of 'canonical commitments' as described above, section 2.3.
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serve this purpose. The states it characterises will not be the occupants of the causal roles
(Lewis 1979, p. 526).
On the face of it a theory which individuates concepts in terms of referential episodes
would be vulnerable to such an objection if it were valid. The objection assumes,
however, that a science should not admit different entities which do not differ in their
causal powers. But this is obviously false; the correct formulation is that a science
should not admit different types of entities which do not differ in their causal powers.
There is only one type of particle called the electron but there are countless electrons.
Physicists make progress by thinking about types of entities; they rarely, if ever, think
about particular electrons. The same should be said of psychologists. Referential
episodes, and hence concepts, are tokens of types of thought components. They are
created by a particular person at a particular time. Psychologists make progress by
thinking about types of concepts and need rarely concern themselves with particular
concepts. But this does not render the notion of a particular concept, distinguished
from others of the same type by the circumstances of its creation and continuity, in any
way problematic.
APPENDIX A
Reference, Causation and Information
What does the version of Conceptual Atomism for which I have been arguing say
about the causal and/or informational relation between a concept and its reference? In
answering this question we must take account of two relatively popular theories.
Firstly, the 'causal theory of reference' says that the semantic properties of a concept
are determined by a causal chain leading back to an 'initial baptism' of the reference.
This theory is well known from Kripke's tentative advocacy of it in Naming and
Necessity (1972/1980). The second theory, often known as 'informational semantics',
says that the semantic properties of concepts are determined by informational relations
between the concept and its reference (where 'information' is understood in the
technical sense found in the work of Claude Shannon (1948) and brought to the
attention of philosophers by Fred Dretske's Knawledge and the Flaw of Information
(1981». I shall argue, perhaps rather controversially, that no causal encounter between
the subject and the reference is necessary for the creation of a concept and that
although a concept stands in an informational relation to its reference this can occur
without any information or causal influencehavingbeen received from the reference.
There is no doubt that in the enormous majority of cases a referential episode begins
with a causal encounter with the reference. This takes the form of a perceptual
encounter which provides the subject with a demonstrative Way of Referring. A
demonstrative Way of Referring constitutively involves a causal relation to the
reference; it would be impossible to identify something demonstrativelywithout being
causally influenced by it. This is not true of recognitional or descriptive Ways of
Referring, of course; indeed, part of the point of such Ways of Referring is to make it
possible to refer to somethingwhich one is not causally influenced by at the time. So
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the question of whether a causal encounter with the reference is necessary for the
creation of a concept is determined by whether or not it is possible to begin a
referential episode with a recognitional or descriptive Way of Referring without having
acquired either of these as a result of a causal/perceptual encounter with the reference.
There may, of course, be certain concepts for which the idea of causal influence is
not appropriate; it is hard to see, for example: how one could acquire concepts like
ISOTOPE or CONTRACT other than by using a definite description to fix the reference.
So let us limit our attention to those cases in which causal influence seems most
necessary: reference to observable physical objects and properties. If the creation of
primitive concepts of this kind does not require causal influence from the reference
then I shall assume that the same conclusion follows for concepts of all kinds.
The advocate of a causal theory of reference need not insist that the chain of
causation goes all the way back to the reference (though the theory is often stated in
this way). Indeed, Kripke's (1980, p. 96) original idea was just that there must be a
chain of causation back to the 'initial baptism' of theterm, and this initial baptism
could be achieved by using a description to fix the reference just as easily as an
ostension. In such a case there would be no chain of causation leading back to the
reference.
It is necessary, however, to be able to distinguish the thoughts of someone who
entertains a simple concept created using a description from those of someone who
entertains a logically descriptive thought containing the same description (a thought
involving a complex conceptual structure with existential quantification). Evans, for
example, considered what he called 'descriptive names'; names which are brought into
existence by stipulating that they stand for the reference of a certain description. These,
according to Evans, differ from ordinary proper names, which are associated with no
particular description. Evans's example of a descriptive name is 'Julius', which is
introduced as 'whoever invented the zip' (1982, §§l.7, l.8, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5). He argued
that descriptive names are referring terms but not 'Russellian' ones; that is, if nothing is
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picked out by the description (i.e. if there is no reference) a sentence containing the
name nonetheless expresses a thought. For example (1982, pp. 50-1), the thought
expressed by:
(1) Julius is F
is the same one expressed by:
(2) The inventor of the zip is F
Evans holds this view even though the name and the description embed differently in
modal contexts. Consider for example (1982, p. 60):
(3) If you had invented the zip, you would have been Julius
This sentence, as Evans observes, could only be correct on the assumption that 'Julius'
is just an abbreviation for 'the inventor of the zip'. But Evans distinguishes the use of
'Julius' as an abbreviation from its us as a descriptive name. If 'Julius' is a descriptive
name then sentence (3) cannot be an acceptable statement.
It is unclear, however, why Evans thought that it was legitimate to say that' Julius'
does not simply abbreviate 'the inventor of the zip' while implying that both the former
and latter terms express the same mode of presentation (which presumably they must if
the thought expressed by 'Julius isF is the same one expressed by 'the inventor of the
zip is F). On the face of it the modal differences between the two terms imply a
difference in the thoughts expressed using them. Evans's argument for identifying the
modes of presentation (i.e. for identifying the thoughts expressed using (1) and (2» is
simply that:
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Someonewho understands and accepts the one sentence as true gets himself into exactly the
same belief state as someone who accepts the other. Belief states are distinguished by the
evidencewhich gives rise to them, and the expectations, behaviour, and further beliefs which
may be derived from them (in conjunction with other beliefs); and in all these respects, the
belief states associated with the two sentences are indistinguishable.We do not produce new
thoughts (new beliefs) simply by a 'stroke of thepen' (in Grice's [1969, p. 140] phrase) -
simply by introducinga name into the language (1982, p. 50).
But surely only the use of 'Julius' as an abbreviation for 'the inventor of the zip' is a
stroke of the pen; introducing it as a name, by contrast, marks a logical difference
manifested by the differences in modal embedding. Names simply contribute their
references to the truth conditions of sentences containing them, whereas descriptions
have a quite different logical structure. Evans did not deny this, yet he thought that
sentences containing descriptive names expressed the very same thoughts as those
containing the corresponding descriptions.
I suspect that Evans's view rests on the same error that is made when it is assumed
that because bachelors can only be identified in virtue of being unmarried men it
follows that 'bachelors are unmarried men' is analytic. Evans might have said:
'someone who believes that ''there were three bachelors at the party" gets into exactly
the same belief state as someone who believes that ''there were three unmarried men at
the party"'. But we have seen that this is not so; although the belief states have many
similarities they do not involve the same concepts. Someone entertaining a descriptive
name associates only one Way of Referring with it (though more can subsequently be
acquired). Consequently such a person is in a position to make an a priori assertion
that 'Julius was the inventor of the zip', but this does not make the sentence analytic.
So the intuition that (1) and (2) express the same thought can be explained away in the
same way as intuitions of analyticity.
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I argued above that just because bachelors are identified by virtue of being
unmarried men it does not follow that possessing the concept BACHELOR requires one
to possess any particular concepts (at most, one needs a concept whose reference is
the property of being male and another whose reference is the property of being
unmarried). With regard to descriptive names it is worth emphasising this notion of
identifying the reference by virtue of somethihg. Thinking about something using a
perceptual demonstrative Way of Referring, for example, involves identifying
something at least partly by virtue of the fact that the item in question is the causal
source of the current perception. It could be argued, moreover, that anyone who has
even quite an elementary understanding of perception must believe that this is what is
going on when something is identified demonstratively. Certainly one could not
coherently see an object and think 'that is not causing my current perception'.
It would be quite a different matter, however, to claim that demonstrative thought
involves identifying the object as the causal source of the current perception; that is,
thinking of it as whatever is referred to by the description 'the causal source of my
current perception'. This would entirely misrepresent the nature of the thought; the
thought that 'that is F is of simple subject-predicate form and does not involve
existential quantification. It is certainly not the same as the thought that 'the causal
source of my current perception is F.
Now, the thought expressed by (2) does involve existential quantification (assuming
a Russellian analysis of descriptions, at least). If it expressed the same thought as (1)
then (1) would also involve existential quantification. But it is not obvious that thinking
of Julius by virtue of the fact that Julius was the inventor of the zip involves existential
quantification at all. For there are two possible ways to analyse a sentence like 'Julius
is the inventor of the zip'. IUsing '<p' for 'invented the zip' the two analyses are:
1 Cf examples (15) and (16) in section 2.5, above.
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(4) ::Ix[x = Julius & <px& Vy (oy -+ Y= x)]
(5) <pJulius& vv (<py-+ Y= Julius)
I can see no reason to insist that (4) is the correct analysis. On the contrary, when one
thinks, about a, that 'a is the <p' one does not make an explicit assumption about
existence any more than one does when one makes any judgment of the form 'a is F.
One merely thinks that a has the property of being <p,and nothing else does. Setting
aside the possibility of a free logic one can of course derive an existentially quantified
sentence from any simple subject-predicate sentence and indeed one can derive (4)
from (5) in this way. But they do not express the same thought.
It might perhaps be objected that one cannot entertain a thought like (5) unless one
has some independent means of identifying Julius. But we would not say this in the
demonstrative case. It is not incoherent to think 'that is the causal source of my current
perception' (or perhaps 'this' perception); it does not require 'that' to be identified in
,
some independent way. In both cases what is thought is uninformative, but not
incoherent. And if another Way of Referring to the same object was acquired the
thought need no longer be uninformative.
So my suggestion is that provided we keep in mind the distinction between thinking
of something by virtue of its having a certain property and thinking of it as 'whatever
has that property' then it will no longer seem compelling to assume that (1) and (2)
express the same thought. It follows that a new referential episode can begin, and a
new concept can be created, even when the thinker has never been causally influenced
by the reference because the initial Way of Referring need not be demonstrative.' If, as
a matter offact, nothing is picked out by an initial descriptive Way of Referring (such
as 'the inventor of the zip ') then the situation can be thought of as analogous to a case
of hallucination in which nothing is referred to by a demonstrative. It may be that the
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fact that an existentially quantified thought like (4) is always derivable from a thought
like (5) could be of some help in making sense of what a person in such a situation
does think, but I shall not pursue this here.
Francois Recanati (1993, pp. 109-112), who agrees with much of what Evans says
about descriptive names, makes an interesting claim about the way in which a
descriptive name can become an ordinary name. Recanati claims that a descriptive
name is 'created in anticipation of a time at which it will be possible to think of its
reference non-descriptively' (1993, p. 109). His idea is that a descriptive name is
introduced via a reference fixing stipulation, then at some later time the thinker 'makes
contact' with the reference, recognising it because it satisfies the reference fixing
description. It is then possible to acquire further information about the reference and
further means of identifying it, and thereafter it is even possible to forget or reject the
original reference fixing description. When 'contact' is made with the reference the
thinker receives information from it, and is only when information has been thus
received that non-descriptive (de re) thought about the 'reference is possible. Recanati
does, however, allow that someone who is only under the illusion of having received
information can also think about the reference non-descriptively.
I do not agree with Recanati's view for the same reasons for which I disagree with
Evans. The implied assumption that only a Way of Referring which involves causal
interaction with the reference allows the creation of a simple, directly referring concept
is arbitrary and unprincipled. But Recanati's discussion does bring out one interesting
fact: that in order to think anything about Julius (other than that he invented the zip) it
is normally necessary to at least believe oneself to have encountered Julius, either
directly or indirectly (e.g. through the testimony of others). Be that as it may, this
seems to be a psychological rather than a logical point. It may well be that in practice
no one would ever take themselves to have de re beliefs about Julius without having
2 This is consistent with Kaplan's (1978, p. 241) claim that dthat (the first child to be born in the
twenty-first century) can refer directly (Kaplan was, of course, writing in the twentieth century).
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been causally influenced by him, but that does not show that causation is a necessary
condition for the availability of the concept expressed by 'Julius'.
An example that helps bring this out is Davidson's (1987) 'swampman'. The
swampman is an atom-for-atom replica of Davidson, created by sheer chance out of
stray molecules in the air moments after Davidson himself is vaporised by a bolt of
lightning in the same place. Despite the fact that the swampman's brain is in the same
state and in the same environment that Davidson's had been in, Davidson claims that
the swampman has no thoughts at first because his words (and presumably concepts)
were not learned; they have no causal history. Now, I have rejected this causal claim.'
Many of the swampman's beliefs may be false, especially those involving memory. But
the swampman will still have Ways of Referring to many objects and properties which
do not require any causal connections with the reference. Moreover, the swampman
will not take himself to be in the position of someone whose concepts have all been
introduced by stipulation even though he has never actually been 'in contact' with
anything. He will be in the position which Recanati thinks is necessary for non-
descriptive thoughts but without ever having been causally influenced by anything.
Now let us turn our attention to the informational relation between a concept and its
reference. Ever since Dretske published his book on the role of information in thought
and knowledge (1981) a number of philosophers (including Fodor) have endorsed the
idea, known as 'informational semantics', that what makes the concept X about x is
that x carries information about X.4 A demonstrative utterance of 'there is an x', for
example, carries the information that there is an x in the vicinity. In order for this to be
so it is normally necessary for there to be a causal relation between appearances of x's
and tokenings of the concept x. So cow refers to cows, on this story, because
tokenings of 'there is a cow' carry the information that there is a cow (and not
3 Davidson may have changed his mind about this too. He said at a conference in 1999 (in Aix-en-
Provence) that he no longer believes what he said about the swampman, though he did not give
details.
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something else) in the vicinity. This can only happen, however, if it is cows (and not
something else) that cause tokenings of 'there is a cow'.
The difficulties involved in establishing precisely which causal relations determine
the informational relation which in tum determines the reference are considerable. But
for those who accept Russell's Principle it is not necessary to solve these problems.
Russell's Principle surely has informational semantics as a corollary; since, in order to
possess the concept cow, I must know how to distinguish cows from all other things
my 'cow' -tokenings must carry information about the presence of cows. It is this
'knowing which' requirement that sets up the informational relation. So it is a
consequence of Russell's Principle that a concept must stand in an informational
relation to its reference.
Consequently, in order to be consistent with what I have said about causation it is
necessary to hold that the requisite informational relation can be established, at least in
principle, prior to receiving any causal influence from the reference. Now, it is vital to
distinguish the notion of receiving information from x 'from the notion of 'carrying'
information about x. By the former, I mean the transmission of information from one
place to another. This usually requires causal influence to pass from one place to
another.' By the latter I mean that there is information in a certain item about some
other item. This can occur without causal influence ever having been passed from one
item to the other. The smoke alarm on my ceiling, for example, carries the information
that the building is on fire when it sounds, but it also carries the information that the
building is not on fire when it is silent. Since the building has never been on fire there
has never been any relevant causal influence from a fire to the smoke alarm. But so
4 I shall assume that the notion of 'information' is familiar and I shall not give a detailed description
of it here. Dretske' s (1981) book contains an excellent exposition.
5 In the terminology used by Hans Reichenbach (1956) and Wesley Salmon (1984) to describe
causation this can be thought ofas the transmission of a 'mark' by a 'causal process'.
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long as it is working properly it is nevertheless fire, specifically, that the smoke alarm's
silence tells me about the absence of.6
So, by the same token, even if I have never encountered a cow it is possible in
principle for me to possess the concept cow. I simply have to get into a state such that
if there were any cows around I would be inclined to recognise them as such. My lack
of 'cow' -tokenings then carries information about a lack of cows in the vicinity. It
may, of course, be difficult to get into the requisite state (i.e. to satisfy Russell's
Principle) for certain concepts without causal influence from the reference. If the
"
reference can be identified descriptively then it is easy." In practice it may be harder for
concepts which can only be identified non-descriptively. But it is not impossible.
Dretske, however, despite allowing the possibility of innate concepts, disagrees that
for other concepts it is possible in practice to be in the requisite informational relation
to the reference without being causally influenced by it. He says this because of
counterexamples such as the following (from Dretske 1981, chapter 9). Suppose
someone tries to teach me the concept RED by showing me a white object with red
light shining on it. What I am shown is not really red, but I nevertheless acquire a
recognitional capacity which will pick out things which are, as a matter of fact, red.
Dretske argues that I do not thereby acquire a concept referring to the colour red
because I have learned the concept in such a way that I am actually sensitised to things
which seem red rather than things which are red. Only by being shown something
which is really red, he argues, can I acquire the sensitivity required to possess the
concept RED.
There is surely a flaw in this reasoning. Certainly if I am aware that I am looking at
a white object with red light shining on it then I might get the wrong end of the stick
6 The lack of sound from the alarm does not imply a lack of information. In nuclear power stations in
order to protect against faulty alarms they use alarms which work in reverse: they make a regular
sound when there is no danger and it is only when they fall silent that there is danger. For these
alarms it is the sound, rather than the silence, that carries the information about the absence of fire (or
radiation etc.)
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and think that 'red' refers to a heterogeneous collection of things which either are or
look red. But I need not be aware of the circumstances. I could be tricked into thinking
that I am looking at an object under normal lighting conditions, and I may make the
assumption that it is only when an object looks that way under normal lightning
conditions that it is red. Consequently I acquire a recognitional capacity for red things
without ever having been causally influenced by one.
In any case, arguments about the practical difficulties in acquiring the requisite
recognitional capacities carry little logical force regarding the nature of reference. They
can all be refuted at once by considering again the swampman, who springs into
existence with concepts which, like a brand new smoke alarm, stand in all the right
informational relations without the swampman ever having been causally influenced by
anything. I therefore conclude that when a concept is created it always stands in an
informational relation to its reference but this does not require there to have been any
causal interaction between the concept and the reference. Only the counterfactual
causal relations needed to sustain the informational relation are essential."
7 Dretske (1981, chapter 9) denied this, but only because he assumed that any concept introduced by a
description would be a complex concept.
8 Fodor (1994, pp. 115-119) comes to fairly similar conclusions about some of the issues discussed in
this appendix. He agrees that it is more plausible that the swampman shows that the causal history of
a terms is not relevant to its identity than that it is. Only for demonstrative thoughts, he argues, is the
actual etiology of the term relevant to its identity; elsewhere it is the counterfactuals that count (p.
119).
APPENDIXB
Spatiotemporal Location and Reference to Physical Objects
I have suggested that Ways of Referring carrsometimes be purely descriptive. The
notion that spatiotemporal particulars such as physical objects can be identified using
definite descriptions has, however, been criticised by Strawson (1959) and others, who
..
claim that no spatiotemporal particular can be identified by description unless the
description contains a demonstrative element (as in 'the ball in that cupboard'). I
disagree with this. Although I accept that no one could identify everything by
description it is nonetheless possible in individual cases to identify a spatiotemporal
particular using a descriptive Way of Referring without any supplementation by a
demonstrative. The terms from which a definite description is constructed cannot
themselves be descriptive ad infinitum, of course; such a description would have no
content. But the terms of the description could pick out their referents via perceptual
recognitional capacities; it is not essential for there to be a demonstrative component.
Strawson's argument, which I shall assume is sufficiently familiar not to need stating
in detail, turns on the idea that a description cannot be relied upon to pick out a unique
individual because no matter how detailed the description is it is impossible to rule out
the possibility of 'massive reduplication', where the description fits more than one item
because of a duplication of a region of the universe. A demonstrative, by contrast,
picks out a unique individual because demonstrative identification enables one to locate
the particular within a spatiotemporal framework in which one is, oneself, situated.
Although Strawson accepted that there could sometimes be 'pure individuating
descriptions' such as 'the first dog to be born at sea' (1959, p. 26) which pick out a
unique object by its non-spatiotemporal distinguishing features, he did not feel that
reference to particulars could be achieved in this way. His reason for this seems to rest
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largely on the fact that it would be impossible for someone to know that there was a
unique object which satisfied the description. Moreover, even though it is logically
possible that a definite description might happen to fit just one individual, thought
which is achieved in this way would be of little use, according to Strawson. This is
because it would be impossible to place the individual referred to within our general
scheme of particular things, those which we "Canact upon and acquire new beliefs
about. It would be impossible to learn anything new about an individual which is
identified purely descriptively except by learning new general truths (1959, pp. 27-8).
I suspect that much of the intuitive appeal of Strawson's argument is due to the fact
that in cases of massive reduplication, as well as in various similar examples derived
from Kant, it is only the difference in the spatiotemporal locations of two objects that
makes it possible to distinguish them. This line of thought led Evans (1982, p. 107) to
suppose that spatiotemporal location is an essential part of what he called the
'fundamental ground of difference' for objects existing in space, that is, whatever
distinguishes items of a given kind from other items. Consequently, Evans seems to
have held that in order to identify an object at a given time it is necessary to be able to
locate it in space and time. Demonstrative identification, of course, does this - by
perceiving an object one is able to 'home in' on its location. It is sometimes also
,
necessary to add a sortal, in order to distinguish different objects at the same
spatiotemporal location such as a statue and a piece of clay, for example. These are
different objects because one could be removed or destroyed without necessarily
destroying the other.
Too much of the Strawsonian argument depends, however, on the observation that
one can never be sure that there is just one item which satisfies a given definite
description. For one can never be sure that just one item is picked out by a
demonstrative either. It is true that demonstratives are much more reliable at capturing
a unique reference than definite descriptions; one is much more likely to acquire true
beliefs by identifying objects demonstratively and making perceptual judgments about
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their properties than by constructing definite descriptions at random and guessing what
should be predicated of them. But demonstrative identification is not infallible. Not
only can a demonstrative fail to refer, there is also a possibility (at least in principle) of
picking out more than one individual. There are at least two ways in which this could
happen. Firstly, there could be an illusion in which the images of two different objects
are superimposed. The objects would, of course, be at different locations in reality but
they could at least appear to be at the same place. Secondly, there is no obvious reason
why two objects could not, in principle, occupy the same location for a period of time.
This may not happen in the actual world but it does not appear to be a logical
impossibility. Objects could sometimes interpenetrate. This would make it impossible
to regard spatiotemporal location as the fundamental ground of difference for physical
objects; indeed, it would suggest that there is no such thing as the fundamental ground
of difference. The objects would, of course, have to be differentiable in some way;
perhaps in certain cases their velocities would suffice.
The possibility of interpenetration need not, incidentally, be in conflict with theories
which suggest that the very idea of a physical object has built into it the idea of
interaction through contact including, perhaps, contact with one's own body (cf.
Peacocke 1993b). The interpenetration need not occur at ever encounter; it would be
coherent to imagine objects which had a certain probability of interpenetration, and a
corresponding probability of resistance, for each contact. 1
Strawson's claim that the descriptive identification of individuals fails to integrate
them into one's general world view in any useful way also seems no more than partially
correct. Insofar as his aim was to show that it was impossible that the identification of
particulars is always by description then he is no doubt correct. But surely if one
1 The possibility of qualitatively identical objects existing at the same location has been argued for by
Mark Johnston (1987) and apparently also in unpublished lectures by Saul Kripke. Peacocke (1992,
pp. 234-5, 1993b, pp. 170-1) briefly makes a similar point to the one just made against Evans's
insistence that there must be a fundamental ground of difference for all particulars, and that the
fundamental ground of difference for physical objects is spatiotemporallocation. Peacocke (1992, p.
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identifies an object descriptively at a particular time there is nothing to prevent one
from then recognising a certain perceived object as the one which fits the description.
One is then able to learn more about the object or interact with it. The possibility of
demonstrative identifications may be indispensable in order for there to be any point in
identifying an object descriptively but this does not render the latter form of
identification incoherent.
There is therefore no relevant difference in logical status between demonstrative and
descriptive ways of identifying spatiotemporal particulars. There is nothing incoherent
.,
in the idea that some (though not all) concepts might have their references identified
descriptively. Descriptive and demonstrative identifications simply differ in their
degrees of reliability, and in the fact that the latter facilitate action and the relatively
reliable acquisition of true beliefs.
235) also adds that there seems to be no fundamental ground of difference for times, and yet thought
about them seems unproblematic.
CHAPTER4
Concepts III: Communication
Up to now we have been considering concepts possessed by a single person. We
should now consider whether the same concept can be possessed by more than one
person. For advocates of Inferential Role Semantics this question poses relatively few
-
problems; two terms express the same concept if they have the same inferential role
regardless of whether the terms belong to the same person or to different people. For
Conceptual Atomism the issue is a little more subtle. I shall argue that concepts can
indeed be shared by different people but only when they engage in a communal word-
using practice. Such a practice facilitates transparent communication, in which the
mutual deference involved in the communal word-using practice creates rational
relations between the thoughts of different people. These rational relations are of the
kind which, according to the Transparency Principle, can only be explained by a
sharing of concepts.
4.1 Communication and shared concepts
Frege's official view of communication was that it required the speaker and hearer to
entertain the same thought. Since entertaining the same thought requires possessing the
same concepts ('modes of presentation' in Frege's terminology) he thus held that
communication required that the speaker and hearer expressed the same modes of
presentation when they used the same words.
In his article 'On Sense and Reference' (1892/1966), however, in a footnote to the
claim that 'the sense of a proper name is grasped by everybody who is sufficiently
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familiar with the language or totality of designations to which it belongs', he seems to
portray this view of communication as an ideal which is not always realised in practice:
In the case of an actual proper name such as 'Aristotle' opinions as to the sense may differ. It
might, for instance, be taken to be the following: the pupil of Plato and teacher of Alexander
the Great. Anybody who does this will attach another sense to the sentence 'Aristotle was
born in Stagira' than will someone who takes as the sense of the name: the teacher of
Alexander the Great who was born in Stagira. So long as the Bedeutung remains the same,
such variations of sense may be tolerated, although they are to avoided in the theoretical
structure of a demonstrative science and ought not to occur in a perfect language (1892/1966,
footnote 2).
As well as giving some of the strongest support for reading Frege as having advocated
a 'descriptive' theory of sense, this passage seems to conflict with the idea that genuine
communication always involves the sharing of thoughts. It offers a view of
communication as requiring only that words are used with the same references
(Bedeutung); the same thoughts might be shared but they do not have to be.
In some of his subsequent writings, however, Frege gave arguments for the sharing
of thoughts in which it did not sound as though he found the idea that communication
could involve differences in sense 'tolerable' at all. Both Logic (1997), which is
thought to have been written in 1897, and The Thought (1956), which was published in
1918, contain arguments such as the following (from Logic):
A thought does not belong specially to the person who thinks it, as does an idea to the person
who has it: everyone who grasps it encounters it in the same way, as the same thought.
Otherwise two people would never attach the same thought to the same sentence, but each
would have his own thought; and if, say, one person put 2 . 2 = 4 forward as true whilst
another denied it, there would be no contradiction, because what was asserted by one would
be quite different from what was rejected by the other. It would be quite impossible for the
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assertions of different people to contradict one another, for a contradiction occurs only when
it is the very same thought that one person is asserting to be true and another to be false. So a
dispute about somethingwould be futile. There would simply be no commonground to fight
on; each thought would be enclosed in its own private world and a contradiction between the
thoughts of different people would be like a war between ourselves and the inhabitants of
Mars (1997, p. 235).
It is possible that Frege changed his views after he wrote 'On Sense and Reference'; he
might have even changed IUs view about what sense is. What is of interest for our
present purposes, however, is that the two passages quoted describe quite different
views of communication. On the first view sharing the same thought is seen only as an
ideal which is not essential for communication to take place; only a common reference
is essential. The second view, however, contradicts this; it suggests that the very idea
of communication requires both parties to entertain the same thought. Failure to do so
results in them simply talking past one another.
Clearly anyone who advocates a descriptive theory of sense, or indeed any version
of Inferential Role Semantics, must accept Frege's point in the earlier passage from
'On Sense and Reference' that different people may often associate different
descriptions (or, more generally, different Ways of Referring), and therefore different
senses, with a word. Advocates of these theories will hold, with the earlier Frege, that
communication between people who associate different senses with a word occurs
provided they refer to the same thing using that word.
A number of philosophers have indeed accepted this conclusion. Evans, for
example, in his discussion of proper names, reasons as follows:
Is there any particular way in which one must think of the object?
It would appear not. Even if we refuse to acknowledge the great diversity in ways of
thinking of the referent that are likely to be found among the consumers in a mature name-
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using practice, there are undeniable differences between a producer, who knows the individual
whom he can recognise as NN ... , and a consumer, who does not.
When we contemplate the fact that different audiences think of the referent in a variety of
different ways (which may be quite different from the way in which the speaker thinks of it),
we do not necessarily have to conclude that the audiences do not know what the speaker is
referring to.
It would appear, then, that the single main requirement for a use of a proper name is that
one think of the referent (1982, pp. 399-400).1
Elsewhere (e.g. 1982, p. 316) he says that we come closest to the Fregean ideal of
communication when using certain (but not all) indexicals, though he still seems to cast
doubt upon the idea that exactly the same thoughts. are shared.'
For Inferential Role Semantics the problem with the Fregean ideal of
communication is essentially an epistemological one; it relates to the fact that it can be
difficult to tell whether someone else is thinking of the reference in the same way that
one is thinking of it oneself Nevertheless, as mentioned above, such theories make it
perfectly clear what it means to say that two people do or do not possess the same
concept. For Conceptual Atomism, however, there is a different problem; it is
necessary to make it clear what it means to say that two people share the same
concept.
Take Fodor's account, for example.' According to Fodor coreferential concepts are
distinguished from one another by syntax; that is, by being associated with physically
different mental symbols. These symbols do not have to differ in any particular way,
except that they have to differ in such a way as to produce the required cognitive
I See also Evans 1982, §1.9 for similar remarks. At the very end of chapter 11 of The Varieties of
Reference (1982, p. 404) McDowell notes that Evans had made some notes towards a further
discussion of this issue but was unable to reconstruct their drift with confidence.
2 See also Dummett 1981 (p. 102f), who accepts that different speakers may employ different means to
determine the reference and may therefore associate different senses with a word, but claims that this
occurs only to a limited extent because 'only what is more or less common knowledge will normally
be taken as part of that sense' (p. 103). Nevertheless this will still 'leave a great deal of play' (ibid).
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differences between different concepts. Fodor denies, however, that this commits him
to a version of type-physicalism, the identifying of psychological types with
neurological types. Typehood can be defined functionally for a given system instead,
such that different tokens of'Mentalese' are of the same type (and would therefore
instantiate the same concept) if they would have produced the same computations
within a given system (Fodor 1994, pp. 105-109).
This, however, leaves open the question of what is it for two people to share the
same concept. If the neurological tokens that instantiate the concept CICERO in my
brain happen to be physically type-identical to the ones that instantiate the concept
TULL Y in your brain (where CICERO and TULLY corefer) does that implythat when I say
'Tully' I am expressing the concept that you express using 'Cicero', and vice versa? It
is not at all obvious that this could not happen, given that other aspects of our
neurophysiologymight differ.
In Concepts (1998) Fodor made it a condition on an acceptable theory of concepts
that 'concepts are public; they're the sorts of things that lots of people can, and do,
share' (1998, p. 28). But it seems that at this point he had not noticed the problem
discussed above because, in response to criticismsmade by Peacocke (2000, p. 335),
he now accepts that there may simplybe no fact of the matter about whether a concept
is shared:
What, if anything, makes A's thought that Cicero is wet type identical to B's thought that
Cicero is wet rather than to B's thought that Tully is wet. (It clearly can't be the spelling,
assuming the thoughts are in Mentalese.) ... It's probably possible to construct cases in which
any Direct Reference theorist (not just any Informational Atomist) has to say that there's no
question of truth as to which of two necessarily coextensive, syntactically primitive names are
translations (Fodor 2000, pp. 369-70).
3 See above, sections 2.4 and 3.l.
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A corresponding question arises for any version of Conceptual Atomism. For the
theory for which I have been arguing the question amounts to this: the theory
individuates concepts in terms of referential episodes. But until now we have only been
considering concepts possessed by a single individual and consequently it has only been
necessary to consider a referential episode as something intrapersonal. Now, we could
just leave it at that, much as Fodor does, and assume that referential episodes are
inherently intrapersonal. The question of whether two people share the same concept
could then only receive either a negative answer or perhaps no answer at all. The
notion of a referential episode can, however, be extended beyond the intrapersonal
case, and concepts can be shared. To see how this can be so we need to examine more
closely the distinction we encountered in Frege's writings between two different kinds
of communication.
4.2 Interpretive versus transparent communication
The first kind of communication, which I shall call interpretive communication,
corresponds to the earlier of the two passages from Frege quoted above and is familiar
from Davidson's (1984) notion of 'radical interpretation'. Radical interpretation
involves trying to understand the utterances of a speaker of a foreign language by
making hypotheses about the meanings of a speaker's sentences. If one were to write
the hypotheses down one would typically use one's own language as a metalanguage.
Hence Jones, when confronted by the alien Smith, might hypothesise that:
(1) 'Roses are red' (in Smith's language) is true if and only if roses are red
Such hypotheses are collated in order to construct a Tarski-style truth theory which
can then serve as a theory of meaning for Smith's language.
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Tarski's theory makes truth a relation between language and the world rather than a
relation between one language and another. Correspondingly, understanding Smith's
language does not require translating it into one's own language but rather
interpreting it; that is to say, determining the references of the words of Smith's
language along with the way in which the words can be systematically combined to
form sentences. It is, of course, clear that on"emust regard Davidsonian theories of
meaning in this way if they are to provide an account of one's understanding of one's
own language, for this understanding could not consist in the understanding of some
other language.
Jones's theory of meaning for Smith's language must contain axioms giving the
denotation of primitive terms in order to facilitate the recursive construction of
theorems of the same general form as (1) for any sentence that Smith can produce. For
example there must be axioms such as:
(2) The reference of 'Cicero' (in Smith's language) =Cicero
In section 3. 1 it was described how Evans and McDowell have shown that a theory of
reference of this form can be used as a theory of sense. This requires choosing one
particular formulation of the theory of reference, because there are many different
interpretations which give equally correct theories of reference for a given language.
The following clause, for example, would be just as valid as (2) in a theory of reference
for Smith's language:
. (3) The reference of 'Cicero' (in Smith's language) = Tully
Itwould not, however, capture the sense of Smith's word 'Cicero'.
Now, when Jones radically interprets Smith (i.e. treats Smith as an alien speaker)
Jones makes hypotheses about the references of Smith's words. A theory of reference
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is then gradually constructed for Smith's language. But it may be that this theory of
reference captures only the references, and not the senses, of Smith's words. Provided
Jones assigns the correct references to Smith's words, however, Smith and Jones can
communicate in a certain way (Jones has to get the combinatorial structure right too,
of course). It does not matter for this kind of communication that when Smith says that
'Cicero was a great orator', Smith and Jones think of Cicero under different modes of
presentation; so long as they both think of Cicero that he was a great orator then in a
certain sense they understand one another. This is what I call interpretive
communication. Its key feature is that understanding a speaker's utterance always
involves making a hypothesis about the reference of each of the speaker's words.
Let us now consider whether there is a way in which the Transparency Principle
could be applied to interpretive communication to help clarify the relations between the
concepts of two people. As a reminder, the Transparency Principle is as follows:
The Transparency Principle: If an attitude A to the thought expressed by the
sentence S(r) can make it irrational to dissent from attitude A to the thought
expressed by the sentence S(.u), without the involvement of any further thoughts,
then 'r' and '}i express the same mode of presentation.
Since rationality tends to be thought of as an intrapersonal rather than an interpersonal
matter it may appear that this principle has no application to the interpersonal situation
involved in communication. A version of the Transparency Principle for the
interpersonal case would have to be something like the following:
Interpersonal Transparency Principle: If, when Smith takes an attitude A to the
thought expressed by the sentence S(r), this can make it irrational for Jones to dissent
from attitude A to the thought expressed by the sentence S(.u), without the
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involvement of any further thoughts, then 'r' and 'Jl' express the same mode of
presentation.
This is a little abstract. A more concrete examplewould be:
Example: Suppose Smith believes that 'Cicero was a great orator'. If there are
circumstancesunder which Smith's believingthis could make it irrational for Jones to
believe that 'Cicero was not a great orator', without the involvement of any further
thoughts, then Smith and Jones both express the same concept using the word
'Cicero'.
The clause 'without the involvement of any further thoughts' is to rule out cases
where, for example, Jones believes something of the form: 'Smith's word "Cicero"
refers to the same thing as my word "Cicero"'. Clearly if further thoughts of this kind
can come into play then it will always be possible for there to be situations in which
Smith's thought could make Jones's thought irrational; but this would not tell us
anything about the individuation of concepts in those situations. This corresponds to
standard intrapersonal cases like that in which my belief that 'Cicero was a great
orator' makes it irrational for me to believe that 'Tully was a great orator', but only
because I happen to believe that 'Cicero is Tully'. The rational relations between my
thoughts would not, in those circumstances, imply that I expressed the same concept
using 'Cicero' and 'Tully'.
The Transparency Principle therefore only has any relevance in circumstances in
which one person's thought can affect whether or not another person's thought is
rational. This does not occur in interpretive communication. Suppose that Jones makes
the hypothesis that Smith's word 'Cicero' refers to Cicero. If Jones then believes that
Smith's sentence 'Cicero was a great orator' expresses a truth it would be irrational for
Jones to assert that 'Cicero was not a great orator'. But this rests on Jones's belief that
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Smith's word 'Cicero' refers to Cicero. This is just an empirical hypothesis and there is
no evidence which can make it rationally necessary for Jones to accept it. It is always
rational, in other words, for Jones to entertain doubts as to whether or not Smith's
word 'Cicero' refers to Cicero. Consequently Smith's thought that 'Cicero was a great
orator' cannot make Jones's thought that 'Cicero was not a great orator' irrational.
We can draw an analogy with the dynamic case here. Suppose that earlier I believed
that 'Cicero' was a great orator' and now I believe that 'Cicero" was a great orator'. If
the only rational relation between the concepts expressed by 'Cicero" and 'Cicero'"
comes about because I make a hypothesis that my earlier utterance of 'Cicero" referred
to the same person as my current utterance of 'Cicero'" then we have no reason to
conclude that both terms express the same concept. The rational relations implicit in
the idea of a retained concept do not come about through a kind of radical
interpretation of one's earlier utterances. On the contrary, these rational relations only
come about when there is diachronic transparency between one's thoughts at different
times. Interpretive communication likewise lacks this' transparency so there is no
reason to suppose that the different speakers share the same concepts.
The analogy suggests that different speakers could only share the same concepts if
communication between them was transparent. Transparent communication would
.,
occur if Jones did not need to rely on the hypothesis that Smith's utterance of 'Cicero'
referred to Cicero; it would correspond to the dynamic case in which the rational
influence of my earlier thoughts about Cicero on my current ones does not rely on my
making the hypothesis that my earlier utterance of 'Cicero' referred to Cicero. Instead
the influence is direct and transparent. 4 In fact transparent communication does take
place but it depends on the existence of the communal word-using practices that make
up a shared language.
4 An analogy could also be made with the way in which perception can be transparent when one takes
one's perceptions at face value. One accepts the testimony of one's senses unreflectively, and in much
the same way transparent communication can occur only when one accepts the testimony of a speaker
unreflectively. See below, and also see above section 2.7.
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4.3 Word-using practices
Davidson holds that communication is always interpretive; it IS always radical
interpretation:
It is an enormous convenience that many people speak in similar ways, and therefore can be
interpreted in more or less the same way. But in principle communication does not demand
that any two people speak the same language. What must be shared is the interpreter's and
the speaker's understanding of the speaker's words (1986, p. 438).
He denies, in fact, that there is any such thing as a language insofar as knowing a
language means knowing a set of conventions which both speaker and hearer must
share in order to communicate. Each of us has a 'prior' theory based on the way in
which we use words ourselves. We normally take the prior theory as an initial
hypothesis about how other people will speak because this saves a lot of time, but this
theory is soon adapted into a 'passing' theory specific to a conversation in order to
take account of idiosyncratic and novel uses of language by our correspondent.
Davidson argues that although idiosyncrasies such as malapropisms are relatively
common they do not usually inhibit communication;when I say, standing before what
is very obviously a swan, 'that duck looks hungry', it is very easy and natural to
interpret me as using the word 'duck' to refer to a variety of waterfowl including
swans. Idiosyncratic uses of language do not prevent us from communicating
interpretively and this shows how little we need conventions in order to communicate.
Understanding other speakers, for Davidson, is part of the more general task of
understanding the world and it makes use of the same hypothesis generating abilities.
I accept that much of what Davidson says is correct; certainly we could not
communicate without the ability to make hypotheses about the meanings which other
speakers attach to their words. So there has to be such a thing as interpretive
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communication, and it has to be pretty common. Sometimes, however, we
communicate in a way which makes use of conventions even though these are not
strictly necessary for the kind of communication with which Davidson is concerned.
These conventionsmake communicationeasier and more efficient;and, moreover, they
do so by making it transparent.
The conventions that I have in mind belong to what I shall call 'word-using
practices'.' It is of course no coincidence that the majority of people within a
community use a certain word to refer to a certain thing most of the time. At some
point in time a new word is created by someone. This word is then passed on to other
people and it spreads through the community. Many of those who acquire the word
acquire the means to identify its reference; but some do not, and must therefore defer
to those who do. All of them take part in a practice of using a certain word to refer to
a certain thing. So far this is, of course, a very familiarstory.
Let us focus on the phenomenon of deference. As is well-known, many of us have
to defer to 'experts' who are able to identify things which we are not able to; for
instance those who, in Putnam's (1975) famous example, can tell the difference
between elm trees and beech trees.6 I am, in fact, among that group of people who
cannot distinguishelms from beeches but I have no idea who the relevant 'experts' are.
-,
Fortunately, I do not have to know this explicitly; provided I can identify the
community of users of the word 'elm' then it will not be too difficult to find someone
5 Evans (1982, chapter 11) describes 'name-using practices'; my idea is similar (though not in every
detail) and I use a different terminology only to emphasise that my account is intended to apply to all
categories of words whose reference does not depend on context. In fact, I am oversimplifying a little
here for expository purposes. It will become apparent that a word-using practice is a special case of a
referential practice, the individuation of which is not quite so closely tied to the use of a particular
word. This allows, for example, an arbitrary change in the word used to refer to a particular thing
without a change of concept (e.g. 'starting from tomorrow we shall use the word 'green' to refer to red
things and vice versa ... '). We shall need to appeal to the more general notion of a referential practice
when we come to consider communication using indexicals, where one word is systematically
exchanged for another when there is a change of context.
6 See also Burge 1979. Burge's examples show that the reference of a term can be determined by what
'expert' members of a linguistic community use it to refer to even when some members of the
community are under a misapprehension about the reference.
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in that communitywho knows how to identity elms. I do not have to know who that
person is in advance.
So deference is not so much a matter of knowing who the experts are as knowing
which community they belong to. Consequently participation in a word-using practice
requires deference to the community whose use of the word constitutes the practice.
Now, deference is often portrayed as one-way traffic; those who cannot single-
handedly identity the reference have to defer to those who can but the latter, the
experts, do not defer to anyone.' This is not quite correct; there are generally no
experts whose use of a word is entirely independent of other people's use of it.
Consider my use of the word 'dolphin', for example. I can, as a matter of fact,
identity dolphins. So, strictly speaking, I am an expert. But I am not sure that I would
like to claim that my use of the word 'dolphin' cannot be mistaken. I simply believe
that I know how to identity dolphins. For all I know, it might tum out that I do not
know how to identity dolphins at all, and the creatures that I thought were dolphins are
actually sharks. So even supposing for the sake of argument that I do as a matter of
fact identity dolphins correctly I still have to be prepared in principle to defer to others.
This would be true even if I had introduced the word 'dolphin' into the language
myself Admittedly, at the moment at which I first coined the term my use would be
definitive and I could not be mistaken; I would be stipulating that 'dolphin' refers to
that species of marine animal, and stipulations cannot be false. But it is, of course,
possible that after some period of time my use of the term might change without my
realising;due to a poor memory I might start callingsharks 'dolphins', for example.
If no one else had been introduced to myword 'dolphin' then ifI changedmy use of
the term and called sharks 'dolphins' we should simply say that I had come to express
a different concept.8 But suppose that I had introduced other people to the 'dolphin'-
7 Cf. Evans's (1982, chapter 11) distinction between 'consumers' and 'producers'.
8 Some philosophers, particularly those influenced by Kripke's (1982) interpretation of Wittgenstein
(1958), have used considerations such as the fact that an individual's reference can drift to argue that
the required normativity of word-use is only possible within a linguistic community. But, quite apart
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practice before my use changed. If none of them had learned to identify dolphins
except by deferring to me then when my use changed so would theirs. But this would
be an unusual situation; it would be more common for at least some people, on
learning the word 'dolphin' from me, to simultaneously learn how to identify dolphins.
Teaching them this would typically, though perhaps not necessarily, involve getting
them to refer to dolphins using a Way of Referring which I used myself For example if
I pointed to a dolphin and said 'that species of marine animal is called a "dolphin" the
learner might acquire a recognitional capacity for dolphins comparable with my own.
Or if I told them that 'dolphins are distinguished by such-and-such features' then they
would share with me a descriptive Way of Referring." It is probably not crucial that
they share the same Way of Referring with me, however, so long as they learn how to
identify the reference correctly.
Even if we started with the same Ways of Referring, however, our Ways of
Referring could subsequently diverge. This would not be not a problem provided we
continued to refer to the same thing. Now, if at some point I started misidentifying
dolphins then the other members of the linguistic community could correct me on this.
In order for this to be possible it would be necessary for me to be willing to defer to
them; I would have to accept that I no longer had a monopoly on the use of the word
'dolphin' and that it was now public property. I could, of course, choose to ignore
other people. But this would be a case in which other people borrowed a term from me
in starting a word-using practice in which I did not participate.
As a practice continues it becomes unnecessary to remember who its originator was.
The practice can continue for as long as the members of the linguistic community
continue to refer to the same object or property. Individuals may go astray by using the
from the fact that the use of a word by a whole community could in principle drift, normativity is
surely accounted for simply by the fact that when a word is used with a given reference there is a
particular item relevant to the truth or falsity of what is said; the possibility of unnoticed drift would
not threaten the truth or falsity of particular uses of a term.
9 This is to some extent comparable with the temporal 'overlap' in Ways of Referring required to
retain a concept through time. See above, section 3.2.
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word with the wrong reference, but can be brought back into the practice by being
corrected by others. Rather than consisting of a set of experts who defer to no one and
a set of 'consumers' who defer to the experts, then, a word-using practice is
constituted by a community of users of the word all of whom are willing in principle to
defer to other members of the community."
Let us return to the case of Jones trying to understand Smith. In order for it to be
possible to recognise a structure in Smith's utterances, and in order to be able to
recognise the same elements of the structure (i.e. the same words or phrases) when
they reoccur in other utterances or in other parts of the same utterance it is necessary
for Jones to be able to identify Smith's words. This is not always a trivial matter; many
of us have had the experience of listening to a foreign language being spoken and not
being able to identify individual words. This can even happen to some extent with a
familiar language when it is spoken with an unfamiliar or foreign accent. Having made
a hypothesis about an initial utterance one then has to make a hypothesis for each
subsequent utterance about whether the same words have been uttered. So it is always
necessary to make a hypothesis about which words have been uttered. Furthermore, it
will not do just to be able to identify generic words." Smith might use the same
generic word to refer to two different things, so it is necessary to be able to determine
10 Fodor (e.g. 1994, p. 33; 1998, p. 154) holds the asymmetric view of deference against which I am
arguing. He could, however, adopt my story without having to renounce anything important; for what
matters to Fodor is that someone in the community must be able to identify the reference
independently, otherwise the whole thing goes round in a circle. My point is that being able to identify
the reference independently does not exempt one from deferring to others, if 'deference' is understood
in a certain way. Woodfield (2000) argues against Fodor's asymmetric view but for different reasons
to those given above. In fact, as Recanati (2000) points out (partly in response to Woodfield), it is
important to distinguish different kinds of deference. Woodfield's remarks mainly concern cases in
which someone possesses a concept independently of the experts but still defers to them in difficult
cases. If, for instance, you have better eyesight than me then I may defer to you about whether an
individual seen in the distance is Jones even though I might be able to identify Jones from close up. I
am not convinced that this kind of deference has anything to do with the individuation of concepts. In
any case, the kind of deference with which I am concerned (and presumably this applies to Fodor as
well) is that in which it is at least possible (for all I know) that I cannot identify Jones at all, and my
only access to Jones is through those people who can.
II On Kaplan's notion of generic words see above section 3.1.
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which use of the generic word (or which Kaplanian common currency 'word') is
involved in the utterance. This will normally be determined by context.
If Smith and Jones are communicating interpretively there will therefore be two
steps involved in understanding utterances: Jones has firstly to identify the words
which Smith uses, and then make a further hypothesis about what each of the words
refers to. An error could occur in either of these steps. Having made an initial
hypothesis about the reference of a word Jones may then assume that subsequent
occurrences of that word have the same reference, but Jones's ascription of meaning to
..
each utterance still rests on the initial hypothesis.
Suppose, however, that Smith and Jones both belong to the same linguistic
community and exchange only words which belong to the word-using practices of that
community. Now their communication becomes transparent rather than interpretive. It
is still necessary for Jones to make a hypothesis about which word Smith is uttering
but, unlike in interpretive communication, no further hypothesis needs to be made.
When Jones determines that Smith has uttered the word 'Cicero' - a word which
already belongs to Jones's vocabulary - there is nothing further to be determined
because Jones already knows what 'Cicero' refers to.
This is clearest in a case in which Jones defers totally to Smith about the identity of
,
Cicero; a case in which Jones's only way of identifying Cicero is through Smith. In that
case it would make no sense, upon hearing Smith's utterance of 'Cicero was a great
orator', for Jones to think 'Smith is saying that someone is a great orator, but is it
Cicero about whom Smith is saying this?,12 Consequently, if Jones were to take it for
granted that Smith was speaking the truth it would be irrational for Jones to dissent
from the thought that 'Cicero was a great orator'. Thus, by appeal to the Transparency
Principle as described above, we can conclude that Jones must share Smith's concept
12 The case is structurally similar to a form of 'immunity to error through misidentification' (see
section 6.6) which occurs with demonstratives: it makes no sense to think, based on perceptual contact
with an object, 'something is F but is it that which is Ft' (where the demonstrative identification
makes use of the same channel of information upon which the predication is based).
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CICERO. This is the only way to account for the rational relations between Smith and
Jones's thoughts."
Since deference is not limited to those who lack an independent means by which to
identify the reference, however, transparent communication can occur between any
members of a word-using practice, whether or not-the correspondents rely on experts
to identify the references of their words." Even if Smith and Jones both have a way of
identifying Cicero, and both do so correctly, Jones still needs no hypothesis about the
reference of Smith's word 'Cicero'. Jones simply has to correctly identify the word-
using practice to which Smith's utterance of 'Cicero' belongs. Transparent
communication thus corresponds to the Fregean ideal of communication in which both
speaker and hearer entertain the same thought; this allows disputants to directly
contradict one another, as described in the later quotation from Frege, above. IS
Let us briefly recap. I have argued that word-using practices involve mutual
deference by all members of the practice. Because of this, there are rational relations
between the thoughts of different thinkers, and these are of precisely the kind which
13 Similar intuitions may lie behind Richard G. Heck Jnr. 's (1995) argument for the sharing of senses.
Heck's argument is complex but the main thrust of it is that communication is essentially a means for
the transmission of knowledge, and mere coreference does not suffice for this. If the acquisition of
knowledge is assumed to require reasons then Heck is essentially arguing that communication must be
transparent inmuch the way that I have been describing.
14 Consequently it does not matter for our present purposes whether or not we say that someone who
defers entirely to others really possesses the concept. I confess that I am uncertain of the correct
treatment of this issue. It would be possible to argue that there are circumstances in which someone
can, by virtue of deference to others, use a word without understanding it or associating any concept
with it (cf. Evans 1982, pp. 400f). Certainly if the only thing Jones believes about Cicero is that
Cicero is whoever Smith (and other members of the 'Cicero' -practice) refers to as 'Cicero', then it is
debatable whether Jones can really be said to have the means to satisfy Russell's Principle. On the
other hand I have a strong intuition that I have the concepts ELM and BEECH even though I cannot tell
elms and beeches apart. The question is what is involved in being able to identify something. I can
presumably still identify something if I need to put glasses on to do so. So tools of certain kinds can be
used. But what if I have to carry a book on trees with me in order to distinguish elms from beeches?
And if that counts, why not think of other people as tools which I can use to help me identify things? I
am not sure how to answer these questions in a principled way, and I leave the matter for further
research.
15 Since in order to defer it is essential to know who one defers to my view contrasts with Kripke's
(1980, p. 92) 'causal' view, in which what matters is who Jones learned the word from (learning is
assumed to involve causation) even if this is not who Jones believes that the word was learned from.
On my view the swampman (see Appendix A) can defer to a particular practice and therefore share a
concept even without having received any causal influence from it.
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the Transparency Principle shows must be explained by shared concepts.
Consequently, different speakers can share concepts even though they may differ in the
Ways of Referring that they associate with a given concept. 16 The notion of a
referential episode can therefore be extended to the interpersonal case; as new
members join a word-using practice the referential episode spreads across the linguistic
community. As with the dynamic case, incidentally, it is important not to
misunderstand the structure of the argument with respect to the Transparency
Principle. As emphasised above, the Transparency Principle sets constraints on the
individuation of concepts but it does not constitute a theory of concepts itself. 17 In this
particular case, that Transparency Principle shows that if there are rational relations of
a certain kind between the thoughts of different thinkers then those thoughts must be
the same. But it is the account of the extension of the notion of a referential episode
through word-using practices which yields the individuation of concepts which gives
rise to the rational relations in question.
A number of situations can occur which may appearto give rise to counterexamples
to this account. For example it may appear that it would be possible for Jones to defer
to Smith without Smith deferring to Jones. This would be a problem because it would
imply that Jones shares Smith's concept but Smith does not share Jones's concept.
.,
Fortunately, this situation cannot occur. In order for it to be appropriate for Jones to
defer to Smith's use of 'Cicero', Jones must have acquired the word from Smith."
Smith must therefore have used the word in communicating with Jones. But once
Smith has communicated the word to Jones (and assuming that Jones may have
16 It would in fact have been possible to start by insisting, as Frege does in Logic (in the quotation
above), that transparent communication clearly does take place and then draw from this the
conclusion that sameness of concept cannot require sameness of Way of Referring. The structure of
the argument would then have mirrored the structure of the argument given for the dynamic case in
chapter 2. I am not, however, entirely sanguine about the chances of convincing anyone by putting the
argument that way around.
17 See section 1.2.
18 Normally Jones would of course defer to a whole community of word-users, of whom Smith is just
one member. I am discussing a community consisting of just two speakers in order to keep things
simple, but the conclusions can be straightforwardly generalised for larger communitites.
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acquired the means to identify the reference), Smith is rationally obliged to defer to
Jones if Jones uses the word. For, having learned the word, Jones would be in a
position to correct Smith if Smith's use went astray. In allowing others access to one's
terms, which one does whenever one uses them in public, one opens oneself to the
possibility of being corrected in future uses.
What if Smith is a hermit who never talks to anyone and never even acknowledges
their existence? Perhaps Jones overhears Smith mumble something about 'Cicero' and
decides to defer to Smith about its meaning. But this is not really deference; Jones does
not learn the word from Smith. This is just a case in which Jones introduces a term as
referring to 'whoever Smith refers to using "Cicero"'. The most Jones can do in that
situation is to interpret Smith. One cannot defer to someone unless they are willing to
correct one's own use of the term. A word-using practice is like a game which requires
all of the players to participate; it requires mutual co-operation. One cannot be playing
the game if one is in a position to change the rules unilaterally (e.g. by deciding to
change the reference of the word), and in such a case one cannot be played with by
others either"
Another objection runs as follows. If Jones defers to Smith then Jones must believe
that Cicero is whoever Smith refers to as 'Cicero'. Why can we not regard this as
Jones's Way of Referring to Cicero?" And ifit is a Way of Referring then according to
the theory proposed in the previous chapter it should be possible to exchange it for a
different Way of Referring without a change of concept. So suppose Jones discovers
that Cicero is the individual who is uniquely <po Jones may then forget all about Smith's
use of 'Cicero' but continue to refer to Cicero in virtue of Cicero being the <po But the
rational relations between Smith's thoughts and Jones's would then disappear, which
19 A rough analogy in the intrapersonal case would be this: suppose I believe that everything that is
true of a is also true of b but I do not believe that everything that is true of b is also true of a. Then 'a'
and' b' do not express the same concepts. Sometimes the rational relations between two thoughts have
to cut both ways in order for the thoughts to contain the same concepts. Cf. Frege's notion of
'equipollence' as a criterion for sameness of thoughts, section 1.1 above.
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would imply that they were no longer the same thought. Worse still, it appears that
Jones's belief that 'Cicero is whoever Smith refers to as "Cicero'" could explain the
putative rational relations between Smith's and Jones's thoughts. If Jones believed that
Smith's utterance of 'Cicero was a great orator' expressed a truth and Jones also
believed that Cicero was whoever Smith referred to as 'Cicero' then Jones could infer
that Cicero was a great orator. This is the kind of 'further thought' that has to be ruled
out for the Transparency Principle to be applicable. Consequently, according to this
objection, there is no need to say that Smith and Jones possess the same concept.
..
This objection implies that what I have been calling transparent communication is
really just interpretive communication, and that the putative transparency between the
thoughts of Smith and Jones can be explained away in terms of what Jones has to
believe in order to defer to Smith. Now, it is certainly true that interpretive
communication can lead one to make inferences of the sort described. To make this a
little clearer it may help to imagine that when Smith uses the name 'Cicero' Jones
interprets this as referring to Tully. Given that Jones believes that Smith's word
'Cicero' refers to Tully, when Jones believes Smith's statement that 'Cicero was a
great orator' Jones can infer that Tully was a great orator. But that does not suffice to
make Smith's 'Cicero' and Jones's 'Tully' express the same concept; the two concepts
do not stand in a transparent relation to one another. By the same token, the objection
argues, neither do Smith's 'Cicero' and Jones's 'Cicero'.
The very fact that we can exchange 'Cicero' for 'Tully' like this ought, however, to
raise suspicions, for Jones could hardly defer to Smith's use of 'Cicero' while
expressing the concept thus acquired using the word 'Tully'. The objection is mistaken
but the reason for this is a subtle one. The best way to illustrate this is by returning to
the analogy with the dynamic case. The retention of a concept through time can be
seen as involving something analogous to deference with respect to one's earlier use of
20 Though see footnote 14, above, on an uncertainty over whether such a 'Way of Referring' would
suffice for concept possession.
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the concept. In thinking about Cicero I take it for granted that I am now referring to
the same individual that I was earlier. This is implicit in the fact that if, earlier, I
thought that Cicero was a great orator then, all else being equal, I should still think this
now (or at any rate I should not deny it).
It would be quite incorrect to explain this quasi-deferential relation by saying that I
must normally believe something of the form 'the person I now refer to as "Cicero" is
the same one that I referred to earlier as "Cicero"', and that my continuing to believe
that Cicero was a great orator rests on an inference of the form: 'Earlier, I truly
.,
believed that "Cicero" was a great orator; by "Cicero" I was referring to Cicero;
therefore Cicero was a great orator'. The inference is valid, but in the normal case it is
entirely superfluous. I can simply retain the concept CICERO and continue to believe the
same things about Cicero non-inferentially. The mere possibility of making such an
inference does not show that such inferences are always necessary. By analogy, when
Smith and Jones both belong to a word-using practice it is possible for Jones to hear
Smith say that 'Cicero was a great orator' and theteby entertain the thought that
'Cicero was a great orator' non-inferentially. Understanding in this situation is direct
and non-inferential; to identify Smith's sentence is to entertain Smith's thought. So the
objection is not valid.21
Finally, I must make one small point about word-using practices. As with so many
epistemological matters, there are no strict rules about how to identify an uttered word
as belonging to a particular word-using practice. There might be more than one
'Cicero', in which case it would be necessary to use contextual clues to determine
which one was being spoken about. As mentioned above, there may also be
idiosyncratic pronunciations which have to be understood. There will always be an
element of guesswork; most of the time we guess correctly though errors do, of
21 The objection just discussed is analogous to what McDowell has, in various publications, called the
'highest common factor conception'. It assumes, incorrectly, that just because interpretation can
sometimes get in the way of transparent understanding it must always get in the way. See for example
McDowell 1982a; see also McDowell 1993.
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course, occur. It may be that malapropisms can sometimes be allowed for; if Smith
accidentally says 'Sisley was a great orator' it may be possible for Jones to correctly
judge that Smith meant to say 'Cicero'. Davidson may be right that there are no
inflexible conventions with regard to orthographic words, but there can still be a
uniform practice provided speakers can identify thepractice.f
A reasonably uniform pronunciation of a word is therefore important in enabling
different speakers to share a practice, but the uniformity should not be exaggerated."
It is the practice, rather than a particular sound or symbol, which must be identified.
Consequently it may be beneficial to re-describe what I have been calling a 'word-using
practice' as a referential practice. This is a referential episode which has spread to
more than one person. Just as an intrapersonal referential episode is not strictly tied to
the use of a particular word, neither is a referential practice. In particular, when two
speakers communicate using indexicals there may be changes of context which
necessitate changes of indexical, but so long as both speakers understand the rules of
use for indexical terms it is possible for a speaker whohears a series of indexical terms
to realise that what is being expressed is part of a continuous referential practice."
22 Although we might be able to make sense of Smith saying 'Sisley' instead of 'Cicero' Smith must
still defer to other people's uses of 'Cicero'. If Smith defers to utterances of 'Sisley' then it does not
seem possible to regard Smith as a member of the 'Cicero' -practice,
23 When thinking becomes a communal exercise there may be rather more breakdowns in the rational
integrity of thought than occur within a single person at a single time. Suppose, through deference, A
shares a concept with Band B shares the same concept with C. Then A and C should share that
concept. In that case, A and C should defer to one another's use of the corresponding word. But they
might not actually do so; C may pronounce the word in a way which B can recognise but A cannot,
and vice versa. Rather than say that A and C do not share the concept I think we should just say that
they fail to recognise the rational relations in which their thoughts stand. It is partly because of this
sort of thing that interpretive communication is important.
24 This will be discussed in greater depth in chapter 5.
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4.4 Demonstratives and the Paderewski paradox
The principles just described can be applied to communication using demonstratives.
Smith and Jones can of course use demonstratives independently of one another in
referring to the same object, and in this case they would possess different concepts.
But if Smith says 'that is blue' Jones may respond anaphorically by saying 'it is not
blue'. The anaphoric 'it' can only refer to the same thing that Smith referred to using
'that'. The notion of anaphor is akin to that of deference; anaphoric communication is
..
transparent. If, instead, Jones had independently identified the object and said to Smith
'that is not blue' there would be no disagreement between them unless Jones intended
the word 'that' to be understood as anaphoric on Smith's demonstrative (the
pragmatics of communication can presumably allow this in certain contexts). Smith can
then respond back to Jones anaphorically or by using a further demonstrative which,
once again, must be understood as anaphoric on earlier uses. A referential practice is
thus initiated, in which Smith and Jones share a concept
Demonstratives give rise to a puzzle which is in fact a special case of a phenomenon
which applies to words of all kinds and stands in need of an explanation. The puzzle
occurs when a participant in a referential practice fails to recognise another speaker's
participation in the same practice and assumes that it is a new practice. This is
diagrammed for the case of demonstratives in figure 2.
1\ 1\
Smith ¢:> Jones Jones ¢:> Brown Brown ¢:> Smith
2a 2b 2e
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In figure 2a Smith and Jones are jointly attending to an object and discussing it using
demonstratives and anaphors. Smith and Jones mutually defer and thus share a concept
which refers to the object. In figure 2b Smith has left the scene and no longer possesses
a demonstrative Way of Referring to the object. But as a matter of fact Smith retains
an alternative Way of Referring to the object (either descriptive or recognitional) and,
moreover, would still defer to Jones if the occasion arose. Consequently Smith still
retains the concept.
Another person, Brown, now appears and joins the referential practice with Jones.
So Brown now shares the same concept with both Jones and Smith. At a still later
time, depicted in figure 2c, Jones has also left the scene but Brown has continued to
keep track of the object. Brown can continue to retain the same concept. In effect,
Smith, Jones and Brown take it in turns to keep track of the object. But now Smith
returns to the scene but does not recognise the object as the one encountered earlier.
Consequently when Brown talks about 'that' Smith does not realise that Brown is
talking about the object seen earlier. But Smith can communicate with Brown about
the apparently new object and, on the face of it, Smith ought to be able to acquire the
concept which Brown possesses. But this concept was supposed to be the one which
Smith already possessed, having retained it from the earlier encounter. Yet it cannot be
the concept which Smith now shares 'with Brown, because for Smith there is an
informative identity between them.
The paradox just described has the same form as a paradox described by Saul
Kripke in 'A Puzzle About Belief (1979). I shall call it the 'Paderewski paradox'.
Paderewski was celebrated both as a musician and as a politician. Suppose that Jones
hears about Paderewski as a musician. Jones thus acquires a certain concept which
involves deference to the linguistic community who use the name 'Paderewski'. But
now suppose that in a different context Jones hears about Paderewski as a politician.
Jones does not assume that the politician called 'Paderewski' is the same person as the
musician called 'Paderewski'. So for Jones the identity:
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(4) Paderewski (musician) = Paderewski (politician)
is informative. Jones therefore possesses two different concepts. Yet both occurrences
of 'Paderewski' ought to express the same concept, as there is only one name, and
only one concept, in general circulation in the linguistic community. The structure of
the puzzle is much the same as the one described above for demonstratives because in
both cases someone thinks that there are two referential practices where in fact there is
only one."
..
If we are to say that just one of Jones's 'Paderewski' concepts is shared with the
community then we need a principled way of deciding which one it is. The situation
looks puzzling precisely because both concepts seem to have an equal claim to being
shared. But there is one asymmetry between them. When Jones learns ofPaderewski as
a musician the situation is absolutely normal; if anything counts as a case of sharing a
concept with the community, this should. But when Jones learns of Paderewski as a
politician the situation is not the same; Jones approaches the conversation from which
the concept is acquired already possessing the concept normally expressed by
'Paderewski'. When Jones assumes that Paderewski the politician is not Paderewski
the musician this implies that Jones believes in a non-existent referential practice and
tries to defer to it. It is impossible to participate in the one and only 'Paderewski'
referential practice while consciously thinking that the practice in question is a different
one from the Paderewski (qua musician) practice. So we must conclude that Jones
does share one concept with the community - the first concept acquired - and that any
25 The Paderewski paradox is similar to the famous paradox concerning Pierre's beliefs about
'London' and 'Londres' from the same article. It is possible, in my opinion, to solve the Pierre
paradox by assuming that 'London' and 'Londres' express different concepts (and are involved in
different referential practices, though admittedly these practices probably share common historical
roots); that is why Pierre can believe that 'Londres est jolie' and 'London is not pretty' without
contradiction. Many people seem to find it intuitively compelling that 'London' and 'Londres' must
express the same concept, but I should have thought that Kripke's puzzle about Pierre makes it
obvious that they do not. Gerald Vision (2001, p. 8), for example, in the process of criticising Fodor,
takes it as a 'presumptive condition about concept possession' that monolingual speakers of different
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further concepts are Jones's own creations and are not shared with anyone. This is true
even though Jones may have conversations with other people about 'Paderewski' while
thinking that they are talking about the politician, not the musician. Communication
may take place at the level of reference but there is only an illusion of transparency and
of the sharing of concepts. 26
Much the same can be said about the case of demonstratives discussed above. When
Smith returns to the scene Smith excludes the possibility that Brown's referential
practice is the same one which Smith had started earlier and regards it as a new one
..
instead. Consequently Smith tries to enter a non-existent referential practice. Smith's
new concept is therefore a brand new creation and is not shared with Brown.
languages can share concepts. But, given that concepts are thought components (which is assumed by
Vision, as well as here) this assumption appears quite unjustified.
26 This is not the only case in which there can be an illusion of transparency. Another one was
discussed in section 1.1, in which an object being kept track of is switched for another one without the
subject noticing. It was observed that this cannot be seen simply as a switching of concepts because a
concept expressed using a demonstrative after the switch cannot be seen as independent of the concept
expressed earlier.
Part 3: Indexicals
CHAPTER5
Changing Indexicals
In a much discussed passage, Frege claimed that the same thought can sometimes be
retained when one indexical term is exchanged for another to compensate for a change
of context:
If someone wants to say the same today as he expressed yesterday using the word 'today', he
must replace this word with 'yesterday'. Although the thought is the same, its verbal
expression must be different in order that the change of sense which would otherwise be
affected by the differing times of utterance may be cancelled out (Frege 1956, p. 296).
Gareth Evans (1981, 1982) dubbed these retained thoughts 'dynamic thoughts' and he,
and subsequently several other philosophers, defended their existence.' For reasons
that will become apparent in the next chapter, although Frege and Evans expressed
their point in terms of retained thoughts I shall defend only the more modest claim that
the same singular mode of presentation can be retained and expressed using one
indexical term followed by another, and hence that a referential practice (and therefore
a concept) can cut across different contexts and different indexical terms. This claim
follows from the same principles of transparency that were used throughout Part 2 but
since it may seem counterintuitive - especially to advocates of Inferential Role
Semantics - I shall defend it in detail, examining several different arguments in tum. A
serious objection, based on the fact that different indexical terms are naturally thought
of as paradigm examples of terms with different inferential roles, is then dealt with in
1 For further arguments see for instance Hoerl1997, LuntIey 1997, 1998, 1999.
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the next chapter. This leads to the development of a novel theory of indexical thought
which is compatible with Conceptual Atomism.
5. 1 Evans's argument
Evans offers two arguments in favour of Frege's claim. The more prominent of these
arguments is intriguing and demands discussion though despite agreeing with its
..
conclusion I do not think it is valid as it stands. Evans follows Frege in focusing on an
example involving temporal indexicals but both authors make it clear that their
arguments apply equally to spatial indexicals such as 'here' and 'there'.2 Since it is a
little clearer I shall concentrate on the latter case. Suppose a subject'S' has a thought
of the form:
(1) It is G here"
S then moves away from the place while keeping track of it (typically using an ongoing
perception of spatially stable objects or features). From a different place, S then thinks:
(2) It is G there
The word 'there' in (2) refers to the same place as the word 'here' in (1). Evans
contrasts the Fregean claim that sentences like (1) and (2) represent 'cross-sections of
a persisting belief state' with what he calls the 'atomistic' conception (which is not to
be confused with Conceptual Atomism) under which (1) and (2) represent a series of
2 See Frege (1956, p. 296), Evans (1985, pp. 310-311).
3 Grammatically many indexicals, including 'here' and 'now', are adverbs. I assume that this is a
quirk of English which disguises their logical form, though perhaps an interesting one if they involve
a kind of disguised predication as the theory which I shall advocate in chapter 6 suggests.
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related but independent atomic thoughts. According to Evans on the atomistic
conception 'the atom must be a perfectly coherent unit of thought by itself, even if it is
entertained by one who has not the least propensity to form the other members of the
series' (1985, p. 309). He then observes that this cannot be correct. For suppose that S
were to think, in a certain place, that 'it is G here' -If S then moved a short distance to
the left, say, it would then be normal for S to believe that 'it is G to the right'. In fact if
someone had no propensity ever to do this then we should not credit them with
thoughts about space at all, for if someone properly understands the notion of space
..
they must surely be committed to the existence of a system of relations such that if one
moves to one's left then the very same place where one was before is now to one's
right. This is closely related to the claim that Peacocke (1997, p. 243) makes in arguing
that PLACE and SPATIAL RELATION form a 'local holism' (see above, section 3.3). By
the same token, to use Evans's example, if someone thinks 'it is now \jI' then we
cannot credit them with genuine temporal thought unless they have a propensity to
think, a moment later, that 'it was \jI just a moment ago'; someone who could think the
first thought without any propensity to think the second just wouldn't be thinking
about a time. The propensity to form these thoughts in a series as the context changes
is therefore a condition for the possibility of thought about space and time. We could
say, borrowing some more of Peacocke's (1986) terminology, that it is among the
canonical commitments of thoughts about places and times that the thinker is disposed
to form a series of thoughts in this way.
This is consistent with what Evans says in section IV of his paper 'Things Without
the Mind' (1980). Someone who could have one of the supposed atomic thoughts
without a propensity to form the next one would have only what Evans calls a 'serial'
grasp of space or time because they would not be committed to the mind-independent
existence of places and times. By contrast Evans argues that a 'simultaneous'
conception is essential for spatial thought (and likewise presumably temporal thought).
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Analogous considerations can be applied to thought about physical objects; one cannot
really be thinking about an object if one never expects its existence to persist. This
notion of persistence lies behind the idea of keeping track of a perceived object - one
would not really be keeping track in the relevant sense if one believed that what one
was perceiving at each moment was an entirely independent time-slice rather than a
temporal stage of an object which persists from one moment to the next. Thus one
cannot fully manifest in an instant the fact that one is thinking about an object via a
perceptual identification. This may lie behind Evans's claim that 'we have to regard the
..
static notion of "having hold of an object at 1" as essentially an abstraction from the
dynamic notion of "keeping track of an object from I to I' '" (1985, p. 311). Much the
same would apply to places and times.
Evans concludes that the supposed atomic thoughts cannot be atomic at all because
they are not coherent independently of thoughts at other places andlor times. Hence,
he concludes, the putative series of thoughts must instead be a single dynamic thought.
There are two remarks I would like to make about 'this argument. Firstly, it is not
absolutely clear from what has been said so far that the series of thoughts described by
Evans must all involve precise reference to the same place or time. When someone
thinks that 'it is G to the right' because of an earlier thought that 'it is G here' it is not
,
obvious that it is a requirement that they must be thinking, of the exact same place,
that it is G rather than simply thinking that it is G at a place that is now located
somewhere to the right - a place which the subject may no longer be able to locate with
precisron.
One could perhaps try to supplement Evans's argument by saying that at least
insofar as one keeps track of a place while moving around one must have a propensity
to think the next thought in the series, for example to move from thinking (1) to
thinking (2). My second remark, however, is that even with this supplementation
Evans's argument is not valid. Evans shows that there are certain thoughts which are
not possible unless the thinker has a propensity to think certain other thoughts, but
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from what has been said it is not obvious why these subsequent thoughts must be
identical to the earlier ones. There are many cases in which the ability to think a certain
thought implies a propensity to think other, different thoughts. No one can be credited
with the thought that 'there goes a rabbit' unless they are inclined to judge that 'rabbits
are physical objects', yet the latter thought is obviously not identical to the former.
Admittedly these thoughts do not form any kind of sequence, but Evans offers no
argument as to the relevance of thoughts occurring in a sequence, or in a way which
depends systematically on changes of context. Put abstractly, Evans's argument has the
..
form: 'anyone who thinks 'a is F' must have a propensity, when the context changes in
a certain way, to think 'b is F'; therefore 'a' and 'b' express the same mode of
presentation'. Clearly without further supplementation this is not valid.
5.2 Transparency
It may be, however, that what Evans was really getting at in the argument just
discussed was the fact that, as he later put it:
It is a precondition of rationality that information acquired at one time should be available to
the subject later: hence, given that in a rational creature information (and misinformation)
generates beliefs, that beliefs should persist (1982, p. 235).
This hints at the notion, embodied in the Transparency Principle, that there are rational
relations between thoughts at different times which can only be accounted for by the
persistence of modes of presentation. Elsewhere, in the less prominent of his two
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arguments, Evans (1985, p. 309) briefly makes this point a little more explicitly, and
the following argument is at least partly inspired by his remarks."
Let us recall the general structure of an argument for the persistence of a mode of
presentation through time, as embodied in the Transparency Principle. If one thinks, at
time ti, that 'Cicero was a great orator' then there- is a kind of ceteris paribus rational
obligation for one to predicate the same thing of Cicero, or at least not to predicate its
negation, a moment later at time h. There are, of course, plenty of circumstances in
which this does not apply; one may forget one's earlier predication, for example, or
one may simply change one's mind. But nevertheless the earlier predication can make
the negation of the later predication irrational. This happens, quite simply, because at h
one remembers one's earlier thought that Cicero was a great orator. Having done so,
and having accepted the earlier thought as true, one would be irrational to assert that
Cicero was not a great orator. Through memory, one's thoughts at one time can thus
have a rational bearing on what one should assent to at a later time. One's thinking can
be diachronically transparent.
This diachronic rational relation implies the retention of a mode of presentation
though time. Imagine that at h one no longer possessed the term 'Cicero' but instead
possessed a newly acquired term 'Tully' which referred to the same person referred to
by 'Cicero' at ti but expressed a different mode of presentation. One would therefore
find the identity 'Cicero = Tully' informative. Under these circumstances one's earlier
thought about Cicero would have no bearing on what one should assent to about Tully
at h unless one also believed that 'Cicero = Tully'. In order to be able to entertain this
identity, however, one would have to retain the mode of presentation 'Cicero' until
4 John Campbell (1987, 1994, pp. 73-88) gives a highly illuminating discussion of a similar argument
for demonstratives, though he does not extend it to indexicals. Michael Luntley (1997, 1998, 1999)
gives a variety of arguments for dynamic thoughts to the effect that the significance of a thought at
one time can sometimes only be captured by acknowledging the rational bearing that it has on earlier
thoughts, and Christoph Hoerl (1997) argues that the possibility of changing one's mind about
whether something is predicable of an object requires there to be a continuous mode of presentation of
the object throughout. The issue of cognitive dynamics is also related to a difficulty with
demonstratives to which David Kaplan (1989a, pp. 588-590) draws attention.
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one acquired the term 'Tully' at h. A diachronic rational relation therefore implies the
retention of a mode of presentation. The same argument can be applied to the modes
of presentation expressed by the different occurrences of 'Cicero' at t. and t2.
Consequently both occurrences of 'Cicero' must express the same mode of
presentation. As an objection one could, of eourse, assert that the modes of
presentation expressed by 'Cicero' at t. and h differ just because of the time difference
and that there is a brute rational relation between different modes of presentation at
different times, but it is very hard to see a motivation for this view. Individuating
.,
modes of presentation in this way has no explanatory value.
An argument of exactly the same structure applies when there is a change of
indexical terms. Consider a subject'S' who acquires at time t. the belief that:
(3) It is rainy here
Suppose that S then moves away from the place at time h but keeps track of it; this
would typically be done perceptually, by keeping it in view. There are circumstances in
which S's thinking (3) at ti would make it irrational for S to think about the same place
at time h that:
(4) It is not rainy there
The circumstances in question are those in which S remembers that the place is rainy
and has no change of opinion on the matter.' While keeping track of a place one has a
constant epistemic engagement with it such that one never needs to reflect on whether
it is the same place that one was thinking about earlier. Consequently even when it
becomes appropriate to replace 'here' with 'there' there is the same kind of rational
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relation between one's thoughts at the different times as exists between the earlier and
later 'Cicero' thoughts described above. In both cases this can only be explained by a
retained mode of presentation; the same mode of presentation is expressed by 'here' in
(3) as is expressed by 'there' in (4).
It cannot be objected that the rational relation between (3) and (4) exists because of
a suppressed identification 'here = there'. For such an identity statement would not be
a possible object of thought. The mode of presentation expressed by 'here' is only
available at time tr while the mode of presentation expressed by 'there' is only available
..
at the later time h; as soon as the place becomes 'there' it ceases to be 'here'. To
suggest that the modes of presentation would be available beyond these times would,
of course, be to concede the point.
Neither can it be objected that the rational relation can be explained by an inference
based on the memory that the place referred to earlier as 'here' is rainy, as follows:
1. (From memory): the place that was referred to by 'here' at ti is rainy
11. There = the place that was referred to by 'here' at ti, therefore:
iii. It is rainy there
Since the thought remembered at line (i) contains no demonstrative or indexical
elements it can be assumed to be retained from tr to hwithout begging the question. If
the place thought about at h was then judged, by whatever means, to be identical to
the place that was thought about at ti (line (ii) then it would be possible to infer the
conclusion, line (iii).
This is certainly a way in which an initial thought 'it is rainy here' could lead to a
later thought 'it is rainy there' and I do not deny that such reasoning often occurs. In
such cases there is no reason to assume that 'here' and 'there' express the same mode
5 The adjective 'rainy' should be understood timelessly, so that if a place is rainy at one time then it is
rainy at all times. If this seems counterintuitive it can be substituted for something unambiguously
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of presentation. But an inference of this kind requires the place to be re-identified at h.
There may certainly be circumstances, those in which the thinker has failed to keep
track of the place, in which such a re-identification is necessary. S might, for example,
recognise the place by noticing certain distinguishing features which S remembers were
possessed by the place seen earlier. But such refleotive thinking differs from a common
unreflective level of thought in which the thinker keeps track of the place, typically
using an ongoing perceptual contact with it. This renders such re-identifications
superfluous. We are concerned only with situations of the latter kind; it only these
..
situations in which the mode of presentation is retained through a change of indexicals.
As a modified objection it might be suggested that it is by keeping track of the place
that the thinker is able to make the re-identification; at h S knows that 'there = the
place that was referred to by 'here' at t.' because the place has been kept track of
throughout. But this would beg the question, for it implies that keeping track allows
the thinker to know that 'there' satisfies 'x = the place referred to by "here" at tl'
simply by having known, at tt, that it was satisfied by 'here'. This assumes precisely the
kind of diachronic rational relation that it was supposed to dispense with.
I have so far spoken of the subject keeping track of a place using perception. This
typically involves using perception to keep track of objects which stand in stable
relations to the place." There are, however, other ways of identifying places, though
these only allow the subject to keep track of a place in relatively limited ways. It may,
for example, be possible to identify a place 'egocentrically', making use of the spatial
relation between the place and oneself. 7 This way of identifying a place cannot be the
norm because it would not allow one to keep track of places as accurately as we
generally do. Imagine, for example, seeing a place in the distance and walking to it; it is
not plausible that one could do this purely egocentrically, without the help of
timeless such as 'is SP's place of birth'.
6 Strictly speaking one could identify places using 'features' rather than objects; this refinement
makes little difference, and I shall ignore it since the actual world contains objects.
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perception. One could, however, keep track of a place egocentrically to the extent that,
for example, if one is aware of moving a little to the left then one knows that the place
must subsequently be identified in virtue of being a little to one's right."
The distinction between different ways in which someone might keep track of a
place is not important for our current purposes, however. For no matter how the place
is kept track of, so long as it is kept track of there will be exactly the same kinds of
rational relations between thoughts expressed using 'here' and 'there' at different times
that have been discussed above. Consequently the argument does not rely on any
assumptions about what is involved in keeping track.
The same argument can be applied whenever one indexical term can be replaced
with a different co-referring term without the need for the thinker to re-identify the
reference. Consider temporal indexicals. It is not possible to keep track of times
perceptually in the same way that it is possible to keep track of places. A time can be
kept track of as it recedes into the past, however, by keeping track of its location in a
sequence of events which one can trace back from events taking place at the present
moment. This is analogous to keeping track of places by touch, feeling one's way from
one object to another and remembering their layout. It may also be possible to keep
track of a time egocentrically over a limited period in a similar way to that described
above for places. Keeping track of unit~ of time such as days is more straightforward;
onejust has to keep track of the number of days which have passed. This would be
difficult to do over long periods, but certainly the transition from 'today' to 'yesterday'
presents no obvious problems.
7 The distinction between egocentric and demonstrative identifications of places is discussed in more
detail in section 6.6, below.
8 This way of keeping track was also discussed earlier (section 3.2) as an example of a case in which
we must either say that there is a continuous Way of Referring which has to be updated to keep up
with the changing circumstances or else we must say that a referential episode does not rely on a strict
overlap between different Ways of Referring. One can start to see here that the notion of 'keeping
track over a period of time' cannot be sharply distinguished from the more general notion of a
referential episode.
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Indexicals which refer to persons do not lend themselves to dynamic transitions
between different terms in the same way that spatial or temporal indexicals do. In
particular, it is hard to imagine circumstances under which one could keep track of
oneself while exchanging indexical terms between 'I' and, for instance, 'you'. There
might, however, (with a little imagination) be ways of keeping track of someone who
changes between 'he' and 'she'. In such cases the same arguments would apply .
..
5.3 Further considerations
The arguments just given can be backed up by a number of supplementary
considerations. Consider, for example, what happens when a thought entertained at
some earlier time is negated." Suppose I see a certain place in the distance and,
thinking it looks attractive, I think:
(5) We should hold the barbecue there
I then walk over to the place, keeping track of it visually as I move towards it. On
arriving at the place, however, I discover that it is not as attractive as it looked from a
distance. I therefore change my mind and think:
(6) We should not hold the barbecue here
Now, the point of saying that I change my mind is that the later thought is not
independent of the earlier one but rather has a certain rational bearing on it. Rather
than simply thinking one thought followed by another, where the two thoughts are
independent, my thinking (6) is inconsistent with my continuing to think (5). The best
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way to explain this is to say that the 'there' of (5) and the 'here' of (6) express the
same mode of presentation, and the change between (5) and (6) is just a change of
predication.
The importance of modes of presentation which survive changes of context can also
be seen in the role that they play in the justification of an on-going project over a
period of time.'? During my search for a good spot for a barbecue I first see a location
in the distance then go there to get a better look at it. My going and looking can be
seen as a project. My decision to embark upon the project is taken in the light of the
.,
thought expressed by (5); I form an intention to go 'there' to get a better look. Now,
suppose that when I arrived at the place the mode of presentation previously expressed
by 'there' was lost and a new, independent one was expressed by 'here'. I would no
longer have any grasp of what I was doing there. My being there would be part of an
ongoing project (to go to the place and look around) which would require a
continuous comprehension of my reasons for what I was doing. The mode of
presentation expressed by 'there' would be likely to appear in a number of beliefs and
desires which went together to form the background justification for the project (e.g.
'it looks nice there and I need to find a nice spot so I should go there to see if it is
better there than the places I have seen so far' etc.) This project could only continue as
,
I moved around if the mode of presentation survived the change of context.
Another point to consider is that since both 'here' - and 'there' -thoughts depend on
the same ability to identify and keep track of places it seems arbitrary to claim that a
mode of presentation of the place becomes unavailable when the linguistic expression
changes. Imagine moving around relative to a particular place, sometimes passing
through it then moving away again. Just the same ability to keep track is involved
throughout. Imagine, for example, sitting on a train and seeing a place in the distance,
9 cr. Luntley 1998; 1999, e.g. pp. 338-342.
10 cr. Luntley, 1997.
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passing through it and moving away again. Throughout the approach it would be
possible to think:
(7) It is G there
It seems implausible that there would be a change in the mode of presentation of the
place during the approach just because it gets steadily closer. After passing through the
place a thought of the same form is possible and it seems similarly implausible to deny
..
that the same mode of presentation of the place is retained as the place gets gradually
further away. Now, at some point while passing though the place it becomes necessary
to say 'here' instead of 'there'. This may happen very briefly. Given the continuity in
the way in which the place is identified throughout the episode it would seem strange
to suggest that the thoughts before and after passing through the place, both of which
would be expressed using the word 'there', involve different modes of presentation.
Indeed if the train had passed just a little to one side of the place instead of straight
through it the thought would have been continuously expressed using 'there' and there
would be no reason whatsoever to suppose that the mode of presentation differed
depending on whether the train was moving towards the place or away from it. If all of
,
this is correct then it seems arbitrary to deny that the same mode of presentation would
also be available while the train was passing through the place, as well as both before
and after. Consequently the same mode of presentation would be expressed first using
'there', then 'here', then 'there' again.
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5.4 Diachronic anaphors
One final consideration depends on a certain understanding of the thoughts expressed
by sentences containing anaphors. Imagine once again being on a train. As the train
stands stationary at time ti I look around at the surrounding countryside and say:
(8) We should hold the barbecue here
The train pulls away, but I keep looking at the same place, never losing track of it. My
continuing perception allows me to make further judgments about the place; from a
distance I can see aspects of it that I could not see from closer up. At time tz based on
these further perceptions I say:
(9) It is well sheltered from the wind
The word 'it' in (9) is an anaphor; it refers to the same place as the word 'here' in (8).
Suppose that by the time I make the judgment expressed by (9) I am no longer at the
place. Consequently it would no longer be appropriate for me to use the word 'here' in
referring to it. Now, the most obvious account of anaphors says that the anaphor
reproduces the mode of presentation expressed by the word it stands in for; in this case
the word 'here' in (8). If anaphors work in that way then it follows that the mode of
presentation expressed by the word 'here' in (8) is still available at h, after I have
moved away from the place.
Now, I could equally have said something equivalent at h using the word 'there'
instead of an anaphor. But we have just seen that the mode of presentation expressed
by 'here' at tl is still available at h. This makes it hard to deny that it is this same mode
of presentation that would be expressed at h by 'there'. The alternative would be to
say that there would be two different modes of presentation of the place available
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simultaneously: the one expressible using the anaphor and the one expressible using the
word 'there'. This is highly implausible, especially since whatever is predicated of the
place under one mode of presentation would have to be predicated of it under the
other mode of presentation.
Although I do not have a simple argument to show that anaphoric thought has to be
construed in the way just described it is a little hard to see what alternatives there
could be. In the absence of any alternative account it is therefore difficult to deny that
the same mode of presentation can be retained through a change of spatial indexicals.
A similar argument could be given for other indexical terms insofar as it is possible to
keep track of the reference through a change of indexicals, so the conclusion is quite
general.
CHAPTER6
The Role of Egocentricity in Indexical Thought
It has now been shown that the same mode of presentation can be retained through a
change of indexical term. Indexicals, however, can very easily appear to be paradigm
examples of terms which have characteristic inferential roles; roles by which the modes
of presentation expressed "could be at least partially individuated. If this were correct it
would conflict with the conclusion just mentioned and would threaten Conceptual
Atomism, which denies that concepts can be individuated in terms of inferential roles.
The aim of this chapter is to show that this difficulty can be avoided.
6.1 Indexical thought and action
The difficulty just mentioned can be put in terms of a simple objection which has been
surprisingly neglected by the advocates of dynamic thoughts. The objection is based on
the fact that indexicals have special consequences for actions and inferences which
differ for different indexicals. This has often been discussed in relation to
communication, where it appears to present major problems for Frege's view that
communication consists in the sharing of thoughts, and has also been discussed in other
contexts. The problem for Fregean communication using indexicals is that when the
shift of context between speaker and hearer requires that they use different indexicals it
will often be rational for them to perform different actions. To borrow an example
from John Perry (1977, p. 494), if you say that:
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(1) A bear is about to attack me
you should roll up in a ball and try to keep still. But if I understand what you said I will
express it using the sentence:
(2) A bear is about to attack you
This thought will give me reason to run and get help, not to roll up in a ball and try to
keep still. The same phenomenon occurs with other indexicals. Consider the following
two pairs of sentences, uttered in different contexts such that the indexical terms of
each pair co-refer:
(3) Today is rainy
(4) Yesterday was rainy
(5) It is rainy here
(6) It is rainy there
The thinker of the first thought in each pair generally has a reason to put up or carry an
umbrella, but the thinker of the second thought in the pair does not.
Now, if two people perform different intentional actions they must be in different
overall psychological states. It does not, of course, follow immediately from this that
the above pairs of sentences express different thoughts, for it could be that the thinkers
perform different actions because they differ in thoughts additional to those expressed.
But we can at least stipulate, for the purposes of argument, that there are no
psychological differences that are unconnected with the thoughts expressed. For
instance we could stipulate that you and I were in identical psychological states before
the appearance of the bear. It follows that there is a difference in psychological state
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associated with the difference in the indexical terms used; and it has seemed natural to
many philosophers to suppose that this difference lies in the singular modes of
presentation expressed by the indexical terms.
This view has led many philosophers to abandon the Fregean idea that indexical
communication involves the sharing of thoughts. Some have suggested that while the
speaker and hearer share a Russellian proposition they differ in the 'character' under
which this proposition is entertained (Kaplan 1989). Character plays the role of mode
of presentation in these theories but the Fregean one-to-one correspondence between
singular modes of presentation and references is broken (perry 1977). Others have
stayed closer to Frege's original conception of thought, but have still rejected his
account of communication. John McDowell, for example, suggests that much of
Frege's account of thoughts could be rescued from these difficulties if indexical
communication were seen as involving "different thoughts that, however, stand and are
mutually known to stand in a suitable relation of correspondence" (McDowell 1984, p.
290). As mentioned above, Evans (1982, pp. 40, 31S-316) had similar doubts about
the Fregean account.' Many have also felt that the difficulties in the Fregean account of
communication were at the root ofFrege's rather problematic view of the first person,
in which there is both a private and a public sense associated with 'I', the former being
principally relevant to action while only the latter is communicable.
The distinctive psychological significance of an indexical term is not only manifested
in communication. If, for example, yesterday, I thought 'today is rainy' it will have
been rational for me, ceteris paribus, to take an umbrella with me when I went out. But
if, today, I think 'yesterday was rainy' this gives me no reason to take an umbrella.
Likewise, when I think 'it is rainy here' I may open my umbrella but when I move
away from the place and think 'it is rainy there' I no longer have any reason to do this.
Even the differences in the utterances of the different indexicals are deliberate and can
therefore be regarded as different actions (different speech acts). Such differences in
The Role of Egocentricity in Indexical Thought 161
rational actions require an explanation in terms of psychological states, and it has
seemed natural to many philosophers to give this explanation in terms of differences in
the modes of presentation expressed by the different indexical terms. Such an
explanation only works if the different modes of presentation putatively associated
with different indexicals have different inferential roles.
An example of this approach is found in the work of John Perry who notes the
variation of rational action with indexical terms in the dynamic case as well as in
communication:
As time passes, I go from the state corresponding to 'The meeting will begin' to the one
corresponding to 'The meeting is beginning' and finally to 'The meeting has begun'. All along
I believe of noon that it is when the meeting begins. But I believe it in different ways. And to
these different ways of believing the same thing, different actions are appropriate:
preparation, movement, apology (1979, p. 19).
When Perry speaks of 'believing the same thing' he does, of course, mean believing the
same Russellian proposition, not the same Fregean thought. Perry's solution is to
adopt a distinction similar to Kaplan's (1989) kontent/character distinction; in Perry's
terminology, although 'what is believed,' remains the same, the 'belief state' changes.
In Kaplan's terminology it is the character which changes. This is, in effect, a change in
a mode of presentation, though not one which is intrinsically related to the reference.
As discussed above, the Perry/Kaplan theory is a version of Inferential Role
Semantics' But although ascribing different characters to the different indexicals offers
a very neat explanation of the associated differences in rational actions it offers no
'resources to deal with the diachronic rational relations discussed in chapter 5. Like
1 See above, section 4.1.
2 See above, section 2.3.
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other versions of Inferential Role Semantics, it buys variation in significance for
rational actions and inferences at the cost of diachronic transparency.'
So there is a problem: Inferential Role Semantics can explain why thoughts
expressed using different indexical terms differ in their characteristic significance for
rational actions and inferences but cannot accommodate the retention of a mode of
presentation through a change of indexicals as implied by the arguments of chapter 5.
Conceptual Atomism, on the other hand, is compatible with the retention of modes of
presentation through changes of indexical but owes us an account of why thoughts
expressed using different "indexical terms differ in their characteristic significance for
rational actions and inferences. It is to this account that we must now turn."
6.2 The structure of indexical thought
As a solution to the difficulty just mentioned I propose an account of indexical thought
according to which there can indeed be a mode of presentation retained through a
change of indexicals (and perhaps common to speakers in different contexts), but in
addition there is a further mode of presentation which is associated with a particular
indexical term and which therefore changes when the indexical term changes. It is this
latter mode of presentation which accounts for the different psychological roles of
different indexical terms. Let us call this the egocentric mode of presentation.
There are two main versions of this theory to consider. Firstly the egocentric mode
of presentation may take the form of a subject term or secondly it may take the form of
3 Kaplan (1989, pp. 537-538) does note the difficulty, but leaves the matter unresolved.
4 Evans shows signs of being aware that there is a problem with the notion of a dynamic thoughts
when he acknowledges that there are differences between different indexical terms which, it might
appear, 'can be exploited to produce the possibility of differing epistemic attitudes to the thoughts,
which would then preclude their being the same thought, if thoughts are intended to be the object of
propositional attitudes' (1981, p. 292). His solution, however, is to point out that it is not possible to
take differing attitudes to the thoughts in question at the same time. This does not seem an adequate
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a predicate. It is the latter version which I think is correct. According to this theory,
whenever there is a thought expressible using the word 'here' the thinker believes that
the place in question has a certain property which I shall call the property of being
here. Thus 'is here' is a predicate, of a kind which I shall call egocentric predicates
(indicated by the underlining). The same applies, mutatis mutandis, for other indexicals.
So, at ti, a thought expressible as 'it is rainy here' involves two different predications
applied to the same singular term:
(7) P is rainy
(8)p is here
The letter 'p' refers to the place and expresses a mode of presentation capable of being
retained through a change of context and a change of indexical term. There are, of
course, no such words as 'p' or 'here' in English; they are merely being used as a
means by which to indicate the structure of the thoughts in question.
Subsequently, at tz, when the thought becomes 'it is rainy there' there is a change of
egocentric predicate but, if the place has been kept track of, everything else remains
the same:
(9) P is rainy
(10) pis there
The retained mode of presentation expressed by 'p' accounts for the transparency of
thought over time and the change of egocentric predicate accounts for the differences
in actions and/or inferences. A corresponding account of communication using
response; there are systematic differences between thoughts expressed using different indexicals which
seem inconsistent with the subject being in the same overall mental state, albeit at different times.
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indexicals, in which the speaker and hearer can share the mode of presentation 'p' but
differ in the egocentric predicates applied, might also be possible.
Some general points must be made about this theory. Firstly, it need not be assumed
that an utterance of 'it is rainy here' expresses two separate thoughts; instead of the
separate thoughts (7) and (8), for example, there .could be just one thought in which
the two predicates ('is rainy' and 'is here') are attached to the same subject term, 'p'.5
Secondly, from what has been said so far it is not necessary that there must be an
egocentric predicate 'is there' at all; there could be an egocentric predicate 'is here' at
ti and then no such predicate at h. Much the same could be said about 'now' and
'then'. Having registered this caveat, however, I shall continue to assume that there is
an egocentric predicate 'is there', for when thinking of a place as 'there' one certainly
has a sense of the egocentric location of the place. In fact there must be a potential
infinity of different predicates corresponding to the infinity of different egocentric
relations, and 'is there' should be understood as expressing whichever one is involved
in the thought in question.
The alternative version of the theory, in which the egocentric mode of presentation
corresponds to a subject term, might initially look equally promising. According to this
version there are two different modes of presentation of the reference simultaneously,
one of which changes according to theindexical term while the other can be retained.
At tl, an utterance of 'it is rainy here' would imply thoughts of the following form:
(11)P is rainy
(12) HERE is rainy
Once again 'p' refers to the place and is capable of being retained through a change of
context and indexical term. The word 'HERE' (when printed as shown) expresses
5 Such possibilities are discussed in greater detail below, section 6.5.
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another mode of presentation of the same place, associated with the word 'here' but
not with the word 'there'. As with the predicate theory there need not be two separate
thoughts; instead of (11) and (12) there could, for instance, be just one thought 'p is
rainy and HERE is rainy' or 'p and HERE are both rainy'. I shall not dwell on these
possibilities,for all that is crucial to our current concerns is that there are two different
modes of presentation of the place. At h, given that the place has been kept track of,
an utterance of 'it is rainy there' would imply a change of just one of these modes of
presentation:
(13) P is rainy
(14) THERE is rainy
The retained mode of presentation 'p' accounts for the diachronic transparency
between tl and h and the change of mode of presentation from 'HERE' to 'THER£'
accounts for the variation in actions or inferences. It would also be possible to give an
account of indexical communication according to which one singular mode of
presentation, 'p', is shared between the speaker and the hearer while the other is not;
rather like Frege's account ofT.
To those who are used to certain standard theories of indexical thought the theory
just described may, at a first glance, look tempting. For it may seem to offer the
possibility of interpreting 'p' as a perception-based 'demonstrative' mode of
presentation leaving 'HERE' as a 'purely indexical' mode of presentation, availableeven
in sensory deprivation." As mentioned above, however, although we typically keep
track of places using perception this is not a necessity. One can, to a more limited
extent, keep track of a place without perceiving anything provided one can somehow
keep track of one's own movements. If one knows that one has moved a little to the
6 Cf Evans (1982, p. 161).
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left, for example, then one knows that the place where one was must be a little to the
right. The same diachronic rational relations exist as in the perceptual case and the
same arguments apply. This means that there is no reason why 'p' should always be
related to perception; even in sensory deprivation there would have to be two modes
of presentation of the place. So the theory does not incorporate a distinction between
'perceptual demonstrative' and 'purely indexical' modes of presentation and I suspect
that this will make it appear a little less plausible.
In any case there is a more serious problem with this theory. The problem relates to
how the thinker is supposed to get from thinking (11) and (12) to thinking (13) and
(14). The transition from (11) to (13) is of course trivial; (13) is the same thought as
(11), which is simply retained. The problem relates rather to (12) and (14). Why, for
example, must someone who starts by thinking (11) and (12) at tr then go on to think
not only (13) but also (14) at ta? This is only explicable ifthere is an inference based on
an identity of the form:
(15) P = THERE
By the same token a 'here' -thought must be associated with an identity of the form:
(16) P = HER£.
If there were no such identities then there would be no reason to predicate the same
thing (such as 'is rainy') of both 'p' and 'HEREITHER£.'.
This would require the thinker of any 'here' -thought, for example, to judge that 'p'
is identical with 'HER£.'. But I can only see one way in which this could occur. Firstly,
'HERE' would have to be identified by the thinker in virtue of uniquely having the
egocentric property 'here'. Secondly there would have to be a judgment that:
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(17) pis here
Thus, on the grounds that only one place can have the property 'here', it would be
inferred that 'p = HER£'. In other words, the only way to judge that 'p = HER£' would
be to judge that the place 'p' had the same egocentric relation to oneself that defines
the place 'H£R£'.
The trouble with this idea is that it renders 'HERE' and 'THER£' redundant. For (17)
is exactly the same thought as (8); it involves an egocentric predication exactly as the
predication theory says. But if the egocentric predication is necessary anyway then
there is no longer any need to posit the modes of presentation 'HER£' or 'THERE'. They
have no explanatory value. Hence the analysis in terms of egocentric predicates is the
correct theory.
6.3 Egocentric Predicates
Egocentric predication has so far been described as a technical notion introduced in
order to solve a technical problem but i~ fact some egocentric predicates are intuitively
quite familiar. The egocentric predicate components 'here' and 'there', for example,
can be thought of as similar to the adjectives 'near' and 'distant', which are also
egocentric predicates. The egocentric predicates associated with indexical thoughts
belong to a more general category of egocentric predicates, defined as those predicates
which pick out a relation in which the thinker is one of the relata.'
When thinking about a place one can be aware of where the place is in relation to
oneself. This is a property of the place; a relational property, but a property
7 The following account of egocentric predicates has benefited from John Campbell's (l993a, pp. 82-
88, 1994, pp. 41-46) account of causal indexicals, with which egocentric predicates have much in
common.
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nonetheless. It is this property which I suggest is predicated of a place by a spatial
egocentric predicate. There are, however, two quite different ways in which this
property could figure in thought. It may, firstly, be conceived of by the thinker as
relational. The place is thought of as being 'where I am', 'near to me', 'distant from
me', and so on. There is no doubt that such relational thoughts occur, and are often
relevant to decisions about which actions to perform. They are also sometimes
essential for communication with others."
It is not obvious, however, that spatial thought must always be conceived of by the
thinker in this explicitly relational way. Moreover, the equivalent relational predicates
in the temporal or personal cases arguably fail to capture the nature of the thoughts
normally expressed by temporal or personal indexical terms. In the temporal case since
the thinker exists at many different times the relational egocentric predicates would
have to contain a reference to something other than the thinker, perhaps to the time at
which the thought itself is occurring. But although such thinking certainly occurs (and
is required, for example, in understanding other speakers' sentences uttered at times
other than the present) it is not clear that unreflective indexical thought about times is
normally understood by the thinker as relational." It is even less plausible that the
corresponding predicates for personal indexicals are always relational. In the first-
person case the relational predicate would be of the form 'is the thinker of this
thought'; it is not plausible that first-person thought depends on such articulations.
When thinking of a place as near or distant it is not necessary to think of this
property explicitly in relation to oneself. Perhaps, then, at the most primitive level of
8 There is, however, some question as to whether it would be intelligible to claim that what it is for a
place to be 'here' could ultimately be understood in terms of its relation to one's own position. See
Evans 1982, pp. 153-157 and Campbell 1993a, pp. 71-76, 1994, pp. 8-16.
9 Higginbotham's (1995) account, in which part of the content of certain thoughts is the thought itself,
has some broad similarities with the relational account of egocentric predicates. Higginbotham cites
examples of sequence of tense and other linguistic phenomena which illustrate the way in which the
logical form that accounts for sequence of tense (on his account, a temporal relation between the
utterance and a 'situation') must sometimes be part of the thinker's mental state. I need not disagree
with this; such reflective uses of indexical terms must be possible. The question is whether they are
universal.
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thought the egocentric predicates associated with the use of indexicals could be
monadic; although they refer to a relation involving the thinker, they are not conceived
of by the thinker as relational. Instead, they are unstructured predicates whose use is
very similar to the unstructured predications 'is near' and 'is distant'.
In the temporal case, the idea that predicates like 'is past' can be understood
monadically seems particularly plausible, especially given that many people (including a
number of philosophers) find it natural to assume that properties like pastness or
futurity, far from being relational, are in fact intrinsic properties of times." If the
theory is also applicable 'to the first person then the egocentric predicate associated
with 'I'-thoughts would be a monadic predicate 'is me', which predicates identity with
a certain person (the thinker), but is not conceived of in this way by the thinker.
6.4 The role of egocentric predicates in communication
As noted above, many philosophers have abandoned the notion of indexical
communication as involving the sharing of singular modes of presentation. On the
theory that has now been outlined, however, there is no longer any need for this
conclusion because the differences in' actions between speaker and hearer can be
accounted for in terms of differences in egocentric predication rather than differences
in the singular mode of presentation. The theory of communication developed in
chapter 4 can therefore be applied to indexicals; so long as both speaker and hearer
understand the general rules of use for indexical terms (e.g. that 'here' refers to the
location of the speaker) then it is possible for there to be the kind of mutual deference
10 If the advocates of this view (the 'tensed'» or A-theory of time) were correct then temporal
predicates like 'is past' should be regarded as non-egocentric monadic predicates. There is still an
active debate on this issue, much of which revolves around the nature of temporal indexicals. For an
argument against intrinsic tenses which is independent of such issues, however, see Appendix C.
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required for them to share in a single referential practice. But what role do egocentric
predicates play in communication, and can they themselves be communicated?
Anyone who can understand an utterance containing an indexical term must
understand the way in which the term combines with context to determine the
reference, and must also assume that the speaker ..understands the functioning of the
term in the same way. This provides us with a clue concerning the role of egocentric
predicates in communication. Take the word 'here', for example. If you understand my
use of 'here' then you must understand not only that I am referring to my own location
but also that since I am expressing my thought using this term I must believe, of that
particular place, that it is where I am. I must, in other words, have a belief of the form
'p is where I am'. This involves the application of a relational egocentric predicate, just
as the theory suggests. Similarly, if I utter a sentence containing the word 'past' then I
must believe, of a certain time, that it is prior to my utterance and if I utter a sentence
containing 'I' then I must believe that it was I who uttered it.
Each indexical utterance therefore implies that -the speaker predicates, of the
reference, the relation picked out by the relevant relational egocentric predicate.
Moreover, since the same words can be uttered by different speakers and in different
contexts, both speaker and hearer must understand that each relational egocentric
predicate is an instance of more general relation such as 'n is where s is' (where 'n'
and's' are variables standing for a place and a thinker respectively). Without this
understanding communication would be impossible.
This does not, however, preclude the possibility that an understanding of relational
egocentric predicates could be dependent upon or additional to an understanding of the
corresponding monadic predicates. It is important, in this connection, to bear in mind
the difference between entertaining a thought which could be expressed using certain
words and actually so expressing it. It is only in the latter case that it is necessary to
insist that the thought involves the relational egocentric predicate. It may be, then, that
in understanding someone else's indexical utterance one can, via an understanding of
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the relevant relational egocentric predicate, put oneself in the other person's position
by understanding what kind of monadic predication is involved in their thinking. It is in
this way that one can literally come to understand another person's point of'view.!'
If it is assumed, with Frege and most 'neo-Fregean' philosophers, that a mode of
presentation determines a unique reference then monadic egocentric predicates cannot
be shared by different people. Only one person can ever be in a position to make
judgments involving a given monadic predicate because the predicate picks out its
reference in virtue of the fact that it is entertained by that particular person. In judging
that a place is 'here', for 'example, I have only to focus my attention upon the place; I
do not have to pay attention to my own location as well. Only I can make the judgment
in this monadic way. The nearest anyone else could come to this judgment would be to
pay attention to both the place and to me, and to make a judgment about the relation
between one and the other. Consequently only I can entertain the particular monadic
predicate associated with my 'here' -judgments. This is consistent with the account of
communication that has been given, however, and there is nothing obviously absurd
about the idea that there are thought components that one can entertain only by being a
particular individual.
6.5 Indexicals and complex demonstratives
There is an analogy between the dynamics of indexicals and the dynamics of complex
demonstratives which, I hope, will help to clarify the role of egocentric predicates
within the theory that has been outlined. Complex demonstratives are those in which
the demonstrative term is modified by a nominal, as in 'that bottle'. To see the analogy
11 These remarks have been influenced by Campbell 1998, pp. 130-131. Campbell argues that there
must be a 'two-stage construction' involved in understanding others, involving both monadic and
relational notions in order to picture what it would be for one's own monadic notions to be someone
else's.
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with indexicals, imagine sitting in front of a bar behind which there is a row of bottles
on a shelf One of the bottles, the tallest one, happens to be the only empty one. It
would be possible to think 'that empty bottle is the tallest'. Now suppose that the
bottle is slowly filled. It would be possible to keep track of the bottle perceptually
throughout. But the expression of the thought would now change through a
modification of the nominal: 'that half-emptybottle is the tallest' then 'that almost-full
bottle is the tallest' and so on. These differences in expression could also lead to
differences in actions or inferences if it happened to be important to the thinker how
full the bottle was. Yet If a mode of presentation of an object can be retained by
keeping track of the object perceptually it should be possible to retain the mode of
presentation of the bottle while it is filled.
It is not difficult to make sense of this example. Although the same mode of
presentation of the bottle is retained throughout there is a change in what is predicated
of it as it is filled.The question ariseswhether 'that emptybottle is the tallest' and 'that
half-empty bottle is the tallest' express the same thought. The answer depends on the
view one takes of complex demonstratives.Many philosophers have held the view that
the nominal does not contribute to the truth conditions of a sentence containing a
complex demonstrative, and this could imply that sentences of the form 'that is G',
'that F is G' and 'that H is G' could' all express the same thought. Opinions vary
among these philosophers, however, as to what the nominal does." Some hold that it
has a restrictive role such that 'that F' can only refer to an object which is F. Others
think it has only a pragmatic role, helping to direct the hearer's attention to the object.
On this pragmatic interpretation an utterance of the form 'that F is G' indicates the
presence of two thoughts: 'that is G', which is the thought expressed and retained
through changes in the nominal, and 'that isF', which is not expressed by the sentence,
though the fact that it is among the speaker's beliefs is manifested by the choice of
words. The latter thought is exchanged for a different one when the nominalchanges.
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I hope the intended analogy is clear: as with indexicals, complex demonstratives
involve a combination of a singular mode of presentation which can be retained
through certain changes with a predicate which can change. In the case of complex
demonstratives what changes is the nominal; m the case of indexicals, I have
suggested, it is an egocentric predicate.
Ernest Lepore and Kirk Ludwig (2000) have recently claimed that the nominal does
in fact contribute to the truth conditions of sentences containing complex
demonstratives. They argue that the concatenation of a demonstrative with a nominal is
a form of restricted quantification so that 'that F is G' shares interpretive truth
conditions with a sentence of the form ''the x such that x = that and x is F is such that x
is G". 13 This contains a pure demonstrative, 'that', but the nominal, 'F', is indirectly
predicated of it via the quantification and therefore contributes to the truth conditions.
If this account is correct it may have implications for indexical thoughts as well. For
it suggests a possible analogous theory according to which instead of pairs of thoughts
like (7) and (8) there is a single thought associated with 'it is rainy here' which could
be paraphrased along the lines of: ''the x such that x =p and x is here is such that x is
rainy"." Whether or not this is correct does not affect the fundamental claim of the
theory of indexical thought for which I have been arguing, which is that the difference
between thoughts expressed using different indexical terms is a difference in
12 See Lepore and Ludwig 2000, pp. 200-201, for a useful survey of the literature.
13 Lepore and Ludwig also give a more precise formulation in terms of satisfaction, suited to a
Davidsonian semantics. I have paraphrased their formulation of the sentence above into English to
avoid the need to explain their terminology. Lepore and Ludwig's (p. 200) primary concern is the
semantics of complex demonstratives, and they do not make explicit the implications of their
discussion for the thoughts expressed using these terms.
14 For the purposes of constructing a semantic theory something more complex may be required
because 'p' is not actually a lexical item (cf. Lepore and Ludwig, p. 237-238). My purpose here,
. however, is only to consider what kinds of thoughts might be expressed. In the appendix to their
article Lepore and Ludwig (pp. 236-238) briefly raise the possibility of extending their account to
more specialised terms. Using 'he' as their example they raise the possibility of an analysis in which
the predicate 'is male' is involved in a way analogous to 'is F' in the case of complex demonstratives.
They do not discuss the 'here' case explicitly but presumably it would involve a predicate 'is here'.
For Lepore and Ludwig, whether such an account should be adopted turns on what one can infer from
sentences containing the term in question (whether, for instance, a true or false assertion of 'he is
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predication and not necessarily a difference in the singular mode of presentation
expressed. It is, however, a version of the theory worth noting.
6.6 Immunity to error through misidentification .
Certain judgments expressible using demonstrative or indexical terms are commonly
said to be immune to error through misidentification. There are, I shall suggest, two
different kinds of immuiiity to error through misidentification (henceforth 'IEM'),
either of which can be exhibited by an indexical judgment. 15 This is most naturally
explained by the theory of indexical thought for which I have been arguing and thus
provides an additional argument for it.
IEM is usually defined along the following lines: a judgment of the form 'a is F,
where 'a' stands for an object and 'F stands for a property, is immune to error
through misidentification if it makes no sense, having judged that something is F, to
wonder whether it is a that is being judged to be F. When I have an empty feeling in
my stomach, for example, it makes no sense for me to judge, on that basis, that
someone is hungry and yet to wonder whether the person in question is me. My
judgment that I am hungry is therefore immune to error through misidentification. This
immunity is a property of judgments, not of sentences or the thoughts expressed by
sentences. I may, for example, judge the same sentence, 'I am hungry', to be true as a
result of being shown an X-ray photograph of an empty stomach. But this judgment
could be in error through misidentification: the person whose stomach appears in the
X-ray might not be me.
handsome' implies that something is male). The arguments given here provide an independent
motivation for adopting such an account.
15 This is not, however, the same distinction made by Andrea Christofidou (2000).
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Much of the interest in IEM has been due to the fact that many first-person
judgments exhibit the phenomenon." This suggests that thinking about oneself does
not always require identifying oneself in any fallible way and this raises interesting
questions about the nature of first-person judgments. IEM does, however, occur in
judgments involving other kinds of terms. To illustrate the two different kinds of IEM
it will help to consider complex demonstratives once again. I shall argue that complex
demonstratives exhibit a different kind of IEM from judgments expressed using terms
of the form 'the F, 'dthat (the F)', or any other term whose reference must be
identified by its properties. I shall then discuss the relevance of this distinction to
indexicals.
Suppose, then, that I see an angry-looking wasp. I may judge that:
(18) That wasp is angry
My ability to identify the wasp rests on the fact that I receive a stream of information
from it through perception. I have no grip on the object of my judgment other than via
this information link. So, since my judgment about the angriness of the wasp also rests
on the same information, there is no possibility that the object which I judge to be
angry is not identical to the one which I refer to as 'that wasp'. My judgment is
therefore immune to error through misidentification because I cannot judge, in this
way, that something is angry and yet wonder whether it is that wasp which is angry.
Borrowing an expression from Evans (1982, p. 180), we can describe judgments which
exhibit IEM for this reason as identification-free.
This contrasts with a situation in which, upon seeing an angry-looking person, I
judge that:
16 Recent discussion of the phenomenon originates from Wittgenstein (1958, pp. 66-7) and Sydney
Shoemaker (1968, 1970). Evans (1982, sections 6.6 and 7.2) also gives an important discussion.
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(19) Smith is angry
This judgment is only correct if the person I see is in fact Smith. It therefore rests on
the truth of an identity between 'that person' and 'Smith', where the former refers to
the person seen. If this identity is false then .the judgment is in error through
misidentification. Let us therefore call such judgments identification-dependentI'
Some judgments which are identification-free can, however, be in error through a
different kind of misidentification. Suppose, for example, that the insect which I saw
was not a wasp, but a bee. My taking it to be a wasp could reasonably be described as
a form of misidentification. The error in this case, however, is not in an identity but in a
predication; the insect is incorrectly judged to be a wasp.
The kind of misidentification just described can be made more vivid by replacing the
structured complex demonstratives 'that wasp' and 'that bee' with unstructured terms
'thasp' and 'thee' respectively. These simply abbreviate the complex demonstratives.
No such terms exist in English, of course, but there.is nothing to prevent them from
being introduced. On mistaking the bee for a wasp I would therefore make the
judgment:
(20) Thasp is angry
Had I correctly identified the insect as a bee I would have judged instead that:
(21) Thee is angry
The error in (20) is a misidentification of 'thee' for 'thasp'. The fact that (20) is
identification-free does not prevent this kind of misidentification from occurring.
17 The identity in question need not always be articulated; it might be possible to judge directly that
Smith is angry, but the truth of one's judgment would still rest on the truth of an identity.
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Some judgments are immune to the kind of misidentification just described.
Suppose that I acquire the true belief that there is just one wasp and one bee in the
room with me. Upon seeing an angry-looking insect I might then make a judgment
that:
(22) The wasp is angry
Given the background knowledge that there is only one wasp in the room a unique
reference can be picked out by the expression 'the wasp'. Unlike the reference of 'that
wasp' the reference of 'the wasp' cannot fail to be a wasp because it is picked out by
virtue of being the one and only wasp in the room. The second kind of
misidentification therefore cannot occur. This judgment, however, is identification-
dependent. For suppose that once again the insect which I saw was the bee rather than
the wasp. The expression 'the wasp' would not refer to the insect which I saw and my
judgment would therefore be in error through misidentification.
The terms 'thasp' and 'thee' could be given a dual use; as well as abbreviating
complex demonstratives they could also be used to abbreviate 'the wasp' and 'the bee'
respectively under the circumstances in which there is only one wasp and one bee
present. When they are used in this latter way the judgment:
(23) thasp is angry
has the same properties as (22); it is identification-dependent but is immune to the
second kind of error through misidentification because the associated predicate 'is a
wasp' has a stipulative rather than informative use. This is the exact opposite of the
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situation In which the word 'thasp' abbreviates the complex demonstrative 'that
wasp'."
Now, as implied above, it is not only judgments containing complex demonstratives
or descriptions which can possess the two different forms of IEM. Any judgment
whose object is identified using the same inforrpation upon which the judgment is
based is identification-free and any judgment whose object is identified by virtue of a
property which it possesses may be immune to the second form of error through
misidentification if the referring term has an intrinsic association with the property.
Let us therefore consider judgments expressed using the word 'here'. I suggest that
there are two different ways in which the place referred to by 'here' can be identified
by the thinker. I shall call these demonstrative and egocentric identifications. They are
analogous to the ways of identifying the reference associated with 'that wasp' and 'the
wasp' respectively and correspondingly 'here' -judgments can exhibit two different
kinds ofIEM.
Let us consider demonstrative identifications first. This means that the Way of
Referring to the place is demonstrative.l" Suppose, for example, that I see a wasp in
my vicinity. Assuming that the word 'here' can be used to refer to a region of space
which extends beyond the boundaries of my body, I might judge that:
(24) There is a wasp here
18 There are some connections between the distinction made here and the referentiaVattributive
distinction made by Donnellan (1966) with regard to definite descriptions. Donnellan's two versions
of 'Smith's murderer is insane' correspond to one case in which the reference is identified in virtue of
. fitting the description and another case in which it is identified perceptually and believed (mistakenly)
to be the item which fits the description. In the former case fitting the description is non-negotiable
but a judgment of identity with a perceived object would be informative. In the latter case the identity
with the perceived object is non-negotiable but fitting the description is not.
19 A demonstrative identification should not be confused with a use of the word 'here' as a
demonstrative as in the sentence 'Smith is here', said while pointing at a place on a map. On the
contrary, all of the uses of the word 'here' which I shall discuss are bound by the rule that the word
'here' refers to the place where the speaker is (or the thinker, if there is no utterance).
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When the identification is demonstrative the place referred to by 'here' is identified
perceptually using information received from any objects within the region referred to
as 'here', including the wasp itself. Judgments involving demonstrative identifications
of places are identification-free for exactly the same reason as judgments about 'that
wasp'. The stream of perceptual information upon which the judgment is based is also
used to identify the place which the judgment concerns. Consequently, when 'here' is
identified demonstratively it makes no sense to judge, based on the information
received from the place, that there is a wasp somewhere but to wonder whether there
is a wasp 'here'.
As with judgments expressed using 'that wasp' or 'thasp', however, identification-
freedom does not render 'here' -judgments involving demonstrative identifications
immune to a second kind of error through misidentification. In referring to a particular
place there is a fact of the matter about whether it is appropriate to use the word 'here'
rather than, for example, 'there'. Using the wrong term would be an error, one which
could reasonably be described as an error of misidentification. This contrasts with
simple demonstratives like 'that' whose use is much more flexible.r"
Now, mistaking 'thasp' for 'thee' (in their demonstrative use) would involve
mistaking the property of being a wasp for the property of being a bee. Mistaking
'here' for 'there', I suggest, would also involve an error in ascribing a property, but
this property is relational. The property is, of course, the one expressed by the
egocentric predicate associated with the indexical term. One uses the word 'here' in
referring to a place when one judges the place to be here, just as one would use the
word 'thasp' in referring to an insect when one judged it to be a wasp. An error
through misidentification of the second kind would result if a demonstratively
20 There may be a hint at the corresponding point for the first-person in Sydney Shoemaker's (1968,
pp. 558-9) pioneering discussion. Having noted that demonstratives exhibit the phenomenon of
identification-freedom to which Evans (1982) later drew attention, Shoemaker suggested that this is
not the same phenomenon that applies to the first-person. He based this claim upon certain differences
between demonstratives and the first-person, the main one of which is that whereas a demonstrative
does not have its reference fixed by any rule the reference of the word T is fixed for a given speaker.
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identified place was judged incorrectly to be here; the word 'here' would then be used
in error in referring to it. Although rare in practice, this kind of error can indeed occur.
If, in the example above, there was a distortion in the air between me and the wasp it
would be possible for the wasp to appear to be much nearer to me than it actually was,
due to the same kind of refractive effect that makes a swimming pool look shallower
than it really is. I would identify the place demonstratively but I would get the
egocentric predication wrong. Consequently if I judged that 'there is a wasp here',
although I could be correct in judging that there was a wasp at the place which I
identified demonstratively using information received from objects including the wasp I
could be incorrect in referring to that place as 'here'.
Egocentric identifications differ from demonstrative identifications in the fact that
they involve stipulating, rather than judging, that the egocentric predicate applies. In
other words, the place referred to as 'here' is identified using either a descriptive or
recognitional Way of Referring by virtue of being the place which uniquely possesses
the egocentric property of being 'here'. This corresponds to the way in which the
property of being a wasp is used to identify the reference of 'the wasp' or 'thasp' in the
second kind of example discussed above. We need not, of course, assume that the
thought is descriptive in form just because the Way of Referring may be descriptive
(similarly there is no need to assume that 'thasp' -judgments must be descriptive;
'thasp' could be a directly referring term involving a descriptive Way of Referring).
I suggest that just as the word 'thasp' can be used in expressing judgments
involving either of the two different ways of identifying its reference, so the word
'here' can be used to express judgments involving either demonstrative or egocentric
identifications of a place, depending on the situation. Demonstrative identifications, for
example, allow places to be kept track of while the thinker moves about. They allow
someone to look at a place some distance away, wonder whether it is warm there, then
go to the place using an ongoing perceptual information link to home in on it, and
finally think 'ah yes, it is warm here'. An egocentric identification, on the other hand,
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allows someone to entertain 'here' -thoughts whilst in sensory deprivation. This duality
does not, however, imply a dual linguistic function of the word 'here'. No matter how
the thinker identifies the reference, the use of the word 'here' is still governed by the
rule that it refers to the place where the speaker is.
In case it should appear tempting to think thatthe identification of 'here' is always
egocentric and that what I have been calling a demonstrative identification of the place
referred to as 'here' is really a case in which a demonstratively identified place is
judged to be identical to the egocentrically identified place referred to as 'here', recall
the response to an equivalent objection given above." In order to judge that the
demonstratively identified place was identical to the egocentrically identified place it
would be necessary to judge that the demonstratively identified place was here; the two
places would then be identified because they both possessed the same egocentric
property. But in that case the demonstrative identification would have to go together
with an egocentric predication anyway and this makes the assumption that there must
always be an egocentric identification superfluous. In any case, if the objection were
correct then 'here' -judgments would never be identification-free (given that, as I shall
argue, judgments based on egocentric identifications are identification-dependent), yet
there is surely a strong intuition that in a great many cases the word 'here' refers to a
region of space which is identified demonstratively without any need for an
identification with a place identified in some other way.
Now, when a place is identified egocentrically judgments about it are immune to the
mis-ascription of egocentric predicates because the place is identified by virtue of the
fact that it has the egocentric property. Such judgments are thus analogous to
judgments about 'the wasp' rather than 'that wasp'. By the same token, however, they
are not identification-free. The perception of a place normally affords an independent
demonstrative identification of it even when the reference of 'here' is determined
21 See section 6.2, above, in which the 'subject-term' version of the theory of indexical thought was
refuted.
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egocentrically. Consequently, if there is a refractive illusion like the one described
above the egocentrically identified place will not be identical to the demonstratively
identified place, even though both places appear to the thinker to have the egocentric
property 'here' (one place will have this property, the other one will not). Error
through misidentification can therefore occur. There are, of course, certain cases in
which the perception of a place does not afford a genuine demonstrative identification
of it at all; for examplewhen the subject is unknowingly looking at an image of a place
relayed through virtual reality spectacles. In such cases it is not possible for the
judgment to be in error through the falsity of an identity statement 'that place = here'.
Even in these cases, however, it makes sense to judge that there is a wasp somewhere
but to wonder whether there is a wasp here.
Evans (1982, pp. 179-191), in his discussion of IBM, places a restriction on the
phenomenon such that it only occurs when the subject is taking it for granted that the
perceptual information upon which the judgment is based is being received in the
'normal' way, not through unnatural media such as virtual reality spectacles or, in
Evans's example, undetected headphones which relay sounds from another place. In
this section of his work Evans seems to assume that 'here' -judgments always involve
what is, in effect, an egocentric identification of the reference yet he nevertheless
claims that such judgments are identification-free. This, if I understand correctly, is
because he takes it for granted that an egocentric identification of a place always
correctly picks out the place from which the perceptual information is received except
in cases in which the information is not received in the 'normal' way. But as we have
seen, even in 'normal' cases there can be two independent identifications of a place,
one egocentric, the other demonstrative, which can come apart when there are
refractions." It follows that in normal cases judgments involving an egocentric
22 Evans's error is hidden by the fact that his examples involve proximal sensory modalities such as
touch, for which no perceptual distortion analogous to refraction is possible.
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identification of a place are never identification-free. There is always some identity of
the form:
(25) here (identified egocentrically) = here (identified demonstratively)
such that the identity could in principle be false, and if it were false the judgment about
the place would be in error through misidentification. Evans tries to exclude cases in
which the identity would be false by definition; but if this definition were extended to
cover even cases of refraction the resulting claim about identification-freedom would
surely be a rather trivial one (error would simply be being ruled out by definition).
To summarise, judgments expressible using the word 'here' can be based on two
different ways of picking out a place, and to these there correspond two different kinds
of IBM. 'Here' -judgments involving a demonstrative identification have in common
with 'that wasp' -judgments that they are identification-free but not immune to a kind
of misidentification which involves the mis-ascription of a certain predicate. 'Here'-
judgments involving an egocentric identification, by contrast, are analogous to 'the
wasp' -judgments in that they are immune to errors in the predication, but if they are
based on perceptual information they are not identification-free.
Let us now consider whether the conclusions drawn for 'here' -judgments can be
extended to other indexical terms. With regard to temporal indexicals it is possible, at
least in principle, to distinguish demonstrative identifications of a time from egocentric
identifications, although it has to be admitted that demonstrative identifications
probably occur very rarely in practice. Whereas demonstrative identifications of places
depend on the perception of objects demonstrative identifications of times depend on
the perception of events. Most perceived events occur at the present time.
Consequently demonstrative identification can normally occur only with indexicals
which refer to the present time, such as 'now' . A time which is identified
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demonstratively via a witnessed event is almost always correctly judged to have the
property expressed by the egocentric predicate 'is now'.
This is a consequence of the fact that one's perceptions normally concern events in
one's vicinity. When an observed event is further away, however, the time that the
information takes to travel becomes a factor. Imagine looking into the night sky and
seeing a star explode. The explosion may have taken place many years previously but
someone who was unaware of the time that light takes to travel across interstellar
distances might think that the explosion was occurring at the present time. This is very
much like the case of refraction discussed above for spatial indexicals. Someone in this
position might judge that:
(26) A star is exploding now
If, however, the time was identified demonstratively via a demonstrative identification
of the event then the associated egocentric predication 'is now' would be in error. If,
on the other hand, the time was identified egocentrically (by virtue of being uniquely
now) then the judgment would be in error through a misidentification of the time (such
judgments, as in the spatial case, are not identification-free but are susceptible to errors
in which the egocentrically identified time is not identical to the demonstratively
identifiable time at which the event occurs).
Let us now consider the first-person. I cannot possibly do justice here to all of the
issues that the first-person raises and I shall have to leave many questions unanswered.
It is, however, possible to make some tentative suggestions based on what has been
said about 'here' - and 'now' -judgments. Let us assume that there are judgments in
which the first-person cannot be used in error. Now, no one else can use the first-
person correctly in referring to me; therefore no one else can have access to a way of
making a judgment about me such that the first-person cannot be used in error. We
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must therefore consider whether there can be a way of making a judgment about a
person which is only available to that person.
There is relatively little information about a person which is available only to that
person. There are ways in which other people can find out about one's physical states
and in many cases one's mental states as well. There are, however, ways of gaining
information about oneself that are not available to other people. If I judge that 'I have
an empty stomach' there are various ways in which someone else could also acquire
the information that I have an empty stomach. But whereas anyone could acquire this
information by looking at an X-ray only I could acquire it by feeling that my stomach
was empty. It is, of course, apparent to me whether or not I am acquiring information
about myself in one of these privileged ways; I perceive that someone's stomach is
empty but there is something about the way in which the information is received that
differentiates the person in question from all others. It therefore seems reasonable to
suppose that receiving information in a privileged way leads me to predicate something
of the person about whom the judgment is made, This predication is, of course,
egocentric; there is an egocentric predicate 'is me', which picks out the relation of
identity between the person referred to and myself, though I would have to understand
the predicate as monadic in order to avoid circularity.
Those judgments which are made 'on the basis of a privileged way of acquiring
information are, as a matter of fact, the ones which are commonly held to be immune
to error through misidentification relative to the first-person. Now, if it were
impossible ever to receive information about another person through one of the
privileged channels just mentioned then it would indeed be impossible for a sincere use
of the first-person to be inappropriate. It should be noted, however, that this is
consistent with either a demonstrative or an egocentric identification of the first-
person. Each type of identification would make one type of error through
misidentification logically. impossible but would leave the other kind of error possible
at least in principle. Consider demonstrative identification. It is perhaps debatable
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whether information received in the privileged ways mentioned above always affords a
genuine demonstrative identification of a person. If it did afford such an identification,
however, then the judgment would be identification-free. The thinker would judge the
person identified to have the egocentric property of being 'me' as a result of the way in
which the information was acquired. But if the information actually came from
someone else then the predication would be in error.
On the other hand, and perhaps more plausibly in most cases, the person could be
identified egocentrically by virtue of satisfying the egocentric predicate 'is me'. This
would make it impossible to mis-ascribe the egocentric predicate but the judgment
would not be identification-free. It would be susceptible in principle to error through
the falsity of an identify between the egocentrically identified thinker and the
demonstratively identifiable source of the perceptual information who appeared,
falsely, to possess the egocentric property 'me'. Since in practice information received
in the privileged ways normally concerns the thinker, error through misidentification
does not normally occur. But this is not a logical immunity to error; it is an immunity
which rests upon a contingency about the way in which information about people is
acquired.
6.7 I am here now
Among the reasons why Kaplan drew the kontent/character distinction was the need to
be able to deal with a phenomenon illustrated by the sentence:
(27) I am here now
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Kaplan (1989, p. 509) claims that anyone who understands this sentence knows that it
cannot be uttered falsely; it can, in other words, be known a priori. Yet the following
sentence (where the symbol '0' implies necessity (truth in all possible worlds)) is false:
(28) 0 I am here now
It is a contingency that I am here now; I could have been somewhere else. It must
therefore be explained how it is possible to know a contingent truth a priori. The
kontent/character distinction offers some apparatus with which to deal with this. It is
the character of the terms which make up (27) that makes it knowable a priori, for the
combination of characters is such as to always pick out a true kontent (the combined
character can, of course, pick out different kontents in different contexts but they are
always true kontents). Yet the kontent thus picked out is the same as that of certain
other sentences such as:
(29) SP is in Coventry at 2.00 pm on 17th July 2001
This sentence is clearly contingent. So on Kaplan's account it is the kontent which is
contingent and the character which makes the truth of the sentence knowable a priori.
I have rejected Kaplan's kontent/character distinction insofar as it applies to
thoughts. I need not reject it as a purely linguistic matter. It would be possible, for
example, to question why the sentence (27) always expresses a truth given that the
truth in question is contingent. Kaplan's approach may be a perfectly acceptable way
of answering this. But if (27) is knowable a priori this must be accounted for at the
level of thought. Consider, for example, someone who utters (27) without
understanding its meaning. Such a person has uttered a truth just in virtue of the
linguistic characters of the terms from which the sentence is composed. But such a
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person does not understand the thought expressed by (27) and therefore cannot know
this truth a priori. The latter must be explained at a different level.
Now, since I reject Inferential Role Semantics I cannot account for the a priori
nature of (27) in terms of the inferential relations between the different indexicals. I
certainly cannot account for the a priori nature of (27) in terms of it being analytic
because I reject analyticity. I can, however, account for it by considering the role of
egocentric predication in (27). There are two cases which we must consider:
demonstrative and egocentric identifications of the reference.
Firstly, suppose that' the references of,!" 'here' and 'now' were identified
demonstratively." I have already admitted that this is likely to be only rarely the case
for 'now' and perhaps 'I', but it is at least possible in principle. After thinking (27),
upon moving away from the place while keeping track of it, it would be possible to
think:
(30) I was there a moment ago
The terms 'I', 'there' and 'a moment ago' could express the same singular modes of
presentation as were expressed by 'I', 'here' and 'now' in (27). Furthermore if we
were to accept that egocentric predicates are not strictly part of the thought expressed
(though in section 6.5 it was suggested that this might not be the case) then it would
follow that (30) could express the very same thought as (27). Yet (30) is by no means
knowable a priori.
In fact if the references of the indexical terms are identified demonstratively then
even (27) is not strictly knowable a priori. For in principle it may be false. Suppose that
the reference of 'now' is identified in virtue of being the time at which a star is seen to
explode. Given that this would actually have occurred in the distant past the thought
23 I shall consider only cases in which the identifications are all demonstrative or all egocentric; it will
be clear from this how cases in which there is a mixture of the two can be treated.
The Role of Egocentricity in Indexical Thought 189
expressed by (27) would be false. (27) is only guaranteed to be true when there is no
possibility of the indexical terms being used inappropriately, and this was shown in the
previous section never to be entirely the case when there is a demonstrative
identification of the reference.
This error would not be likely to occur in practice. As I have said, I do not suggest
that the references of 'I' and 'now' are normally identified demonstratively (I suggest
only that there are circumstances in which they could be identified in this way). And
although I do suggest that demonstrative identifications of 'here' are common it does
not appear that there are 'many cases in which I could be mistaken in thinking that I am
located within the region which I refer to as 'here'. In cases of refraction like the one
described above, for example, although the region referred to as 'here' is not co-
extensive with the region which has the egocentric property 'here' I am nonetheless
located within the relevant region (within both regions, in fact). I cannot think of a
refractive illusion in which this would not be the case, though such an illusion might be
possible. The only kind of spatial illusion I can think of in which (27) would come out
false would be the 'virtual reality' kind. I could, for example, be unknowingly wearing
virtual reality spectacles and could think that 'I am here now' where 'here' referred
demonstratively to the place which I perceived. It might, however, be necessary to rule
out cases like this; firstly for Evans's reason that the information is not received in the
'normal' way and secondly because it is not clear that it is possible to demonstratively
identify a region of space in this way at all. It could very well be argued that a
'conceptual element' would be needed in such an identification, just as it is when one
identifies a place seen on a television screen. If one does not know that one is looking
at a screen one does not identify the place.
If illusions could be ruled out, however, then even with a demonstrative
identification one could, after all, know (27) a priori. This is because of the relations
between the egocentric predications. This becomes clearer in the case in which '1',
'here' and 'now' are all identified egocentrically. Egocentric identification makes the
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egocentric predications 'is me', 'is here' and 'is now' immune to error because, as
described above, the reference is identified by virtue of satisfying those predicates.
Now, if we assume once again Gust for simplicity) that the egocentric predicates are
not part of the thought expressed by (27) then the thought expressed by (27) is of the
form:
(31) S is at place p at time t
This would be the same thought that is expressed by (30)_24As with Kaplan's account
there is something common to (27) and (30) and it is this common element which is
contingent; but on this account what is common to (27) and (30) is a Fregean thought
rather than a kontent. Where (27) and (30) differ is in the associated egocentric
predication rather than in their Kaplanian character; and it is this which makes (27), but
not (30), knowable a priori.
The egocentric predication makes (27) knowable, a priori because of the relations
which a thinker ordinarily knows to hold between the egocentric properties 'me',
'here' and 'now'. In particular, a thinker ordinarily knows that if a place is 'here' then
it is 'where I am now' (the 'I' and 'now' imply the egocentric predications 'is me' and
'is now'). It is not obvious that someone who grasped only the monadic form of the
predicate 'is here' would know this but I assume that ordinary thinkers (anyone likely
to reflect on the nature of (27» grasp the relational predicate as well. Consequently
someone who thinks (27) can infer that it is true if and only if:
(32) I am now where I am now
24 If we drop the assumption that the egocentric predicate is not part of the thought expressed then
(27) and (30) express different thoughts. The account would become slightly more complicated, but I
hope it will be clear that these complications do not invalidate the account.
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Clearly this is always true and its form makes it knowable a priori.
Incidentally it is worth noting that the terms'!', 'here' and 'now' are not inter-
definable. Although no one would suggest that understanding each of these terms
consists entirely in understanding its relation to the other two (this would obviously be
circular) there may nevertheless be a temptation to assume that given the reference of
any two of these terms it is always possible to determine the reference of the third.
This is not true. It is true that 'here' always refers to 'the place where I am now', and I
have appealed to this in explaining how (27) can be known a priori. This one relation
between'!', 'here' and "now' is sufficient for that purpose. But it is not true, for
example, that the reference of 'now' is 'the time at which I am here' (because I may be
here at many different times) and neither is it true that the reference of 'I' is 'the
person who is now here'. The latter is because it is possible (logically, even ifnot in the
actual world) for more than one person to be at a single place." If I believed that I
lived in a world where more than one person could occupy a place then I would not
imagine that I could identify myself as 'the person Who is now here'. Yet intuitively
there seems to be no reason to imagine that my indexical thinking would be any
different in such a world to the way it is in the actual world.
6.8 Rip van Winkle
I shall finish by briefly discussing the example with which Kaplan began the recent
discussions of cognitive dynamics:
Suppose that yesterday you said, and believed it, 'It is a nice day today'. What does it mean
to say, today, that you have retained that belief? It seems unsatisfactory to just believe the
same content under any old character - where is the retention? You can 't believe that content
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under the same character. Is there some obvious standard adjustment to make to the
character, for example, replacing today with yesterday? If so, then a person like Rip van
Winkle, who loses track of time, can't retain any such beliefs. This seems strange (1989, pp.
537-8).
Rip van Winkle falls asleep and wakes up years later thinking that only a day has
passed. Kaplan's theory implies that Rip fails to retain his belief because when he
thinks 'yesterday was fine' the wrong day is referred to (because the character of
'yesterday' picks out the previous day, not the day on which Rip fell asleep). Kaplan
expresses this as a worry; Evans (1985, p. 311) dismisses the worry, arguing that there
is nothing more strange about the idea of someone losing a belief by losing track of
time than there is in the idea that a belief about an object could be lost by losing track
of the object.
John Perry (1997), who adopts Kaplan's kontentlcharacter distinction at the level of
both language and thought (he speaks of 'doxastic characters' for the latter), argues
that Kaplan and Evans are both wrong to think that Rip cannot retain his belief
When he awakes... Rip updates his belief according to his view of how the context has
changed. His view about the change of c~ntext is mistaken, and the new character, 'Yesterday
[the day before the day of this thought] was nice' is not a way of believing the original
content. But that is no reason to say that Rip has lost his original belief. He retains it under
various other backup characters (1997, p. 36).
Among the 'backup characters' which Rip might use to retain the belief, Perry lists
'[the day I remember], and '[the day this belief was acquired]'. Now, although I do not
accept the kontent/character distinction at the level of thought because of the
difficulties it faces in dealing with cognitive dynamics Perry's view has certain things in
25 See Appendix B on the possibility of interpenetration of physical objects.
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common with my own. The major difference is that Perry thinks that Rip can only
retain the kontent of his belief; the fact that it is retained under a different character
makes it a different psychological entity. I, by contrast, hold that Rip could, in
principle, retain the very same Fregean thought. Whereas, for Perry, the retention of
kontent requires backup characters on my view. the retention of a thought requires
backup Ways of Referring. But Ways of Referring are not strictly part of the thought,
even though in some cases they are part of the subject's overall psychological state.
Suppose that on the day on which he fell asleep Rip was able to identify the day not
only egocentrically but also as, for example, the day on which a tornado was sighted
near the town (assume that tornadoes are very rare in Rip's part of the world, so that
this fact picks out a unique day during Rip's lifetime). When Rip wakes up he may
assume that a day has passed and may therefore assume that the day he remembers can
be identified as 'the day before today'. This is, of course, an error, just as Perry says.
So long as Rip persists in this belief then he is surely in a confused state in which there
is no unique day that he is thinking about when he says 'yesterday was nice'. But
suppose he discovers that he has been asleep for longer than a day. Now his thought
can become clear again, because he can identify the day as 'the day on which a tornado
was sighted near the town' and dispense with the idea that it is also 'the day before
today'. I see no reason why we cannot regard this as the retention of Rip's original
thought. If no alternative Ways of Referring are available, however, Rip really does
lose track of the thought. 26
26 Some of Perry's examples of backup characters strike me as unable to satisfy Russell's Principle
(just knowing that a day is the day I remember does not identify it adequately) but they are clearly
supposed to perform the same identifying function as Ways of Referring. I assume he adopts these
examples because they would always be available to Rip; whereas I, by contrast, think that there is
only a possibility, rather than a guarantee, that Rip will be able to retain the thought using a backup
Way of Referring.
APPENDIXC
An Argument for the Tenseless Theory of Time
I have argued that thoughts expressed using temporal indexicalsinvolve or manifest an
egocentric predication such as 'is now' or 'is past'. This is predicated of the time being
thought about. It is possible, however, to dispute whether these predicates are really
egocentric. The A-theory or 'tensed' theory of time says that the A-series of
McTaggart's (1908) famous argument is real. This means that the properties picked
out by terms like past, present and future, which are known in the literature as 'tenses',
are mind-independent properties of times (and are therefore not egocentric).
Consequently on this view the 'flow' or 'passage' of time is a feature of mind-
independent reality. The B-theory or 'tenseless' theory says the opposite, that tenses
have no mind-independent reality and that the apparent flow of time is merely
psychological. Only the B-theory is consistent with the theory that tensed properties
are egocentric.
Debates between A- and B-theorists have continued with increasing intensity in
recent years.IMany of these debates have concerned the nature of temporal indexicals
(and, in particular, whether they can be construed in a way which avoids McTaggart's
paradox). Since these debates have become quite complex it would be useful to have
an argument which settled the question about tense independently of questions about
the functioning of indexical terms. This would settle the question as to whether the
temporal predicates which I claim to be associated with temporal indexicals are
egocentric without the need to become embroiled in further debates about tensed
thought. It would not be a problem if the A-theory were correct; the theory of
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indexical thoughts could simply be adjusted so that in the temporal case the predicates
are not egocentric. Fortunately, however, I have an argument against the A-theory
which does not depend on assumptions about temporal indexicals. I shall go through it
in outline then explain it in more detail.
The argument, in a nutshell, is as follows. Experience provides each of us with a
strong intuitive impression that time flows. The A-theorist takes this as a reflection of
the fact that time really does flow. But on any physicalist or supervenience theory of
the mind the nature of experience is determined entirely by the physical state of the
world - experience could not be different unless the physical state of the world were
different. Now our understanding of the role of time in physical science suggests that
the putative flow of time has no role in determining the physical state of the world. It
follows from this that the flow of time could have no role in determining the nature of
experience. The impression that time flows thus arises quite independently of the
putative real flow of time. Consequently the nature of temporal experience provides no
reason to posit a real flow of time; and I shall argue that it follows in tum that there
can be no a priori reason either. I shall now go through each step of this argument in
detail.
It appears to be common ground among most A- and B-theorists that experience
provides a strong intuitive impression that time flows. This is often assumed to favour
the A-theory; for it seems to be implicitly assumed that the A-theory can account for
the way time seems to flow by appealing to the supposed fact that it really does flow.
A certain onus is placed instead on the B-theorists to account for the temporal features
of experience in a way which is consistent with their denial that the flow of time is real.
Thus L. Nathan Oaklander remarks that:
1 For book-length defences of the A- and B-theories see Smith 1993 and Mellor 1998 respectively. For
further relevant examples of current debates see the papers collected in Oaklander and Smith 1994
and also Le Poidevin 1998.
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Regardless of how many arguments Mellor, Smart, I, and other defenders of the tenseless
theory offer, we will never persuade tensers to abandon their view unless we can explain
those features of our experience of time that seem to require that time be tensed. It is an
impression deeply felt by all of us that time, or events in time, flow from the far future to the
near future and then, after shining in the spotlight of the NOW or present moment,
"
immediately recede into the more and more distant past. But does this impression reflect a
basic truth about time? (Oaklander and Smith 1994, p. 289).
Accounting for the temporal features of experience certainly poses a difficult and
important task for the B-theory. But the A-theory owes us an account of these features
of experience too - one which shows how the putative real flow of time can be a factor
in determining the nature of temporal experience. I shall argue that no such account is
possible.
The reason why the A-theorist's task is impossible is that the flow of time, as it is
normally construed, couldn't cause the kinds of things it would have to cause in order
for it to have a role in explaining why temporal experience is the way it is. The features
of experience that give the impression that time flows are part of the way things seem
to the subject; they are not merely relational states. That is to say, the kind of temporal
experience that we have could not consist in merely experiencing times which are as a
matter of fact tensed because the putative tenses show up in the way things seem to the
subject. Now on any physicalist or supervenience theory of the mind the way things
seem to the subject is determined by some aspect of the brain state; consequently if
there are such things as mind-independent tenses they must have a role in determining
brain states.
However only certain kinds of things can have a role in determining brain states.
The brain is a part of the physical world and the succession of its states is determined
by the physics of the brain and its environment. If someone were isolated within a
closed environment then in principle the physics of the system comprising the brain and
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its environment would determine the subsequent states of the brain and thus the
experiential states of the subject. Even if a physicist could not predict these states in
practice, and even allowing for quantum indeterminacy and the like, the system would
still evolve in accordance with the laws of physics and nothing else.
Now the laws of physics do not require that time flows. The mathematical equations
which describe the evolution of a system over time contain a variable t for time, into
which one can substitute arbitrary values to determine the state of the system at a given
time. The notion of flow does not enter the picture at all. Physics does of course
require there to be a temporal ordering (a B-series) and the position of a given event in
this ordering can be relevant in determining its effects. But this position is relevant only
because it is relative to other events; the absolute temporal locations determined by the
tensed properties of an A-series have no such role in determining physical states.
Although in the past some writers have thought that the tenseless nature of physical
laws was alone sufficient to refute the A-theory, that is not the argument to be given
here.' Moreover it is of course necessary to use tensed vocabulary when applying
physical laws in practice; there will be statements like 'it is now three o'clock and the
system is in state SI; the laws of physics show that the system will be in state S2 five
minutes after it is in state SI, so it will be in state S2 five minutes from now'. But what
matters for the present argument is just that no tensed properties have a role in
determining the states SI and S2 themselves; they are the same physical states no
matter whether they occur in the past, present or future.
These considerations make it clear that if there were such a thing as the flow of time
it would have no role in determining brain states and consequently it would have no
role in determining the nature of experience. The impression that time flows thus arises
quite independently of whether or not it really flows. This is not to suggest that the
putative flow of time must be construed as altogether impotent. All that need be said is
that the flow of time would be powerless to cause the sorts of things it would have to
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cause in order to be experienced. Or, to put it in a way which avoids mentioning
causation at all, the flow of time can have no role in determining the nature of temporal
experience because it plays no role in determining brain states. The argument does not
say that we should reject the existence of anything which cannot exert causal influence
on us; it applies only to what is reflected in experience.
There is a useful analogy between the present argument and a certain argument
against those theories in the philosophy of mind which posit epiphenomenal qualia.
Epiphenomenal qualia are supposed to be features of consciousness which give our
experiences the particular subjective qualities they have. But although the putative
epiphenomenal qualia are effects - they are caused by states of the brain - they
themselves have no effects in the physical world whatever, and consequently are
missed out by physical descriptions of the world.
Daniel Dennett points out what is wrong with this view In Consciousness
Explained: 3
Suppose that Otto insists that he (for one) has epiphenomenal qualia. Why does he say this?
Not because they have some effect on him, somehow guiding him or alerting him as he makes
his avowals. By the very definition of epiphenomena (in the philosophical sense), Otto's
heartfelt avowals that he has epiphenomena could not be evidence for himself or anyone else
that he does have them, since he would be saying exactly the same thing even ifhe didn't have
them (Dennett 1991, pp. 402-3).
Consequently we cannot have any evidence for the existence of epiphenomenal qualia,
and there seems no sensible option but to reject them. I suggest that we can regard the
. flow of time as similarly epiphenomenal. Our avowals that time seems to flow can be
no evidence that it does flow, for we would be saying the same things even ifit did not.
2 See for instance Russell 1940 and Grunbaum 1967.
3 Dennett's argument follows those of I. Fox (1989) and G. Harman (1990).
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I have shown that experience would be just the way it is even on the assumption
that there is no real flow of time. Since experience thus provides no support for the A-
theory, it seems in order to reject it. But perhaps the A-theorist will now claim that
there are arguments in favour of the A-theory which do not appeal to features of
experience, and which are thus immune to the above criticisms. If the above
considerations are accepted, however, any such a priori arguments would face a
formidable difficulty. The problem would be to make clear just what was being
claimed. Given the above arguments, the a priori A-theorist would have to accept that
whatever the putative A-properties are, they have nothing to do with what is reflected
in experience. Itwould therefore be necessary to find suitable terms with which to refer
to these putative A-properties. But I took as a starting point the fact that experience
provides a strong impression that time flows. We can of course report on this using
tensed vocabulary (as Oaklander does when he uses the words 'past', 'present' and
'future' in the quotation above). Consequently the normal tensed vocabulary is
unavailable to the A-theorist because it is already in use to describe what is reflected in
experience, which it has already been accepted has nothing to do with A-properties.
This implies that any intrinsic properties of times posited by an a priori argument can
have nothing to do with pastness, presentness or futurity. So nothing recognisable as
the A-theory can be salvaged.
Carnap and others used to reject as 'metaphysics' anything which could not be
reduced to experience. It is important to see that the present argument, by contrast,
concerns only that which is reflected in experience. It shows that given a physicalist or
supervenience theory of the mind nothing that is reflected in experience can belong
within the realm of metaphysics. The dualism of the A- and B-series, like the Cartesian
dualism of mental and physical substance, comes unstuck through a combination of the
impossibility of explaining how the two sides could interact and the unintelligibility of
claiming that they do not. A modem understanding of the place of the mind in the
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natural world thus shows the flow of time to be nothing more than a last imaginary
ghost in nature's machinery.
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